Tag Archives: Investing

09.11.25
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U.S. Rates Likely to Fall – Here’s the Good and Bad

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Unfortunately, there exists weakness in the U.S. labor force, as a notable deterioration in job creation, initial jobless claims, and job openings is taking place at this time. This weakness will likely lead the Federal Reserve to lower U.S. interest rates at the next FOMC, which takes place next week with an announcement on the 18th. The current consensus is for a 0.25% reduction in the Fed Fund’s Rate to 4.0%-4.25%. There is also a rising expectation that the “cut” could be larger. That might be more hope than reality at this time, given the CPI’s 0.4% posting today.

So, if rates were to be lowered, who benefits and who gets hurt? Well, individuals seeking loans – mortgages, cars, student loans – certainly benefit. But individuals hoping to generate some income from savings and retirement assets get hurt, especially since these rates tend to be shorter maturity instruments. Who else is impacted? Fixed income asset managers will benefit if they are holding coupon bonds, as falling rates drive bond prices upward. However, those holding bonds with adjustable yields won’t benefit as much.

How about DB pension funds? Yes, those pension funds invested in U.S. fixed income will likely see asset appreciation. However, both public and multiemployer plans have dramatically reduced their average exposure to this asset class. According to P&I’s annual survey, multiemployer plans have 18.2% in U.S. domestic fixed income, while public plans have roughly 18.7% of plan assets dedicated to U.S. fixed income. As a point of reference, corporate plans have nearly half of the plan’s assets dedicate to fixed income (45.4%). As rates fall, these plans will see some appreciation providing a boost in their quest to achieve the desired ROA. Great!

However, let us not forget that pension liabilities will be negatively impacted by falling rates, as they are bond-like in nature and the present value of those liabilities will grow. This is what crushed DB pensions during the massive decline in interest rates from 1982 until 2021. A move down in rates will directly benefit less than 50% of the assets, if we are talking about a corporate plan, and <20% of the assets for multiemployer and public funds. However, 100% of the liabilities will be impacted! Doesn’t seem like a good trade-off. As a result, funded ratios will decline and funded status shortfalls will grow, leading to greater contributions.

Given the mismatch identified above, I’d recommend that you not celebrate a potential decline in rates if you are a plan sponsor or asset consultant, unless you are personally looking for a loan. I would also recommend that you align your plan’s asset cash flows (principal and income from bonds) with your liability cash flows (benefits and expenses) while rates remain moderately high. As I’ve stated many times in this blog, Pension America had a great opportunity to de-risk DB pensions in 1999 but failed to act. Please don’t let this opportunity slip by without appropriate action.

09.09.25
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A Peer Group?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Got an email today that got my heart rate up a little. The gist of the article was related to a particular public pension fund that eclipsed its “benchmark” return for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025. Good job! However, the article went on to state that they failed to match or exceed the median return of 10.2% for the 108 public pension funds with asset >$1 billion. What a silly concept.

Just as there are no two snowflakes alike, there are no two public pension systems that are the same, even within the same state or city. Each entity has a different set of characteristics including its labor force, plan design, risk tolerance, benefit structure, ability to contribute, and much more. The idea that any plan should be compared to another is not right. Again, it is just silly!

As we’ve discussed hundreds of times, the only thing that should matter for any DB pension plan is that plan’s specific liabilities. The fund has made a promise, and it is that promise that should be the “benchmark” not some made up return on asset (ROA) assumption. How did this fund do versus their liabilities? Well, that relationship was not disclosed – what a shocker!

Interestingly, the ROA wasn’t highlighted either. What was mentioned was the fact that the plan’s returns for 3-, 5-, and 10-years were only 6.2%, 6.6%, and 5.4%, respectively (these are net #s), and conveniently, they just happened to beat their policy benchmark in each period.

I’d be interested to know how the funded ratio/status changed? Did contribution expenses rise or fall? Did they secure any of the promised benefits? Did they have to create another tier for new entrants? Were current participants asked to contribute more, work longer, and perhaps get less?

I am a huge supporter of defined benefit plans provided they are managed appropriately. That starts with knowing the true pension objective and then managing to that goal. Nearly all reporting on public pension plans focuses on returns, returns, returns. When not focusing on returns the reporting will highlight asset allocation shifts. The management of a DB pension plan with a focus on returns only guarantees volatility and not success. I suspect that the 3-, 5-, and 10-year return above failed to meet the expected ROA. As a result, contributions likely escalated. Oh, and this fund uses leverage (???) that gives them a 125% notional exposure on their total assets. I hope that leverage can be removed quickly and in time for the next correction.

