Tag Archives: Asset allocation

05.07.26
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Unique Liabilities Require A Unique Solution

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Most pension plans have exposure to fixed income. Perhaps not as much as they did prior to 2000, but today’s common thinking is that the current exposure is enough to act as a buffer should equity markets not continue along this momentum fueled path, and finally, to support the monthly liquidity needs of the fund. But are those the right reasons to use bonds and what type of fixed income should be used to accomplish those objectives?

We observe that most funds use a variety of investment grade bonds (Treasuries, Agencies, Corporates, etc.) and they have that collection benchmarked to a generic index such as the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Index (a.k.a. the Agg). As a reminder, the Agg was created by Ron Ryan when he was Head of Research at Lehman Brothers a few years ago. But, again, is this the right approach? We at Ryan ALM, Inc. believe that bonds should only be used for their cash flows (principal and interest) and not as a performance driver. Bonds are perhaps the only asset class with a known cash flow equal to the value at maturity (PAR) and contractual interest payments. Those known cash flows can be modeled to meet the plan’s ongoing liability cash flows (benefits + expenses). 

Which brings me to the point that every pension plan’s liabilities are unique, and as such, no generic index such as the Agg could possibly match a plan’s liabilities. If the asset cash flows don’t match and fund the liability cash flows (benefits and expenses), the plan is subject to unnecessary interest rate risk. Again, given that every pension plan has a unique set of liabilities this would suggest that each pension plan needs to have an investment strategy created specifically for their cash flow needs. Cash Flow Matching (CFM) is an investment strategy with a very long and successful history. An appropriately crafted CFM portfolio will meet and fully fund chronologically the liability cash flows as far into the future as the allocation to the CFM strategy lasts.

We take great pride in our proprietary CFM optimization modeling, which we began using at Ryan ALM’s founding in 2004. Having the ability to tailor unique solutions to client specific issues/requests is a hallmark of our firm, and this capability is being recognized throughout the industry. In fact, we recently received this feedback from an ALM expert at a large asset/liability consulting firm, who stated that I’m “impressed with the team’s ability to build portfolios for such non-standard cashflow streams.” Thank you!

We’d be happy to demonstrate our capability and we’re always willing to provide a free analysis highlighting how your fund could benefit through CFM and Ryan ALM’s expertise. Just call us.

05.04.26
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Why Wouldn’t You Prefer a SD of +/-0%?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I continue to be surprised that more pension plans don’t embrace greater certainty in the management of their funds. The Iran War is leading to great uncertainty related to inflation, interest rates, and economic growth. Yes, U.S. equities have enjoyed a healthy recovery following the initial outbreak in the Middle East, but is that sustainable?

Callan does a good job of providing a regular review of what asset allocation would be necessary to achieve a 7% return and the risk (measured as standard deviation) to achieve that return objective. Callan indicated that it was very easy to achieve a 7% return all the way back in 1994 when U.S. interest rates were higher than they are today. In fact, an allocation of 85% to fixed income and small allocations to L.C. equity, SC equity, and int’l stocks would have produced a 7% return with only a 5.6% annual standard deviation.

However, in the most recent update from 2024, Callan suggests the following asset allocation is necessary to achieve a 7% return:

This means that 68% of the time, a plan sponsor should expect an annual return of 7% +/- 8.6%. At two standard deviations (95% of the observations or 19/20 years), the annual return will fall between +/- 17.2% of the 7% target. Would you be comfortable knowing that your fund could generate an annual return of -10.2%? Think about the impact a return like that would have on contributions?

What if I said that cash flow matching (CFM) a portion of your pension fund would result in those assets having an annual SD of 0% barring a default which occurs at a rate of 0.18% annually among investment grade corporate bonds for the last 40-years. How’s that possible? When CFM is implemented, the plan’s asset cash flows and matched agains the plan’s liability cash flows (benefits and expenses). They mover in lockstep with each other no matter where rates go. Today’s U.S. interest environment is attractive and getting more attractive as I write this post, as the 30-year Treasury bond yield has topped 5% (5.02% at 11:47 am DST). Higher rates are great for CFM, as they lower the present value of those future promises.

Furthermore, the use of a CFM portfolio secures the pension promises, dramatically improves plan liquidity, eliminates interest rate risk for the portion of the plan, extends the investing horizon for the residual plan assets, and reduces the cost of those future pension promises. Again, why wouldn’t you embrace an element of certainty?

