Tag Archives: stocks

08.27.26
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Deja Vu All Over Again? Just Saying!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Yogi Berra, the great Yankee catcher, but also a NY Mets player/coach in 1965, is credited with the saying it’s “Deja Vu all over again”, which he supposedly uttered back in 1961. Are we potentially witnessing in 2026, with AI investments soaring and equity valuations that may be stretched, a replay to what transpired in March 2000? Now, I’ve heard many arguments that today’s technology companies aren’t your fathers’ or even your grandfathers’ but anytime I hear the phrase “this time is different”, I want to run and hide.

Let’s explore. At the peak of the dot-com bubble in March 2000, Information Technology represented approximately 35% of the capitalization-weighted S&P 500. That level of concentration within the S&P 500 was deemed extraordinary at that time. Remember when Cisco Systems was the largest stock in the S&P 500 index? What transpired from March 2000 to October 2002, proved incredibly painful to those investors that believed that “this time was different”. Unfortunately, it wasn’t! The result was a significant reduction in the weight of the technology sector within the S&P 500 from 2000-2002 by an incredible 21.7%. The technology bubble burst took down Tech’s exposure from roughly one-third of the index to about 13% by the 2002 bear-market bottom.

PeriodTechnology weight in S&P 500
1995~10%
March 2000~34.5%
Oct. 2002~12.8%

That leads to today’s discussion comparing March 2000’s Technology exposure versus August 2026’s broader “technology-related” weight when you include Meta, both classes of Alphabet, Amazon, and Tesla. As you can see by the information displayed below, roughly 50% of the S&P 500’s weight is now in technology-related entities.

ComponentS&P 500 weight
Official Information Technology37.15%
Amazon3.84%
Alphabet Class A3.06%
Alphabet Class C2.45%
Meta Platforms1.83%
Tesla1.55%
Broader technology exposure49.88%

In other words, today’s exposure is about 15.4 percentage points higher in technology than at the peak of the dot-com bubble.

However, the exposure to Technology and AI is not limited to the S&P 500 (equities), as massive investment in data centers (real estate) done through significant debt financing (fixed income) might be subjecting a pension plan’s entire asset allocation to significant risks.

Is your portfolio prepared for the next significant market correction?

08.11.26
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Will Rising Rates Rattle Equity Markets?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Uncertainty abounds! That uncertainty continues to drive expectations for oil, inflation, and interest rates up and down like a Yoyo. However, recent inflationary trends suggest that U.S. interest rates could continue higher. The U.S. 30-year Treasury bond’s yield is only 4 basis points off it’s cyclical peak since rates began rising aggressively in March 2022.

At Ryan ALM, we recently completed a cash flow matching (CFM) analysis for a public fund in which we were able to defease the pension plan’s liabilities out to 2100. The portfolio that we created to accomplish that objective had a YTM of 6.03%. Barring any defaults (occur at <0.2% in IG space), that is what the plan sponsor should expect to receive over the life of the program. Unlike a broadly diversified pension asset allocation striving to hit an ROA target and all of its standard deviation, there is NO volatility associated with that long-term return and cash flows. There is no potential for a major drawdown impacting future contributions and the plan’s funded status.

Just how has the bond market changed? This morning, our head trader, Steve Devito, shared with us the characteristics for a couple of bonds that had been shown to him. Here is an incredible example of where rates have gone: $2mm par value of ORCL 6.70 maturing in 2056 @ +245 above the comparable Treasury offered at a 7.70% YTM (quality:Baa2 / BBB-). WOW! Here you have an investment-grade corporate bond trading at a yield of 7.7%. The average ROA for a public pension plan is roughly 6.75%. In another example, Steve shared: $2mm GOOGL 6.50 maturing in 2066 @ +124 above the comparable Treasury at a YTM of 6.50% AA (40-year maturity). Google is offering a AA credit 40-year bond at a YTM of 6.5%!

I suspect that there are many other examples of high quality corporate bonds trading at yields greater than 6%. So, I ask: At what level of rates do U.S. corporate bonds become too much competition for U.S. equities and all their uncertainty? As a pension plan sponsor, wouldn’t you prefer to have the certainty of a CFM portfolio securing your pension liabilities from next month chronologically as far into the future as your allocation goes? In the meantime, your residual alpha assets have just been granted a longer investing horizon allowing them to wade through today’s uncertainty without being encumbered with a cash sweep of dividends and capital distributions.