09.05.25
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I’m Concerned! Are You?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I’ve been concerned about the U.S. retirement industry for many years, with a particular focus on traditional pensions. The demise of DB pensions is a major social and economic issue for a significant majority of American workers, who fear that their golden years will be greatly tarnished without the support of a traditional DB pension plan coupled with their inability to fund a supplemental retirement vehicle, such as a defined contribution plan.

I recently had hope that the rising U.S. interest rate environment would bring about a sea change in the use of DB pensions, but I haven’t seen the tidal wave yet. That said, the higher rate environment did (could still) provide plan sponsors with the ability to take some risk off the table, but outside of private pensions, I’ve witnessed little movement away from a traditional asset allocation framework. You see, the higher rate environment reduces the present value cost of those future benefit payments improving both the funded ratio and funded status of DB pensions, while possibly reducing ongoing contributions. Securing those benefits, even for just 10-years dramatically reduces risk.

But, again, I’ve witnessed too few plans engaging in alternative asset allocation strategies. That’s not the same as engaging in alternative strategies, which unfortunately continues to be all the rage despite the significant flows into these products, which will likely diminish future returns, and the lack of distributions from them, too. An alternative asset allocation strategy that Ryan ALM supports and recommends is the bifurcation of assets into two buckets – liquidity and growth – as opposed to having all of the plan’s assets focused on the return on asset (ROA) assumption.

By dividing the assets into two buckets, one can achieve multiple goals simultaneously. The liquidity bucket, constituting investment grade bonds, will be used to defease the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses, while the growth or alpha assets can grow unencumbered with the goal of being used to defease future liabilities (current active lives). One of the most important investment tenets is time. As mentioned above, defeasing pension liabilities for even 10-years dramatically enhances the probability of the alpha assets achieving the desired outcome.

So why am I concerned? The lack of risk mitigation is of great concern. I’m tired of watching pensions ride the rollercoaster of returns up and down until something breaks, which usually means contributions go up and benefits go down! Given the great uncertainty related to both the economy and the labor force, why would anyone embrace the status quo resulting in many sleepless nights? Do something, and not just for the sake of doing something. Really do something! Embrace the asset allocation framework that we espouse. Migrate your current core bond allocation to a defeased bond allocation known as cash flow matching (CFM) to bring an element of certainty to the management of your plan.

Listen, if rates fall as a result of a deteriorating labor force and economy, the present value of pension liabilities will rise. Given that scenario, it is highly likely that asset prices will fall, too. That is a lethal combination, and not unique given how many times I’ve seen that play out during my 44-year career. Reach out to us if you aren’t sure how to start the process. We’d be pleased to take you through a series of scenarios so that you can determine what is possible. Perhaps you’ll sleep like a baby after we talk.

09.05.25
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Today is National 401(k) Day. Where is National DB Pension Plan Day?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I suspect that most of us have no idea that today, September 5, 2025, is National 401(k) Day. This day is recognized every year on the Friday following Labor Day. The day is supposed to be an opportunity for retirement savings education and for companies to inform their employees about their ability to invest in company sponsored 401(k)s. Did you get your update today? Unfortunately, like many small company employees, I don’t have access to one or a DB plan.

For the uninformed, 401(k) plans are defined contribution plans (DC). This plan type was created in the late 1970s (Revenue Act of 1978) as a “supplemental” benefit. Corporate America liked the idea of a DC offering because it helped them recruit middle and senior management types who wouldn’t accrue enough time in the company’s traditional pension plan. Again, the benefit was supplemental to the traditional monthly pension payment and not in lieu of it!

I think that defined contribution plans are fine as long as they remain supplemental to a DB plan. Asking untrained individuals to fund, manage, and then disburse a retirement benefit is a ridiculous exercise, especially given their lack of disposable income, investment acumen, and NO crystal ball to help with longevity issues. In fact, why do we think that 99.9% of Americans have this ability? Regrettably, we have a significant percentage (estimated at 28%) of our population living within 200% of the poverty line. Do you think that they have any discretionary income that would permit them to fund a retirement benefit when housing, health insurance, food, education, childcare, and transportation costs eat up most, if not all, of an individual’s take home pay? Remember, these plans are only “successful” based on what is contributed. Sure, there may be a company match of some kind, but we witnessed what can happen during difficult economic times, when the employer contribution suddenly vanishes.

