Tag Archives: Ryan ALM

01.30.26
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“Everybody’s looking under every rock.” Jay Kloepfer

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Institutional Investor’s James Comtois has recently published an article that quoted several industry members on the near-term (10-years) return forecast for both public and private markets, which according to those asked are looking anemic. No one should be surprised by these forecasts given the incredible strength of public markets during the past three years and the fact that regression to the mean tendencies is not just theory.

An equally, if not greater, challenge is liquidity. As the title above highlights, Jay Kloepfer, Director of Capital Markets Research at Callan, told II that “Liquidity has become a bigger issue,” He went on to say that “Everybody’s looking under every rock.” Not surprising! Given the migration of assets from public markets to private during the last few decades. The rapid decline in U.S. interest rates certainly contributed to this asset movement, but expectations for “outsized” gains from alternatives also fueled enthusiasm and action. The Callan chart below highlights just how far pension plans have migrated.

I’ve written a lot on the subject of liquidity. Of course, the only reason that pension plans exist is to fund a promise that was made to the participants of that fund. Those promises are paid in monthly installments. Not having the necessary liquidity can create significant unintended consequences. No one wants to be a forced seller in a liquidity challenged market. It is critical that pension plans have a liquidity policy in place to deal with this critical issue. Equally important is to have an asset allocation that captures liquidity without having to sell investments.

Cash flow matching (CFM) is such a strategy. It ensures that the necessary liquidity is available each and every month through the careful matching of asset cash flows (interest and principal) with the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses. No forced selling! Furthermore, the use of CFM extends the investing horizon for those growth assets not needed in the CFM program. Those investments can just grow unencumbered. The extended investing horizon also allows the growth assets to wade through choppy markets without the possibility of being sold at less than opportune times.

So, if you are concerned about near-term returns for a variety of assets and with creating the necessary liquidity to meet ongoing pension promises, don’t rely on the status quo approach to asset allocation. Adopt a bifurcated asset allocation that separates plan assets into liquidity and growth buckets. Your plan will be in much better shape to deal with the inevitable market correction.

01.26.26
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Another Cockroach!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As most folks were focused on the massive snowstorm that crippled a large swath of the U.S., BlackRock was disclosing another significant loss in one of their private debt funds. In this case, BlackRock TCP Capital, a publicly traded middle-market lending fund, expects to mark down the net value of its assets 19 per cent after a string of troubled loans weighed on results, marking the latest sign of pressure in the private credit market.

BlackRock’s vehicle is a business development company (BDC), which pools together private credit loans and trades like a stock. According to multiple reports, the fund has struggled in part because of its exposure to e-commerce aggregators which are companies that buy and manage Amazon sellers. Furthermore, BDC shares have been hit over the past year. There are currently 156 active BDCs, of which 50 are publicly traded. BDC Investors have concerned over private credit returns, underwriting standards and increased regulatory scrutiny. FINALLY!

Of course, this is not an isolated incident for either private credit/debt in general or specifically BlackRock. As you may recall, BlackRock was forced to reprice a private debt holding from par to zero last November, when Renovo Home Partners, a Dallas-based home-remodeling roll‑up that collapsed into Chapter 7 bankruptcy, triggering a roughly $150 million total loss on a private loan largely held by BlackRock.

Funds managed by BlackRock (notably its TCP Capital Corp. BDC) provided the majority of roughly $150 million in private credit to Renovo, while Apollo’s MidCap Financial and Oaktree held smaller slices. As of late September 2025, lenders were still marking this loan at 100 cents on the dollar, implying expectations of full repayment. This shouldn’t have come as a complete surprise because earlier in 2025, lenders had already agreed to a partial write‑off and debt‑to‑equity swap, trying to stabilize Renovo’s capital structure.​

This unfortunate outcome highlights how “mark‑to‑model” valuations in private credit can keep loans at par until very late, then reprice suddenly when a borrower fails. This practice suggest that headline yields in private credit may understate true default and loss severity risk, especially for highly leveraged sponsor‑backed roll‑ups. Yet, it doesn’t seem to have rattled either the market or institutional asset owners who continue to plow significant assets into this opaque and potentially saturated market. It continues to amaze me the number of “searches” being conducted for private credit/debt. Asset classes can get overwhelmed driving down future returns. Do you know what the natural capacity is for this asset class and the manager(s) that you are hiring? Caveat emptor!