As we regularly write, we are always willing to showcase how CFM can positively impact your plan by providing a free analysis. You will get a better understanding of your plan’s cash flow requirements and an understanding of the potential cost reduction of the future benefit payments. You’ll also have a greater appreciation for the possible significant reduction in asset management fees that is achieved through the use of CFM. Now is the time to act before the markets negatively react to these rising U.S. interest rates.

07.31.26
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Why wait?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Due to great uncertainty brought on by the conflict in the Middle East and the war’s potential impact on the price of oil ($85.63 at 10:01 EST) that could drive inflation higher, U.S. long-dated Treasury yields continue to rise. In fact, the U.S. 30-year Treasury yield has not been this high (5.26%) since July 6, 2007, when the yield was at 5.28%. Where yields go from here is anyone’s guess, but I will share that oil, as represented by WTI, has risen 24.9% since June 30, 2026. Given the exposure that oil or oil-derived inputs have in more than 6,000 products, the significant rise in the recent price could impact inflation for quite some time, even if oil soon began to flow more freely.

We recently saw the average 30-year BBB+ bond trading at 110 bps above the prevailing 30-year Treasury. If that relationship is maintained, pension plans could potentially cover most of their desired return on asset (ROA) annual target (average public pension plan has a 6.75% ROA) through bonds. Should inflation spike once again, there is no telling how high U.S. interest rates could rise. Despite domestic equity’s apparent immunity to market fundamentals and geopolitical risks, there will come a time when higher U.S. yields become too attractive to ignore leading to the potential for rebalancing out of equities into fixed income. That action will likely lead to lower equity prices and falling bond yields.

So, I ask, why wait? Why wait to take risk from your current asset allocation before the markets act? Why not SECURE your benefit promises through cash flow matching (CFM) well into the future and reduce the volatility related to returns, contributions, and funded status? Why not take advantage of very attractive bond yields? As a reminder, core, active fixed income strategies are highly interest rate sensitive. Rising yields negatively impact bond prices, as seen in the performance of the Aggregate Bond Index, which is up only 0.1% annually for the 5-years ending June 30, 2026. However, a CFM strategy, which secures benefits that are future values, eliminates interest rate risk, as future values are not interest rate sensitive.

Public pension plans have done a good job of improving their funded ratios since bottoming after the Great Financial Crisis but remain only one market crash away from repeating this vicious cycle. Get off the performance rollercoaster. Secure your promises chronologically for some period into the future (your plan’s funded status should dictate the allocation). You and your participants will sleep much better knowing that the promises made will be kept.

06.17.26
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Just Another Meme Stock?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Equity markets are partying like it’s 1999! Valuations be damned! Are the improved funded ratios for defined benefit plans going to be secured through de-risking strategies or are they going to once again be subjected to the whims of the capital markets? For plan sponsors benchmarking your equity exposure to the S&P 500, are you prepared for the volatility potentially associated with the great technology concentration (now roughly 50% of the index)? For those invested in the Nasdaq indexes, are you prepared for SpaceX’s impact, which should happen soon?

Come on, folks. Let’s not repeat the mistakes of the past. Higher interest rates, higher inflation, crazy equity valuations, and geopolitical uncertainty have not seemed to tamp enthusiasm for U.S. stocks. What will? Will it take a stock like SpaceX – now valued at $2.75 trillion – to be the reason that stocks fall back to earth? SpaceX has been trading for three days. The action on the stock suggests that it is just another meme stock.

Can you believe that SpaceX has overtaken Amazon as America’s fifth-largest company? A closer examination of the fundamentals shows just how irrational our markets/investors have become. Let’s look at the current fundamentals of Amazon versus SpaceX.

Valuation

MetricSpaceXAmazon
Revenue$19.30B TTM $716.9B in 2025 
Earnings-$9.36B TTM $77.7B net income in 2025 
P/S137.7x about 3.5x 
P/E-284.2x about 34x normalized 

SpaceX’s valuation is being priced as an extraordinarily high-growth story, despite being a money-losing company, which is why its P/S is dramatically higher than Amazon’s. Amazon, by contrast, already has large-scale revenue and meaningful profitability, so its valuation looks much more grounded in current fundamentals, despite it carrying a rich valuation at 34x normalized earnings.