I’m not sure what the Callan team would identify as the proper allocation to achieve a 7% return today, but I suspect that the annual standard deviation is greater than the 8.6% from 2024. Every time a pension plan falls short of the annual ROA, contributions must increase to make up for the shortfall. Greater investment certainty, like that associated with using CFM, reduces the likelihood that the pension plan sponsor with suffer from a negative surprise associate from increased contributions.

05.01.26
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Is Now Really the Time to Buy Stocks?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

U.S. equity markets enjoyed a robust April despite myriad economic and geopolitical inputs that might have given investors pause. Should equity investors remain bullish at this time? The graph below caught my attention primarily because of the recent disconnect between the two lines related to the Shiller Excess Cape Yield (ECY) and subsequent 10-year Real Return for equities. There are many, many valuation tools that claim to provide clues about the future direction of stocks, and this is such an example. Those tools can be short-, medium-, and long-term in nature. The ECY happens to be one valuation metric that provides “guidance” for longer time frames. The current reading of 1.60% certainly looks rich relative to its long history.

In case you don’t know, the Shiller excess CAPE yield is a valuation measure that compares the stock market’s earnings yield with the “real” yield on the 10-year Treasury note. In simple terms, it asks how much extra return stocks may offer over inflation-adjusted government bonds.

How it is calculated

  • Take the inverse of the CAPE ratio, which is the market’s “earnings yield.”
  • Subtract the real 10-year Treasury yield.

So, ECY=(1/CAPE)−10-year real Treasury yield

A higher excess CAPE yield suggests stocks might look more attractive relative to bonds. A lower reading suggests the equity risk premium is thinner, meaning stocks offer less return versus bonds. As mentioned above, current readings show the S&P 500 Shiller Excess CAPE Yield around 1.60% for April 2026, which is well below its long-term average of 4.60%. Another data source put it at 1.41 as of April 30, 2026.

Investors have historically used the ECY as a long-term asset allocation tool, especially when comparing stocks with Treasury bonds. It is not a short-term trading signal, but rather a rough guide to whether equities look cheap or expensive relative to real bond yields. A CAPE yield below 2% has generally signaled subdued future equity returns over the next 5 to 10 years, providing a valuation warning sign, and not an exact measure.

As a reminder, there are many valuation techniques used to identify opportunities and risk when investing in U.S. equities. Depending on a pension plan’s liquidity needs, funded ratio, willingness to take risk, etc. today’s current environment may be providing an opportunity to reduce risk by trimming equities and using the proceeds along with core fixed income assets to establish a cash flow matching mandate. In the process, the plan’s liquidity is improved, promised benefits secured, and the investing horizon extended for the residual assets. Give us a call. We are always willing to provide a free analysis showcasing how CFM can help your fund.

04.16.26
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Pension Game: Find the Liabilities?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I can remember as a child playing the games hide-and-seek and manhunt among myriad activities with my friends in Palisades Park. We would play for hours. It was particularly exciting as daylight waned just before we were beckoned home when the streetlights flicked on.

Those games were innocent and most of the time no one got hurt. However, Ron Ryan, Ryan ALM’s Chairman, has written about another game. In this competition, he’s challenging pension professionals to “find the liabilities”. Why? Unfortunately, most of the effort put forth by pension professionals (outside of actuaries) is focused on assets: the allocation, manager selection, and performance. But is that the correct approach? Of course not.

The only reason that a pension plan exists is because of a promise that has been made to the plan participant. Pre-funding that promise through a pension system is a most effective approach to meeting those future obligations. As a result, that promise needs to be the focal point of pension management, but it rarely is. Unfortunately, most folks think that managing a pension is all about returns. How has the fund performed relative to the return on asset (ROA) assumption.

As Ron points out in this excellent piece, if all the investment managers/strategies outperform their generic asset specific benchmarks, but the total fund underperforms its liability growth rate, has the fund won? Of course not. That’s why we believe that the primary objective in managing a DB pension plan should be to SECURE the promises at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk.

As I mentioned earlier, the games that I engaged in as a child in New Jersey were innocent. Failure to understand what a plan’s liabilities look like could be much more harmful. We’ve seen that scenario play out many times and with significant consequences. Don’t let your fund become the victim of an assets-only approach.

04.14.26
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Pension Plan Sponsor: “I Wish that I could…”

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

In October, I will celebrate my 45th year in the pension/investment industry. I’ve been truly blessed, but also frustrated by activities that I deem detrimental to the successful management of DB pension plans.

First and foremost, I believe that a majority of folks think that achieving the return on asset assumption (ROA) is the primary objective in managing a DB pension plan. This is an incorrect assumption! Creating an asset allocation targeted at a return only guarantees annual volatility, and NOT success.