01.23.26
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How Does One Secure A Benefit?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

We hope that you’ll agree that going to Chicago in January demonstrates the lengths that Ryan ALM personnel will go to help plan sponsors and their advisors protect and preserve DB pension plans. We are just thankful that we left yesterday, as today’s temperature is not expected to get to 0. OUCH!

Ron Ryan and I spent the last couple of days speaking with a number of funds and consultants about the many benefits of cash flow matching (CFM), which is gaining incredible traction among pension sponsors of all types. Who doesn’t want an element of certainty and enhanced liquidity within their plans given all the uncertainty we are facing in markets and geopolitically.

The idea of creating an element of certainty within the management of pension plans sounds wonderful, but how is that actually achieved? This is a question that we often receive and this trip was no exception. We had been discussing the fact that the relationship between asset cash flows (bond principal and interest) and liability cash flows (benefits and expenses) is locked in on the day that the bond portfolio is produced. The optimization process that we created blends the principal and interest from multiple bonds to meet the monthly obligations of benefits and expenses with an emphasis on longer maturity and higher yielding bonds to capture greater cost reduction of those future promises.

However, to demonstrate how one defeases a future liability, my example below highlights the matching of one bond versus one future $2 million 10-year liability. In this example from 18-months ago we purchased:

Bond: MetLife 6.375% due 6/15/34, A- quality, price = $107.64

Buy $1,240,000 par value of MetLife at a cost = $1,334,736

Interest is equal to the par value of bonds ($1,240,000) times the bond’s coupon (6.375%)

As a result of this purchase, we Receive: 

  Interest =  $78,412.50 annually ($39,206.25 semi-annual payments)

                            Total interest earned for 10 years is $784,125

  Principal = $1,240,000 at maturity (par value)

Total Cash Flow = $2,024,125  – $2,000,000 10-year Liability  = $24,124.99 excess

                             ($24,124.99 excess Cash Flow)

Benefits:

Able to fund $2 million benefit at a cost of $1.335 million or a -33.25% cost reduction

Excess cash flow can be reinvested or used to partially fund other benefits

In today’s yield environment, our clients benefit to a greater extent asking us to create longer maturity programs given the steepness of the yield curve. If they don’t have the assets to fund 100% of those longer-term liabilities, we can defease a portion of them through what we call a vertical slice. That slice of liabilities can be any percentage that allows us to cover a period from next month to 30-years from now. In a recent analysis produced for a prospect, we constructed a portfolio of bonds that covered 40% of the pension plan’s liabilities out to 30-years. As a result, we reduced the present value cost to defease those liabilities by –42.7%!!

Reach out to us today to learn how much we can reduce the future value cost of your promised benefits. We do this analysis for free. We encourage you to take us up on our generous offer.

01.20.26
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ARPA Update as of January 16, 2026

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

We hope that the continuing success of the ARPA pension legislation warms your heart despite ridiculously cold temperatures in New Jersey and elsewhere.

Regarding last week’s activity, pleased to report that two plans received approval for their SFA applications. Pension Trust Fund Agreement of St. Louis Motion Picture Machine Operators and Teamsters Local 837 Pension Plan, both non-priority group members, will receive a combined $19.9 million in SFA and interest for their 1,431 members. These approvals are the first for the PBGC in just under one month.

In other ARPA news, there were no new applications filed, as the e-Filing portal remains temporarily closed. In addition, as we’ve been reporting, the window for initial applications to be submitted was to close on 12/31/25. From this point forward, only revised applications should be received by the PBGC. Despite that impediment, two more funds, NMU Great Lakes Pension Fund and UFCW Pension Fund of Northeastern Pennsylvania, added their names to the extensive waitlist seeking Special Financial Assistance. These plans and the others currently on the list must believe that the current deadline in place will be amended.