Defined benefit plans are the gold standard of retirement vehicles. They once covered more than 40% of the private sector workforce, most union employees, and roughly 85% of public sector workers. What happened? Did we lose focus on the primary objective in managing a DB plan which is to SECURE the promised benefits in a cost-effective manner with prudent risk? Did our industry’s focus on the return on asset assumption (ROA) create an untenable environment? Yes, we got more volatility and less liquidity! Did we did we get the commensurate return? Not consistently. It was this volatility of the funded ratio/status that impacted the financial statements and led to the decision to freeze and terminate a significant percentage of private DB plans. It is a tragic outcome!

What we have today is a growing economic divide among the haves and haves-not. This schism continues to grow, and the lack of retirement security is only making matters worse. DB plans can be managed effectively where excess volatility is not tolerated, where the focus is on the promised benefit and not some made up ROA, and where decisions that are made relative to investment structure and asset allocation are predicated on the financial health of the plan: mainly the funded status. We need DB plans more than ever and ONLY a return to pension basics will help us in this quest. Forget about all the newfangled investment products being sold. Replacing one strategy for another is no better than shifting deck chairs on the Titanic. We need improved governance and a renewed focus on why pensions were provided in the first place.

08.27.25
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Not So Fast

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

In addition to publishing my thoughts through this blog, I frequently put sound bites out through LinkedIn.com. The following is an example of such a comment: Given Powell’s statement about “balancing dual mandates”, it seems premature to assume that the Fed’s next move on rates is downward. Tariffs have only recently kicked in and their presence could create a very challenging situation for the Fed should inflation continue on its path upward. Market reaction seems overblown. September’s CPI/PPI numbers could be very interesting.

As a follow-up to that comment, here is a graph from Bloomberg highlighting the recent widening in the spread between 5-year and 30-year Treasuries, which is at its widest point in the last 4 years.  This steeping of the yield curve would suggest that inflation is being more heavily anticipated on the long end.

As I mentioned above, the reaction to Powell’s comments from Wyoming last Friday seemed overblown given the rethinking about “dual mandates”. Inflation has recently reversed the downward trajectory and with the impact of tariffs yet to be truly felt, it is doubtful that we’ll see inflation fall to levels that would provide comfort to the U.S. Federal Reserve policy makers. Yes, there may be a small (25 bps) cut in September, but should inflation continue to be a concern the spread in Treasury yields referenced above could continue to widen. President Trump’s goal of jumpstarting the housing market through lower mortgage rates would not likely occur.

From a pension perspective, higher rates reduce the present value of those future promised benefits. They also provide implementers of cash flow matching (CFM) strategies, such as Ryan ALM Advisers, LLC, the opportunity to defease those pension liabilities at a lower cost (greater cost savings). Bond math is very straight forward. The higher the yield and the longer the maturity, the greater the cost savings. Although higher rates might not be good for U.S. equities, especially given their current valuations, the ability to reduce risk at this time through a CFM strategy should be comforting.

Bifurcate your asset allocation into two buckets – liquidity and growth. The liquidity bucket will house the CFM strategy, providing all the necessary liquidity to meet ongoing monthly obligations as far into the future as the allocation will cover. The remaining assets (all non-core bonds) in the growth or alpha portfolio will now have more time to just grow unencumbered, as they are no longer a source of liquidity. Time is a critical investment tenet, and with more time, the probability of meeting the expected return is enhanced.

There is tremendous uncertainty in our markets and economy currently. One can bring an element of certainty to the management of pensions, live with great uncertainty.

08.22.25
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Confusing the Purpose!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

There recently appeared in my inbox an article from an investment advisory firm discussing Cash Flow Driven Investing (CDI). Given that CDI, or as we call it Cash Flow Matching (CFM), is our only investment strategy, I absorb as much info from “competitors” as I can.

The initial point in the article’s summary read “There is no one-size-fits-all approach for cashflow driven investment strategies.” We concur, as each client’s liabilities are unique to them. Like snowflakes, there are no two pension plan liability streams that are the same. As such, each CDI/CFM portfolio needs to reflect those unique cash flows.