Profitability

Amazon is clearly ahead on earnings quality: it generated $80.0B of operating income and $77.7B of net income in 2025. SpaceX, on the other hand, reported a $9.36B trailing-twelve-month loss and a negative net margin.

Growth profile

Clearly, SpaceX’s case is mostly about future optionality: investors are paying for expected expansion in launch, satellite, and adjacent businesses rather than present-day profits. Amazon’s case is more balanced because it combines growth with profitability, especially from AWS and advertising, which support its margins.

SpaceX will need to increase sales by roughly 37x to match Amazons P/S of 3.5x. Nothing grows to the heavens – even a rocket company. Risks to pension funding seem to be skewed to the downside. It is time to take some profits and secure the promises that have been given to your plan participants. Please don’t waste another golden opportunity to fortify your plan’s funding.

05.01.26
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Is Now Really the Time to Buy Stocks?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

U.S. equity markets enjoyed a robust April despite myriad economic and geopolitical inputs that might have given investors pause. Should equity investors remain bullish at this time? The graph below caught my attention primarily because of the recent disconnect between the two lines related to the Shiller Excess Cape Yield (ECY) and subsequent 10-year Real Return for equities. There are many, many valuation tools that claim to provide clues about the future direction of stocks, and this is such an example. Those tools can be short-, medium-, and long-term in nature. The ECY happens to be one valuation metric that provides “guidance” for longer time frames. The current reading of 1.60% certainly looks rich relative to its long history.

In case you don’t know, the Shiller excess CAPE yield is a valuation measure that compares the stock market’s earnings yield with the “real” yield on the 10-year Treasury note. In simple terms, it asks how much extra return stocks may offer over inflation-adjusted government bonds.

How it is calculated

  • Take the inverse of the CAPE ratio, which is the market’s “earnings yield.”
  • Subtract the real 10-year Treasury yield.

So, ECY=(1/CAPE)−10-year real Treasury yield

A higher excess CAPE yield suggests stocks might look more attractive relative to bonds. A lower reading suggests the equity risk premium is thinner, meaning stocks offer less return versus bonds. As mentioned above, current readings show the S&P 500 Shiller Excess CAPE Yield around 1.60% for April 2026, which is well below its long-term average of 4.60%. Another data source put it at 1.41 as of April 30, 2026.

Investors have historically used the ECY as a long-term asset allocation tool, especially when comparing stocks with Treasury bonds. It is not a short-term trading signal, but rather a rough guide to whether equities look cheap or expensive relative to real bond yields. A CAPE yield below 2% has generally signaled subdued future equity returns over the next 5 to 10 years, providing a valuation warning sign, and not an exact measure.

As a reminder, there are many valuation techniques used to identify opportunities and risk when investing in U.S. equities. Depending on a pension plan’s liquidity needs, funded ratio, willingness to take risk, etc. today’s current environment may be providing an opportunity to reduce risk by trimming equities and using the proceeds along with core fixed income assets to establish a cash flow matching mandate. In the process, the plan’s liquidity is improved, promised benefits secured, and the investing horizon extended for the residual assets. Give us a call. We are always willing to provide a free analysis showcasing how CFM can help your fund.

04.14.26
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Pension Plan Sponsor: “I Wish that I could…”

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

In October, I will celebrate my 45th year in the pension/investment industry. I’ve been truly blessed, but also frustrated by activities that I deem detrimental to the successful management of DB pension plans.

First and foremost, I believe that a majority of folks think that achieving the return on asset assumption (ROA) is the primary objective in managing a DB pension plan. This is an incorrect assumption! Creating an asset allocation targeted at a return only guarantees annual volatility, and NOT success.

Second, meeting monthly liquidity through the sweeping of interest, dividends, capital distributions, and worse, the selling of investments harms the long-term return of your fund.

Third, using core fixed income as a return generator is not a sound strategy, as bonds are highly interest rate sensitive, and who knows the future direction of rates.