There was one application withdrawn during the prior week, as the Dairy Employees Union Local #17 Pension Plan pulled their initial application seeking $3.5 million in SFA for the 633 plan participants. Under the current rules, they have until 12/31/26 to resubmit a revised application.

Lastly, there were no applications denied nor were any of the previous recipients of SFA asked to rebate a portion due to census errors.

The U.S. interest rate environment is reacting to some of the global uncertainty. As a result, longer dated Treasury yields are marching higher. As of 9:51 am, the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond is 4.93%, while the 10-year Treasury note yield is at 4.29%. These yields are quite attractive for plans receiving SFA and wanting to secure benefits and expenses with the proceeds. Don’t miss this opportunity to significantly reduce the cost of those future benefits.

01.16.26
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Is A “K” Truly Representative?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I recently attended the Opal Public Fund Forum in Arizona. I’ve always appreciated the opportunity to attend and speak at Opal’s pension conferences. This latest version was no exception. However, I found it interesting that there were two thoughts being expressed over and over again. First, many presenters talked about uncertainty. The other idea centered on the current economic environment, which was frequently described as being K-shaped.

Regarding uncertainty, we often write about the onerous impact of uncertainty on individuals, both from a psychological as well as a physiological standpoint. Yet the pension community continues to embrace uncertainty through implementation of traditional asset allocation approaches, which are potentially subject to significant market events. Why? I’m not going to dwell on this topic today as I’d rather focus some attention of the current economic environment, and I’ve covered many times how Ryan ALM can bring certainty, and a sleep-well-at-night approach, to pension management.

As the title above questions, is defining the current economic environment as a K appropriate? When I look at the letter K, it says to me that 50% of something is advancing while another 50% is declining. Is that what is happening in today’s economy? Are 50% of American workers showing strong economic gains, while 50% struggle? I would say, “NO”! No matter what metrics one reviews, indications are that a far greater percentage of the American workforce is struggling to meet basic living needs than a K would suggest. I’m not sure what letter truly represents today’s conditions, but when only 10%-20% of our households are seeing improved conditions that doesn’t conjure up a K in my mind.

The idea of American Exceptionalism is being challenged by today’s economic realities. It is so disappointing given the potential that we possess as a nation. However, our collective wealth continues to be concentrated among a small percentage of American households at the same time that expenses for basic needs – housing, medical coverage, education, childcare, food, insurance, utilities, and retirement – continue to challenge most budgets.

In a recent article by Adam Bonica, titled “The Wall Looks Permanent Until it Falls”, Adam highlights (lowlights perhaps) the significant differences in key metrics relative to a U.S. peer democracy group of 31 developed nations (OECD). For instance, he shows multiple stats in four broad categories, including Economy and Inequality, Family and Livelihood, Survival and Safety, and Institutions and Justice. It is not to say that these peers don’t have these issues – they do. They just experience them at much lower rates. The comparisons that Mr. Bonica focused on were just the averages for the peer group relative to the U.S., and they prove quite stark.

For instance, the peer average for the Top 1% of households by income is 12.8%, while in the U.S. it is 21%! If the Top 1% of earners just took 12.8%, every American household would get an additional $19k/year. If the Top 1% of Household wealth in the U.S. only had 23.2% of the country’s wealth instead of the 30.6% it currently has, every American household would have an additional $96k. A big expenditure every year for American households is healthcare. Our peers average 9.2% of one’s household spending while we average 17.1%. Just matching the rate of spending would reduce our annual expenditure for healthcare by -2.1T/year. Oh, and it isn’t like our “investment” in healthcare is reaping longevity rewards – it isn’t, as we average -4.1 years less than our average peer (78.4 years versus 82.5 years).

We can do a lot better as a society and economy. There are currently 15 million Americans working full-time that earn a level of income that is below the poverty line. Not acceptable. Only about 10% of the American workers are in DB pension plans. As I’ve stated many times, asking untrained individuals to fund, manage, and then disburse a “benefit” without disposable income, no investment acumen, and no crystal ball to help with longevity is just poor policy. Again, we can do better. Ron and I and the Ryan ALM team are focused on protecting and preserving DB pension plans. I wish that we could do more!