The second point in their summary of key points is where we would depart in our approach. They stated: “While most will have a core allocation to investment grade credit, the broader design can vary greatly to reflect individual requirements.” This is where I believe that the purpose in using CFM is confused and unnecessarily complicated. CFM should be used to defease a plan’s net outflows with certainty. At Ryan ALM, Inc. we use 100% of the bond assets to accurately match the liability cash flows most often through the use of investment-grade corporate bonds. Furthermore, It is a strategy that will reduce risk, while stabilizing the plan’s funded status and contribution expenses associated with the portion of the liability cash flows that is defeased. It is not an alpha generator, although the use of corporate bonds will provide an excess yield relative to Treasuries and STRIPS, providing some alpha.

As we’ve discussed many times in this blog, traditional asset allocation approaches having all of the plan’s assets focused on a return objective is inappropriate for the pension objective to secure and fully fund benefits in a cost-efficient manner despite overwhelming use. We continue to espouse the bifurcation of the assets into liquidity and growth buckets. The liquidity bucket should be an investment-grade corporate bond portfolio that cash flow matches the liability cash flows chronologically from the next month as far out as the allocation will cover. The remaining assets are the growth or alpha assets that now have time to grow unencumbered.

Why take risk in the CFM portfolio by adding emerging markets debt, high yield, and especially illiquid assets, when the purpose of the portfolio is to create certainty and liquidity to meet ongoing benefits and expenses? If the use of those other assets is deemed appropriate, include them in the alpha bucket. As a reminder, CFM has been used successfully for many decades. Plan sponsors live with great uncertainty every day, as markets are constantly moving. Why not embrace a strategy that gives you a level of certainty not available in other strategies? Use riskier strategies when they have time to wade through potentially choppy markets. CFM provides such a bridge. If you give most investment strategies a 10-year time horizon without the need to provide liquidity, you dramatically enhance the probability of achieving the desired or expected outcome.

Unfortunately, we have a tendency in our industry to over-complicate the management of pensions. Using a CFM strategy focused on the plan’s liabilities, and not the ROA, brings the management of pensions back to its roots. Take risks when you have the necessary time. Focusing the assets on the ROA creates a situation in which one or more assets may have to be traded (sold) in order to meet the required outflows. Those trades might have to be done in environments in which natural liquidity does not exist.

08.20.25
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Hey Ryan ALM – What if…?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

We hope that you are enjoying a wonderful summer season. Thanks for taking the time to visit our blog, where we’ve now produced >1,650 mostly pension-related posts.

I wanted to share the following email exchange from earlier this week. I received an email at 6:40 pm on Monday from a senior member of the actuarial community who is familiar with our work. He said that he had a client meeting on Wednesday and he was wondering if we could model some potential outcomes should the plan decide to take some risk off the table by engaging a cash flow matching strategy (CFM).

The actuary gave us the “net” liabilities (after contributions) for the next 10-years and then asked two questions. How far out into the future would $200 million in AUM cover? If the client preferred to defease the next 10-years of net liabilities, how much would that cost? We were happy to get this inquiry because we are always willing to be a resource for members of our industry, including plan sponsors, consultants, and actuaries.

We produced two CFM portfolios, which we call the Liability Beta Portfolio™ or LBP, in response to the two questions that had been posed. In the first case, the $200 million in AUM would provide the client with coverage of $225.8 million in future value (FV) liabilities through March 31, 2031 for a total cost of $196.3 million. Trying to defease the next 10-years of liabilities would cost the plan $334.8 million in AUM to defease $430 million in net liabilities.

 $200 million in AUM10-year coverage
End Date3/31/31 7/01/35
FV$225,750,000$430,000,000
PV$196,315,548$334,807,166
YTM  4.52%  4.75%
MDur  2.73 years  4.45 years
Cost Savings $-$29,424,452-$95,192,834
Cost Savings %  13.04%   22.14%
Excess CF$230,375$679,563
RatingBBB+  A-

As we’ve mentioned on many occasions, the annual cost savings to defease liabilities averages roughly 2%/year, but as the maturity of the program lengthens that cost savings becomes greater. We believe that providing the necessary liquidity with certainty is comforting for all involved. Not only is the liquidity available when needed, but the remaining assets not engaged in the CFM program can now grow unencumbered.

If you’d like to see how a CFM program could improve your plan’s liquidity with certainty, just provide us with the forecasted contributions, benefits, and expenses, and we’ll do the rest. Oh, and by the way, we got the analysis completed and to the actuary by 12:30 pm on Tuesday in plenty of time to allow him to prepare for his Wednesday meeting. Don’t be shy. We don’t charge for this review.