That being said, if I were a pension plan sponsor, I’d wish that I could find an investment strategy that provided: All of the plan’s liquidity needs, certainty for a portion of that plan, and a longer investment horizon for my alpha generating assets (non-bonds) so that I enhance the probability of achieving the desired outcome.

Great news – there is such a strategy. Cash Flow Matching (CFM) is designed to use investment-grade bonds for their cash flows of interest and principal (upon maturity) to match liability cash flows of benefits and expenses for as far out as the allocation goes. Furthermore, it extends the investing horizon for the non-bond assets so that they can wade successfully through choppy markets without being a source of liquidity. Finally, there is an element of certainty (minus that rare occurrence of an IG bond default) absent in the management of DB pension plans outside of a pension risk transfer (PRT) or an annuity.

I believe that the primary objective in managing a DB pension plan is to SECURE the pension promise at low cost and with prudent risk. Does focusing on the ROA secure benefits – no. The “sweeping” of dividends, interest, and capital distributions to meet ongoing liquidity needs can negatively impact the plan’s long-term return. Guinness Global (U.K. investment shop) produced a study that said sweeping dividends and not reinvesting them reduced the return to the S&P 500 by 47% over 10-year periods back to 1940 and 57% for 20-year periods.

Finally, bonds are highly interest rate sensitive. After a nearly 40-year decline in U.S. interest rates which drove bond prices up and yields down, we have seen rates rise to more average levels where they are holding leading to very weak fixed income returns for recent performance periods. Matching asset cash flows with liability cash flows eliminates interest rate risk for that portion of the portfolio, as benefits and expenses are future values that are not interest rate sensitive. Furthermore, Ryan ALM’s approach is to use 100% IG corporate bonds to build the CFM portfolio. A 100% IG portfolio will outperform a core active fixed income portfolio by the yield differential given the core portfolio’s exposure to agencies and Treasuries.

Question: If you had the opportunity to bring some certainty to the management of pensions, why wouldn’t you do it? If not, please share with us why not.

03.25.26
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What is My Funded Ratio? Who Cares!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

The funded ratio of a DB pension plan gets a lot of attention, especially if it is perceived to be weak. But does the funded ratio truly tell you the whole story as to the financial health of a DB pension plan? We, at Ryan ALM, Inc. don’t think so.

So, how is the funded ratio calculated:

Funded ratio = MV of plan assets / plan liabilities earned to date X 100

The market value of assets is a present value (PV) calculation. The market value of liabilities is the future value of liabilities earned to date discounted back to a PV calculation based on a discount rate. For public and multiemployer plans the discount rate tends to be the fund’s return on asset assumption (ROA), while it is an AA corporate blended rate for private pensions. In today’s interest rate environment, the discount rate for private plans will be roughly 1.5% less than the discount rate based on the average ROA. That means that liabilities for private funds will have a greater current value than the value of liabilities calculated based on the discount rate using the ROA. Oh, okay, so the choice of a discount rate can change my funded ratio. That’s interesting. So that tells me that if I wanted to improve my funded ratio, all I’d have to do is increase my discount rate to lower the PV of my liabilities. That’s very interesting.

So, it appears that the funded ratio calculation can be manipulated to some extent. As we think about the formula above, is there anything missing? Yes, where are the future contributions, which can be significant. Why are future payment liabilities in the calculation, but projected contributions, which are future assets of the fund, not included? Common thinking suggests that those future contributions aren’t guaranteed, which is why they aren’t factored into the funded ratio calculation. However, is that a correct assumption? In doing some research, it appears >80% of DB pension funds receive 100% of the annual required contribution (ARC). Even NJ’s public pension system is making the ARC and then some.

We recently had a conversation with a large plan sponsor who thought that their fund was <50% funded based on the formula above. Not surprisingly, they were very focused on this ratio and looking for investment strategies that could potentially enhance it. As an FYI, this plan’s future contributions as forecasted by their actuary were significant. In fact, future contributions were so large that they were equal to 73% of the forecasted liabilities! Yes, without including the pension fund’s current assets, this plan was 73% funded, provided those projected contributions were met which they have been for more than a decade.

So, given these forecasted contributions is that pension fund really <50% funded?