01.09.26
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Milliman: Corporate Pension Funding UP – Again!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Milliman released its monthly Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index (PFI), which analyzes the 100 largest U.S. corporate pension plans. They reported that the funded ratio has now improved for nine straight months – impressive! As of December 31, 2025, the funded ratio for the index constituents is 108.1%, which is up substantially from year end 2024’s 103.6%.

The increase in the funded ratio for December (and the year) was mostly driven by the performance of the assets for the index’s constituents that saw an 11.32% average return for the year, increasing asset values by $53 billion. A rather stable interest rate environment lead to only a $1 billion decline in the PV of those FV liabilities.

According to Zorast Wadia, author of the Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index report, “discount rates fell during the year, and this trend could extend into 2026, potentially reversing some of the recent funded status gains and underscoring the continued need for prudent asset-liability management.” We couldn’t agree more.

It was the significant decline in U.S. interest rates during a nearly four decade bull market for bonds that really crushed funding for private DB pension plans. It would be tragic to witness a deterioration in the funded ratio/status after reclaiming a strong financial footing. Secure those promises and sit back and enjoy managing surplus assets.

Here is the link to the full December report: View this month’s complete Pension Funding Index

12.30.25
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Pension Reform or Just Benefit Cuts?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

According to NIRS, at least 48 U.S. states undertook significant public pension reforms in the years following the global financial crisis (GFC), with virtually every state making some form of change to its public pension retirement systems. I’ve questioned for some time that those “reforms” were nothing more than benefit cuts. When I think of reform, I think of how pension plans are managed, and not what they pay out in promised benefits. However, this wasn’t the case for those 48 states which mostly asked their participants to contribute more, work for more years, and ultimately get less in benefits.

Equable Institute released the second edition of its Retirement Security Report, a comprehensive assessment of the retirement income security provided to U.S. state and local government workers. The report evaluated 1,953 retirement plans across the country to determine how well public employees are being put on a path to secure and adequate retirement income. Unfortunately, the reports findings support my view that pension reforms were nothing more than benefit cuts. Here are a couple of the points:

“Retirement benefit values have declined significantly: The expected lifetime value of retirement benefits for a typical full-career public employee has dropped by more than $140,000 since 2006, primarily due to policy changes after the Great Recession such as higher retirement ages, longer vesting, and reduced COLAs.“

“Only 46.6% of public workers are being served well by their retirement plans.“

Yes, newer plan designs are allowing for greater portability through hybrid and defined contribution plans, but as I’ve discussed in many blog posts, asking untrained individuals to fund, manage, and then disburse a “benefit” without the necessary disposable income, investment acumen, and a crystal ball to help with longevity issues is poor policy. We have an affordability issue in this country and it is being compounded by this push away from DB pensions to DC offerings.

Pension reform needs to be more than just benefit adjustments. We need a rethink regarding how these plans are managed. As we have said on many occasions, the primary objective in managing a pension plan is not one focused on return, which just guarantees volatility in outcomes. Managing a pension plan, public or private, should be about securing the promises that were given to the plan’s participants. That should be accomplished at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk.

Regrettably, most pensions are taking on more risk as they migrate significant assets to alternatives. In the process they have reduced liquidity to meet benefits and dramatically increased costs with no promise of actually meeting return projections. Furthermore, many of the alternative assets have become overcrowded trades that ultimately drive down future returns. Higher fees and lower returns – not a great formula for success.

It is time to get off the performance rollercoaster. Sure, recent returns have been quite good (for public markets), but as we’ve witnessed many times in the past, markets don’t always cooperate and when they don’t, years of good performance can evaporate very quickly. Changing one’s approach to managing a pension plan doesn’t have to be revolutionary. In fact, it is quite simple. All one needs to do is bifurcate the plan’s assets into two buckets – liquidity and growth – as opposed to having 100% of the assets focused on the ROA. Your plan likely has a healthy exposure to core fixed income that comes with great interest rate risk. Use that exposure to fill your liquidity bucket and convert those assets from an active strategy to a cash flow matching (CFM) portfolio focused on your fund’s unique liabilities.