Second, meeting monthly liquidity through the sweeping of interest, dividends, capital distributions, and worse, the selling of investments harms the long-term return of your fund.

Third, using core fixed income as a return generator is not a sound strategy, as bonds are highly interest rate sensitive, and who knows the future direction of rates.

That being said, if I were a pension plan sponsor, I’d wish that I could find an investment strategy that provided: All of the plan’s liquidity needs, certainty for a portion of that plan, and a longer investment horizon for my alpha generating assets (non-bonds) so that I enhance the probability of achieving the desired outcome.

Great news – there is such a strategy. Cash Flow Matching (CFM) is designed to use investment-grade bonds for their cash flows of interest and principal (upon maturity) to match liability cash flows of benefits and expenses for as far out as the allocation goes. Furthermore, it extends the investing horizon for the non-bond assets so that they can wade successfully through choppy markets without being a source of liquidity. Finally, there is an element of certainty (minus that rare occurrence of an IG bond default) absent in the management of DB pension plans outside of a pension risk transfer (PRT) or an annuity.

I believe that the primary objective in managing a DB pension plan is to SECURE the pension promise at low cost and with prudent risk. Does focusing on the ROA secure benefits – no. The “sweeping” of dividends, interest, and capital distributions to meet ongoing liquidity needs can negatively impact the plan’s long-term return. Guinness Global (U.K. investment shop) produced a study that said sweeping dividends and not reinvesting them reduced the return to the S&P 500 by 47% over 10-year periods back to 1940 and 57% for 20-year periods.

Finally, bonds are highly interest rate sensitive. After a nearly 40-year decline in U.S. interest rates which drove bond prices up and yields down, we have seen rates rise to more average levels where they are holding leading to very weak fixed income returns for recent performance periods. Matching asset cash flows with liability cash flows eliminates interest rate risk for that portion of the portfolio, as benefits and expenses are future values that are not interest rate sensitive. Furthermore, Ryan ALM’s approach is to use 100% IG corporate bonds to build the CFM portfolio. A 100% IG portfolio will outperform a core active fixed income portfolio by the yield differential given the core portfolio’s exposure to agencies and Treasuries.

Question: If you had the opportunity to bring some certainty to the management of pensions, why wouldn’t you do it? If not, please share with us why not.

03.31.26
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Trouble Paying the Bills?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

“The worst thing that can happen,” Andrew Junkin, CIO, Virginia Retirement System says, “is that you’re a forced seller in any market.”

That quote appeared in a Chief Investment Officer article from March 4, 2026. We couldn’t agree more with Mr. Junkin. Despite improved funding, public funds are being challenged to find adequate cash flow to meet the monthly benefits and expenses. Two factors are at play: 1) improved funding leads to lower annual contributions, and 2) much heavier allocations to alternatives have dried up liquidity, as expected capital distributions fail to materialize.

According to a report by NIRS, from 2001 to 2023, public pension plans shifted roughly 20% of public equity and fixed income into alternatives such as private equity, real estate, and private credit. These are illiquid investments. Despite the “wisdom” of the pension crowd, illiquidity is a RISK and not an alpha generator. As more assets shifted into these illiquid investments, the trades became ever more crowded reducing liquidity further. That is, unless one was willing to take a significant haircut through the secondary markets.

As a reminder, public pension funds are designed to become cash-flow negative over time. Contributions into these funds exceed benefits in earlier decades, building a corpus to be used to fund retirements down the road. They are designed to have the last $ pay the last promised benefit. There is no inheritance waiting for the last few beneficiaries.

You want to have adequate liquidity that isn’t forcing the sale of assets at inopportune times? Develop an asset allocation strategy that bifurcates your assets into two buckets – liquidity and growth – and stop the focus on the ROA as if it were the Holy Grail. It isn’t! Use a cash flow matching (CFM) investment strategy to ensure that abundant liquidity is available from next month as far into the future as your allocation goes. The remainder of the assets go into the growth bucket. If you still want to maintain a heavy allocation to alternatives, they can now grow unencumbered as they are no longer a source of liquidity.

The allocation should be driven by the pension plan’s funded ratio and ability to contribute. We recently provided a large fund with an analysis that showed a plan with <50% funding could still secure the promised NET benefits for the next 33-years, while creating a substantial surplus that could now be managed as aggressively as members of that Board could withstand. Not only are the promised benefits secure, but so are the participants who can now sleep well at night knowing that myriad risks won’t sabotage their golden years.