08.14.25
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Are Investors About to Get Their Comeuppance?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As we’ve discussed in this blog on many occasions, the U.S. interest rate decline from 1982 to 2022 fueled risk assets well beyond their fundamentals. During the rate decline, investors became accustomed to the US Federal Reserve stepping in when markets and the economy looked dicey. There seems to be a massive expectation that the “Fed” will once again support those same risk assets by initiating another rally through a rate decline perhaps as soon as September. Is that action justified? I think not!

Recent inflation data, including today’s PPI that came in at 0.9% vs. 0.2% expected, should give pause to the crowd screaming for lower rates. Yes, employment #s published last week were very weak, and they got weaker when Erika McEntarfer, the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, was fired after releasing a jobs report that angered President Donald Trump. In addition, we have Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent, demanding rates be cut by as much as 150-175 bps, claiming that all forecasting “models” suggest the same direction for rates. Is that true? Again, I think not.

You may recall that I published a blog post on July 10, 2025 titled “Taylor-Made”, in which I wrote that the Taylor Rule is an economic formula that provides guidance on how central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, should set interest rates in response to changes in inflation and economic output. The rule is designed to help stabilize an economy by systematically adjusting the central bank’s key policy rate based on current economic conditions. It is designed to take the “guess work” out of establishing interest rate policy.

In John Authers (Bloomberg) blog post today, he shared the following chart:

Calling for a roughly 2.6% Fed Funds rate in an environment of 3% or more core and sticky inflation is not prudent, and it is not supported by history. Furthermore, the potential impact from tariffs will only begin to be felt as most went into effect as of August 1, 2025.

Getting back to the Taylor Rule, Authers also provided an updated graph suggesting that the Fed Funds rate should be higher today. In fact, it should be at a level about 100 bps above the current 4.3% and more than 270 bps above the level that Bessent desires.

Investors would be wise to exit the lower interest rate train before it fuels a significant increase in U.S. rates as inflation once again rises. The impact of higher rates will negatively impact all risk assets. Given that a Cash Flow Matching (CFM) strategy eliminates interest rate risk through the defeasement of benefits and expenses that are future values and thus not interest rate sensitive, one could bring an element of certainty to this very uncertain economic environment before investors get their comeuppance! Don’t wait for the greater inflation to appear, as it might just be too late at that point to get off the lower interest rate train before it plummets into a ravine.

07.31.25
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When Should I Use CFM?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Good morning. I’m currently in Chicago in the midst of several meetings. Yesterday’s meetings were outstanding. As you’d expect, the conversations were centered on DB pension plans and the opportunity to de-risk through a Cash Flow Matching strategy (CFM) in today’s economic environment. The line of questioning that I received from each of my meeting hosts was great. However, there does seem to be a misconception on when and how to use CFM as a de-risking tool. Most believe that you engage CFM for only the front-end of the yield curve, while others think that CFM is only useful when a plan is at or near full funding. Yes, both of those implementations are useful, but that represents a small sampling of when and how to implement CFM. For instance:

As a plan sponsor you need to make sure that you have the liquidity necessary to meet you monthly benefits (and expenses). Do you have a liquidity policy established that clearly defines the source(s) of liquidity or are you scurrying around each month sweeping dividends, interest, and if lucky, capital distributions from your alternative portfolio? Unfortunately, most plan sponsors do not have a formal liquidity policy as part of their Investment Policy Statement (IPS). CFM ensures that the necessary liquidity is available every month of the assignment. There is not forced selling!

Do you currently have a core fixed income allocation? According to a P&I asset allocation survey, public pension plans have an average 18.9% in public fixed income. How are you managing that interest rate risk, which remains the greatest risk for an actively managed fixed income portfolio? As an industry, we enjoyed the benefits of a nearly four decades decline in U.S. interest rates beginning in 1982. However, the prior 28-years witnessed rising rates. Who knows if the current rise in rates is a blip or the start of another extended upward trend? CFM defeases future benefit payments which are not interest rate sensitive. A $2,000 payment next month or 10-years from now is $2,000 whether rates rise or fall. As a result, CFM mitigates interest rate risk.

As you have sought potentially greater returns from a move into alternatives and private investments, not only has the available liquidity dried up, but you need a longer time horizon for those investments to mature and produce the expected outcome. Have you created a bridge within your plan’s asset allocation that will mitigate normal market gyrations? A 10-year CFM allocation will not only provide your plan with the necessary monthly liquidity, but it is essentially a bridge over volatile periods as it is the sole source of liquidity allowing the “alpha” assets to just grow and grow. That 10-year program coincides nicely with many of the lock-ins for alternative strategies.