Once that simple task has been done, you will now have SECURED a portion of your plan’s promises (benefits) chronologically from next month as far into the future as that allocation will take you. In the process the growth assets now have a longer investing horizon that should enhance the probability of achieving the desired outcome. Contribution expenses and the funded status will become more stable. As your plan’s funded status improves, allocate more of the growth assets to the liquidity bucket further stabilizing and securing the benefits.

This modest change will get your fund off that rollercoaster of returns. The primary objective of securing benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk will become a reality and true pension reform will be realized.

12.29.25
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A Time to Look Back

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Nearly eight years ago (2/28/18), I produced a blog post titled, “Let’s Just Cut Them Off!”, in which I took offense to an article trashing pension legislation then referred to as the “Butch Lewis Act” (BLA). The writer of the article, Rachel Greszler, The Heritage Foundation, stated that the BLA (as well as other potential solutions at that time) were nothing more than tax-payer bailouts.  She estimated that these bailouts could amount to as much as $1 trillion. I stated at that time that “I don’t know where she has gotten this figure, but it is not close to reality.”

Ms. Greszler defined the potential recipients of these loans (now grants) as the entire universe of multi-employer plans totaling roughly 1,375 (at that time) with an unfunded liability of $500 billion.  However, the Butch Lewis Act, and subsequently ARPA) was only designed for those plans that were designated as “Critical and Declining”.  The total amount of underfunding for that cohort was roughly $70 billion.  A far cry from the $1 trillion that she highlighted above.

So, where are we today? I’m happy to report that as of 12/19/25, the PBGC has approved Special Financial Assistance to 151 pension plans totaling $75.2 billion. These grants are ensuring that 1,873,112 American workers will receive the retirement benefits they were promised! Amazing!

In my original post, I wrote “given the author’s concern for the million or so union workers whose benefits may be trashed, she certainly doesn’t propose any solutions other than to say that a “bailout” is a horrible way to go.  If these plans don’t receive assistance, they are likely to fail, placing a greater burden on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which is already financially troubled.” Fortunately, through the ARPA pension legislation, the PBGC’s multiemployer insurance fund is stronger today than it has been in decades.

I finished my post with the following thoughts: “Retirement benefits stimulate economic activity, and usually on the local level. The loss of retirement benefits will have a direct impact on these economies. Also, these benefits are taxed, which helps pay for a portion of the loans (now grants). Doing nothing is not an answer. I applaud the effort of those individuals who are driving the Butch Lewis Act. I encourage everyone to reach out to your legislatures to educate them on the BLA and to gain their support. There are millions of Americans who need your support.  Thank you!”

I was thrilled to work with Ron Ryan and the BLA team headed by John Murphy and David Blitzstein. It remains one of the highlights of my 44-year career. Who knew when I began working with Ron and that team it would lead me to eventually join Ryan ALM, Inc. We continue to fight to protect and preserve DB pensions for the masses. There is a ton of work remaining to do. Securing those promises through cash flow matching (CFM) is an important first step. Let us help you accomplish that objective.

12.15.25
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Bond Math and A Steepening Yield Curve – Perfect Together!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

We are in the midst of a project for a DB pension plan in which we were asked to model a series of liability cash flows (benefits and expenses) using cash flow matching (CFM) to defease and secure those liabilities. The plan sponsor is looking to allocate 40% of the plan’s assets initially to begin to de-risk the fund.

We first approached the assignment by looking to defease 100% of the liabilities as far into the future as that 40% allocation would cover those benefits and expenses. As it turns out, we can defease the next 11-years of projected B&E beginning 1/1/26 and carrying through to 10/31/37. As we’ve written many times in this blog and in other Ryan ALM research (ryanalm.com), we expect to reduce the cost of future liabilities by about 2% per year in this interest rate environment. Well, as it turns out, we can reduce that future cost today by 23.96% today.

Importantly, not only is the liquidity enhanced through this process and the future expenses covered for the next 11-years, we’ve now extended the investing horizon for the remaining assets (alpha assets) that can now just grow unencumbered without needing to tap them for liquidity purposes – a wonderful win/win!