In another example, the same fund that thought that they were poorly funded, could defease net pension liabilities for the next 33-years. How is it possible that a plan that believes it is <50% funded able to significantly reduce risk, enhance liquidity, and SECURE pension promises for 33-years? Furthermore, this fund was going to establish a $4.4 billion surplus on the day that those benefits and expenses were defeased for 33-years. If it just earned the projected ROA, that $4.4 billion would grow to $34.2 billion during that 33-year period. Wow! 

So, I ask once more, does that sound like a plan in financial distress, which a funded ratio of <50% might suggest? NO!

The funded ratio is but one measure of a pension plan’s health. Unfortunately, many in our industry would look at that # and say that more risk needs to be taken to achieve “full funding” down the road, when in fact reducing risk through a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy is the appropriate approach. It is past the time to get off the scary asset allocation rollercoaster. 

03.02.26
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Eliminate the Uncertainty

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

There are many benefits to using Cash Flow Matching (CFM) for your pension plan, endowment or foundation. The obvious benefit is the liquidity that is created to meet ongoing expenditures, whether benefit payments or grants. That liquidity comes at a premium today for many entities that have migrated significant financial resources to alternative investments, which are having a difficult time providing their investors with capital distributions.

The other significant benefit is the certainty that comes from using CFM. I’ve appreciated the opportunity to speak at NCPERS, IFEBP, LATEC, and OPAL in the last few months and in each case, I asked the audience if there was any investment strategy within their fund that brought certainty? Not a single hand was raised. They could have mentioned cash reserves as an example, but that is an expensive long-term strategy because of the low short-term yields available today.

The cloud of uncertainty under which we live is not comfortable! Yes, both pension funds and E&Fs are long-term investors, but the riding of markets up and down often leads to a significant increase in the contributions necessary to maintain their funding. That activity is not helpful to anyone. Who knows what will transpire as our country navigates through several potential geopolitical landmines. Combine that reality with uncertain economic growth, weaker labor markets, sticky inflation, and equity valuations that seem stretched, and markets could be in for a rocky period.

Wouldn’t it be a blessing to have CFM in place that not only provides the necessary liquidity so that assets aren’t forced to be sold at less than opportune times, but a strategy (service) that provides certainty since your obligations (liability cash flows) are matched with asset cash flows of bond principal and interest income for as far out as the bond and cash allocation will provide. It isn’t often that we are presented with an investment strategy that is truly a sleep-well-at-night offering for the long term. 

As a reminder, humans hate uncertainty, as it impacts us in both psychological and physiological ways. Yet, in the management of pensions and E&Fs, sponsors have wholeheartedly embraced uncertainty. The disconnect is quite surprising. Again, I don’t know what will transpire in markets today, tomorrow, or next year. I don’t know how the Iran situation will impact shipping lanes and the price of oil and inflation or worse, destabilize the entire region by bringing into the conflict Iran’s friends, such as Russia and China. I’m not a gambler and I don’t believe that managers of pension assets should be either.

I think it is critically important to SECURE the promises given to your plan’s participants and to achieve that objective with low cost and prudent risk. Riding the asset allocation rollercoaster accomplishes neither objective. Now’s the time to act. Not after markets have been rocked.

02.12.26
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It Should Be Relative and NOT Absolute

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I was participating on a panel at the Opal/LATEC conference yesterday. The moderator asked a question about the importance of process. In my response, I mentioned a number of process elements that are critical to the successful management of pension plans. Here is one point that I made that doesn’t get the attention that it deserves. Many, if not most, defined benefit pension plans have created an investment policy statement (IPS) that specifically restricts certain investments and their respective weights within the pension fund. The plan sponsor and their consultant likely allow investments in public equities and certain styles of equity management (i.e. value and growth, large and small cap, etc.). However, in many cases they restrict the exposure to any one security by an absolute amount such as 5%. This is the wrong approach.

Limiting exposures does reduce the risk that any one stock could have an outsized impact on the pension plan’s return, but by doing so, the plan sponsor is potentially negatively impacting the investment manager. Not all U.S. equity benchmarks are the same and treating them as such is potentially damaging to the manager and fund.