There has been improvement in the funded status of public pension plans. According to Milliman, as of June 30, 2025, the average funded ratio for the constituents in their top 100 public pension index is now 82.9%, which is the highest level since December 2021. That’s terrific to see. Don’t you want to preserve that level of funding and the contribution expenses that coincide with that level? Riding the rollercoaster of performance can’t be comforting. Given what appears to be excessive valuations within equity markets and great uncertainty as it relates to the economic environment, are you willing to let your current exposures just ride? By allocating to a CFM program, you stabilize a portion of your plan’s funded status and the contributions associated with those Retired Lives Liability. Bringing a level of certainty to a very uncertain process should be a desirable goal for all plan sponsors and their advisors.

If I engage a CFM mandate, don’t I negatively impact my plan’s ability to meet the return objective (ROA) that we have established? NO! The Ryan ALM CFM portfolio will be heavily skewed to investment-grade corporate bonds (most portfolios are 100% corporates) that enjoy a significant premium yield relative to Treasuries and agencies. As mentioned previously, public pension plans already have an exposure to fixed income. That exposure is already included in the ROA calculation. By substituting a higher yielding CFM portfolio for a lower yielding core fixed income program benchmarked to the Aggregate index, you are enhancing the plan’s ability to achieve the ROA while also eliminating interest rate risk. A win-win in my book!

So, given these facts, how much should I allocate to a CFM mandate? The answer is predicated on many factors, including the plan’s current funded status, the ability to contribute, whether or not the plan is in a negative cash flow situation, the Board’s risk appetite, the current ROA, and others. Given that all pension systems’ liabilities are unique, there is no one correct answer. At Ryan ALM, we are happy to provide a detailed analysis on what could be done and at what cost to the plan. We do this analysis for free. When can we do yours?

07.24.25
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A few Observations from Newport

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As I mentioned in my ARPA update on Monday, I had the pleasure of attending the Opal Public Fund Forum East in beautiful Newport, RI, and neither the conference nor Newport disappointed. I don’t attend every session during the conference, but I do try to attend most. In all honesty, I can’t listen to another private equity discussion.

As always, there were terrific insights shared by the speakers/moderators, but there were also some points being made that are just wrong. With this being my first day back in the office this week, I don’t have the time to get into great detail regarding some of my concerns about what was shared, but I’ll give you the headline and perhaps link a previous blog post that addressed the issue.

First, DB pension plans are not Ponzi Schemes that need more new participants than retirees to keep those systems well-funded and functioning. Actuaries determine benefits and contributions based on each individual’s unique characteristics. If managed appropriately, systems with fewer new members can function just fine. Yes, plans that find themselves in a negative cash flow situation need to rethink the plan’s asset allocation, but they can continue to serve their participants just fine. Remember: a DB pension plan’s goal is to pay the last benefit payment with the last $. It is not designed to provide an inheritance.

Another topic that was mentioned several times was the U.S. deficit and the impending economic doom as a result. The impact of the U.S. deficit is widely misunderstood. I was fortunate to work with a brilliant individual at Invesco – Charles DuBois – who took the time to educate me on the subject. As a result of his teaching, I now understand that the U.S. has a potential demand problem. Not a debt issue. I wrote a blog post on this subject back in 2017. Please take the time to read anything from Bill Mitchell, Warren Mosler, Stephanie Kelton, and other disciples of MMT.

Lastly, the issue of flows into strategies/asset classes seems not to be understood. The only reason we have cycles in our markets is through the movement of assets into and out of various products/strategies. Too much money chasing too few good ideas creates an environment in which those flows can overwhelm future returns. It is the same for individual asset management firms. Many of the larger asset management firms have become sales organizations in lieu of investment management organizations as they long ago eclipsed the natural capacity of their strategies. In the process, they have arbitraged away their insights which may have provided the basis for some value-added in the past. I believe that too much money is chasing many of the alternative/private strategies. In the process, future returns and liquidity will be negatively impacted. We’ve already seen that within private equity. Is private debt next?

Again, always enjoy seeing friends and industry colleagues at this conference. I continue to learn from so many of the presenters even after 44-years in the industry. However, not everything that you hear will be correct. It is up to you to challenge a lot of the “common wisdom” being shared.