As impressive as that analysis proved to be, we know that bond math is very straightforward: the longer the maturity and the higher the yield, the greater the potential cost savings. Couple this reality with the fact that the U.S. Treasury yield curve has steepened during the last year, and you have the formula for far greater savings/cost reduction. In fact, the spread between 2-year Treasury notes and 30-year bonds has gone from 0.35% to 1.35% today. That extra yield is the gift that keeps on giving.

So, how does one use only 40% of the plan’s assets to take advantage of both bond math and the steepening yield curve when you’ve already told everyone that a full implementation CFM only covers the next 11-years? You do a vertical slice! A what? A vertical slice of the liabilities in which you use 40% of the assets to cover all of the future liabilities. No, you are not providing all of the liquidity necessary to meet monthly benefits and expenses, but you are providing good coverage while extending the defeasement out 30-years. Incredibly, by using this approach, we are able to reduce the future cost of those benefits not by an impressive 24%, but by an amazing 56.1%. In fact, we are reducing the future cost of those pension promises by a greater sum than the amount of assets used in the strategy.

Importantly, this savings or cost reduction is locked-in on day one. Yes, the day that the portfolio is built, that cost savings is created provided that we don’t experience a default. As an FYI, investment-grade corporate bonds have defaulted at a rate of 0.18% or about 2/1,000 bonds for the last 40-years according to S&P.

Can you imagine being able to reduce the cost of your future obligations by that magnitude and with more certainty than through any other strategy currently in your pension plan? What a great gift it is to yourself (sleep-well-at-night) and those plan participants for whom you are responsible. Want to see what a CFM strategy implemented by Ryan ALM can do for you? Just provide us with some basic info (call me at 201/675-8797 to find out what we need) and we’ll provide you with a free analysis. No gimmicks!

12.11.25
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Something Has Got to Give

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s FOMC lowered rates another 25 bps today. The new target is 3.75%-4.0%, down from 4.5%-4.75% during the last 3 meetings. Currently, the 10-year Treasury yield (4.145% at 3:21 pm EST) is only marginally greater than the median CPI (Latest reading from the Cleveland Fed is 3.5% annually).

Ryan ALM, Inc.’s Head Trader, Steve DeVito put together the following comparison.

Steve is comparing the 10-year Treasury note yield (blue) versus the Median CPI (red) since January 2016. The green line is the “real” yield (10-year Treasury – the median CPI). For this period of time, there has been very little real yield, as U.S. rates were driven to historic lows before inflation spiked due to Covid-19 factors. However, historically (1962-2025), the real yield has average 2%. With rates down and inflation remaining stubbornly steady to increasing slightly, the real yield that investors are willing to take is, and has been, quite modest (0.17% since 2008). Why? Were the historically low rates in reaction to covid-19 an anomaly, or has something changed from an investor standpoint? Given today’s fundamentals, one might assume that investors are anticipating a sudden reversal in inflation, but is that a smart bet?

The WSJ produced the graph in today’s edition highlighting the change in the U.S. Treasury yield curve during the last year. As one can clearly see, the yield curve has gotten much steeper with the 30-year Treasury bond yield 0.4% above last year’s level (at 4.81%). That steepness would indicate to me that there is more risk longer term from inflation potentially rising.

So, it seems as if something has to give. If inflation remains at these levels, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note should be about 1.25% greater than today. If in fact, yields were to rise to that level, active core fixed income managers would see significant principal losses. However, cash flow matching managers and their clients would see the potential for greater cost reduction in the defeasing of pension liabilities, especially for longer-term programs. Bond math is very straight forward. The longer the maturity and the higher the yield, the greater the cost savings.

Managing a pension plan should be all about cash flows. That is asset cash flows versus liability cash flows of benefits and expenses. Higher yields reduce the future value of those promises. Remember, a CFM strategy is unique in that it brings an element of certainty (barring a default) to the management of pensions which live in a world of great uncertainty. Aren’t you ready for a sleep-well-at-night strategy?