If a large cap growth manager has been retained and they are asked to manage a portfolio relative to the Russell 1000 Growth Index, limiting exposure in a stock to 5% would mean forcing that manager to make a negative bet against any stock in the index that has a weight greater than 5%. As of today, there are three stocks – Nvidia (12.9%), Apple (11.6%), and Microsoft (8.8%) – that the manager couldn’t own at benchmark weight, let alone own them above the index weight. This index is cap weighted, and as the stocks perform well their weight in the index grows. Not being able to own the stock at its index weight is harmful.

Worse, if the investment manager wants to make a positive bet on the stock, they can’t, forcing them to potentially choose weaker companies to round out their portfolio. When a manager is chosen, they are often picked because of their past track record of producing an excess return for a level of risk (tracking error). Restricting exposures to an absolute weight may render those previous return/risk characteristics moot. Furthermore, the exposure to a single stock should be relative to the weight in the index +/- band, which would be very dependent on the amount of tracking error that is comfortable to the plan sponsor.

For instance, a good information ratio (excess return/tracking error) is 0.33%. Meaning that for every 1% excess return, the manager is taking 3% tracking error. If the manager is hoping to add 2% above the benchmark over a cycle, that manager is going to have a tracking error close to 6%. The relative weight of a stock in a portfolio must reflect that level of potential tracking error. Higher tracking error portfolios need more flexibility. In this case, it would make sense to allow the manager to invest in Nvidia at the index weight +/- 2%. For lower risk strategies such as an enhanced index that only has 1% tracking error, perhaps the index weight +/- 0.5% would be appropriate.

Now, the Russell 1000 Growth Index is one of the more concentrated indexes with nearly 60% of the weight of the index in just the top 10 holdings, but it isn’t the only one. Currently, the S&P 500 has the same three stocks (Nvidia, Apple, and Microsoft) at weights greater than 5% and two others, Amazon and Alphabet, at weights >3%. If the manager wants to overweight a holding in the S&P 500 by +/- 2%, they would be restricted with a 5% absolute restriction and no ability to overweight.

I recommend that you review your IPS and make sure that your “risk control” objectives are not restricting your manager’s ability to produce an excess return. Remove any absolute constraint and replace it with a relative weighting based on the tracking error that the manager produces. Again, lower risk enhanced index managers will only need a +/- 0.5% to +/-1% restriction, while higher tracking managers will need greater flexibility.

01.30.26
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“Everybody’s looking under every rock.” Jay Kloepfer

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Institutional Investor’s James Comtois has recently published an article that quoted several industry members on the near-term (10-years) return forecast for both public and private markets, which according to those asked are looking anemic. No one should be surprised by these forecasts given the incredible strength of public markets during the past three years and the fact that regression to the mean tendencies is not just theory.

An equally, if not greater, challenge is liquidity. As the title above highlights, Jay Kloepfer, Director of Capital Markets Research at Callan, told II that “Liquidity has become a bigger issue,” He went on to say that “Everybody’s looking under every rock.” Not surprising! Given the migration of assets from public markets to private during the last few decades. The rapid decline in U.S. interest rates certainly contributed to this asset movement, but expectations for “outsized” gains from alternatives also fueled enthusiasm and action. The Callan chart below highlights just how far pension plans have migrated.

I’ve written a lot on the subject of liquidity. Of course, the only reason that pension plans exist is to fund a promise that was made to the participants of that fund. Those promises are paid in monthly installments. Not having the necessary liquidity can create significant unintended consequences. No one wants to be a forced seller in a liquidity challenged market. It is critical that pension plans have a liquidity policy in place to deal with this critical issue. Equally important is to have an asset allocation that captures liquidity without having to sell investments.

Cash flow matching (CFM) is such a strategy. It ensures that the necessary liquidity is available each and every month through the careful matching of asset cash flows (interest and principal) with the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses. No forced selling! Furthermore, the use of CFM extends the investing horizon for those growth assets not needed in the CFM program. Those investments can just grow unencumbered. The extended investing horizon also allows the growth assets to wade through choppy markets without the possibility of being sold at less than opportune times.

So, if you are concerned about near-term returns for a variety of assets and with creating the necessary liquidity to meet ongoing pension promises, don’t rely on the status quo approach to asset allocation. Adopt a bifurcated asset allocation that separates plan assets into liquidity and growth buckets. Your plan will be in much better shape to deal with the inevitable market correction.