03.25.26
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What is My Funded Ratio? Who Cares!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

The funded ratio of a DB pension plan gets a lot of attention, especially if it is perceived to be weak. But does the funded ratio truly tell you the whole story as to the financial health of a DB pension plan? We, at Ryan ALM, Inc. don’t think so.

So, how is the funded ratio calculated:

Funded ratio = MV of plan assets / plan liabilities earned to date X 100

The market value of assets is a present value (PV) calculation. The market value of liabilities is the future value of liabilities earned to date discounted back to a PV calculation based on a discount rate. For public and multiemployer plans the discount rate tends to be the fund’s return on asset assumption (ROA), while it is an AA corporate blended rate for private pensions. In today’s interest rate environment, the discount rate for private plans will be roughly 1.5% less than the discount rate based on the average ROA. That means that liabilities for private funds will have a greater current value than the value of liabilities calculated based on the discount rate using the ROA. Oh, okay, so the choice of a discount rate can change my funded ratio. That’s interesting. So that tells me that if I wanted to improve my funded ratio, all I’d have to do is increase my discount rate to lower the PV of my liabilities. That’s very interesting.

So, it appears that the funded ratio calculation can be manipulated to some extent. As we think about the formula above, is there anything missing? Yes, where are the future contributions, which can be significant. Why are future payment liabilities in the calculation, but projected contributions, which are future assets of the fund, not included? Common thinking suggests that those future contributions aren’t guaranteed, which is why they aren’t factored into the funded ratio calculation. However, is that a correct assumption? In doing some research, it appears >80% of DB pension funds receive 100% of the annual required contribution (ARC). Even NJ’s public pension system is making the ARC and then some.

We recently had a conversation with a large plan sponsor who thought that their fund was <50% funded based on the formula above. Not surprisingly, they were very focused on this ratio and looking for investment strategies that could potentially enhance it. As an FYI, this plan’s future contributions as forecasted by their actuary were significant. In fact, future contributions were so large that they were equal to 73% of the forecasted liabilities! Yes, without including the pension fund’s current assets, this plan was 73% funded, provided those projected contributions were met which they have been for more than a decade.

So, given these forecasted contributions is that pension fund really <50% funded?

In another example, the same fund that thought that they were poorly funded, could defease net pension liabilities for the next 33-years. How is it possible that a plan that believes it is <50% funded able to significantly reduce risk, enhance liquidity, and SECURE pension promises for 33-years? Furthermore, this fund was going to establish a $4.4 billion surplus on the day that those benefits and expenses were defeased for 33-years. If it just earned the projected ROA, that $4.4 billion would grow to $34.2 billion during that 33-year period. Wow! 

So, I ask once more, does that sound like a plan in financial distress, which a funded ratio of <50% might suggest? NO!

The funded ratio is but one measure of a pension plan’s health. Unfortunately, many in our industry would look at that # and say that more risk needs to be taken to achieve “full funding” down the road, when in fact reducing risk through a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy is the appropriate approach. It is past the time to get off the scary asset allocation rollercoaster. 

03.16.26
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Unfortunately, the Joke Was On Us!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I started raising alarm bells related to DB pension exposure to alternatives – mainly private equity and private credit several years ago, and have produced roughly a dozen blog posts that touch on this issue. You may recall some of the posts from 2024:

The Joke’s On Us!

Good Ideas are Often Overwhelmed!

Kinda Silly Question

Well, unfortunately it appears that it is time to pay the piper! As mentioned in the posts listed above, we as an industry don’t truly appreciate the idea that there is a natural capacity to EVERY investment. As an industry, we DO overwhelm good ideas and those funds that are late to the party are often left with just the crumbs in the chaffing dish.

I stumbled over a good, but scary, list of recent events within private credit. The list was compiled by Ignacio Ramirez Moreno, Host of The Blunt Dollar Podcast:

Cliffwater saw 14% redemption requests.

Morgan Stanley’s fund got 10.9%.

Blackstone hit a record 7.9%.

All three capped withdrawals below what investors requested.

Glendon Capital flagged concerns about Blue Owl’s valuations.

Pimco called it “a crisis of really bad underwriting.”

JPMorgan’s marking down loans and tightening lending to private credit funds.

Partners Group thinks defaults could double.

Pimco’s predicting a “full-blown default cycle.”

Apollo’s saying the pain could last 12-18 months.

Well, that is some list! In addition, I was always quite skeptical of the credit quality that was assigned to these companies, and I guess that I wasn’t too far off given that 43% of private credit borrowers have negative free cash flow. Furthermore, the U.S./Israel vs. Iran war won’t help either, as inflation expectations have ratcheted higher reducing significantly the prospects for Fed action leading to lower rates. In fact, it would not be surprising to see the Fed have to raise rates. If such an action occurs, the higher interest rates could exacerbate the current challenging environment for private debt borrowers and their income statements.

Let’s see how the pension plan sponsor community and their advisors deal with private credit’s first real crisis. It should be both interesting and likely painful.

03.13.26
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What is the PCE Price Index Telling Us?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As most investors know, the Federal Reserve’s primary inflation measure is the Core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) targets 2% annual PCE inflation while trying to balance long-term price stability and maximum employment. The PCE is produced by the Department of Commerce. Why the PCE? The PCE inflation index covers broad household spending and importantly it adjusts for shifts in consumer behavior, unlike fixed-basket indexes, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Furthermore, the PCE reflects actual expenditures economy-wide and updates the index weights more dynamically. The goal of the PCE inflation measure is to help gauge underlying trends in the broader economy.

The most recent PCE inflation data was published as of today, March 13, 2026, covering a period through January 2026. Core PCE (excluding food and energy) ticked up to 3.06% in January 2026, after having touched 3% at year-end. Cleary, this reading remains well above the Fed’s 2% target, reflecting persistent underlying pressures that may become even more dramatic with the 41% increase per barrel of WTI registered since the close on Friday, February 27th.

The PCE inflation measure has recently accelerated while CPI cooled primarily due to differences in housing weights (lower in PCE) and consumer behavior adjustments.

MonthHeadline PCE (%)Core PCE (%)Headline CPI (%)Core CPI (%)
Dec 20252.93.02.72.9
Jan 20262.93.12.42.5
Feb 2026 (est)??2.4?

The fact that core PCE has now exceeded 3% must be worrying for the FOMC/FED that are also dealing with broader economic pressures, such as employment and US interest rates. Speaking of rates, historically the U.S. 10-year Treasury note has traded at a premium yield to inflation of roughly 2%, with periods as high as 3% or greater. The 10-year Treasury note is currently trading at a yield of 4.25% (as of 10:29 am) suggesting that a “normal” spread should have the YTM at 5.1%.

Given the great uncertainty related to current economic and geopolitical issues, it would not be surprising to see the Treasury yield curve continue to shift upwards. Such a move would create a wonderful environment for pension plan sponsors to de-risk through a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy. It is time to bring an element of certainty to the management of DB pensions to reside in a state of great uncertainty! Don’t wait to explore the amazing benefits provided by CFM.

03.09.26
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It’s Not Just the Price of Gasoline!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Folks (the investment community) seem to be focused on the rising price of oil for its effect on gasoline prices, but the impact of rising oil prices has far greater implications for the broader U.S. economy. Evidence indicates that a vast majority of manufactured goods and industrial processes use petroleum products that are feedstocks to make plastics, synthetic fibers, solvents, and many chemicals, which then become inputs into consumer goods, packaging, vehicles, electronics, building materials, and more.

Because plastics, synthetic fibers, and petrochemical-derived materials pervade sectors from automotive to consumer goods to packaging, a large majority of U.S. manufactured products (“most”) depend on oil products somewhere in their supply chain, either as material or as critical process input.

An extended increase in the price oil could have a dramatic impact on inflation, U.S. interest rates, the labor force, and overall economic activity. Have pension plans done enough to secure the necessary liquidity to meet the promised benefits and the expenses incurred to meet those monthly payments? Has the significant migration of pension assets to alternatives significantly reduced the available liquidity? Do plans understand that in crisis most asset classes tend to find correlations closer to 1 than 0, making the forced sale of assets to meet benefits challenging and more expensive.

Dividing a pension plans asset allocation into two buckets – liquidity and growth – as opposed to having the plan’s assets focused on the return on asset (ROA) assumption can mitigate liquidity risk. Use a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy to ensure that the necessary liquidity (asset cash flows of interest and maturing principal from bonds) is available to meet the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses monthly. While the CFM strategy is SECURING the promised benefits, the remainder of the assets can just grow unencumbered – no forced selling.

Who knows how long this conflict in the Middle East will last. Pension plans may be “long-term” investors, but they have short-term cash needs that must be met. There is no kicking the can down the road. Adopt this bi-furcated asset allocation and enjoy the benefits that come from the knowledge that your promises have been secured.