Tag Archives: Investing

04.01.26
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March Proves Challenging for Core Fixed Income

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

March was a difficult month for active core fixed income managers, as the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Index fell -1.8%. Uncertainty related to the impact of the Iran War on oil prices and subsequently inflation, pushed rates higher across the Treasury yield curve. The U.S. 10-year Treasury note saw yields rise 38 bps to 4.31%.

Agencies fell -1.7% in line with Treasuries, while the Corporate sector declined -2.0%. Corporate spreads ended March with an option adjusted spread (OAS) of 88.6 bps. The best performing Corporate sector was Financials (-1.7%), while Utilities performed worst at -2.2%.

The greatest risk managing bonds is interest rate risk. Given both geopolitical (Iran, Taiwan, Ukraine) and economic risks (oil, inflation, interest rates), now is the time to significantly reduce risk within your fund, whether that be a DB pension or E&F. Why continue to ride active fixed income through these uncertain markets? One can use a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy to SECURE and fund net liabilities chronologically well into the future. In the process, interest rate risk is eliminated as future benefits and expenses are not interest rate sensitive.

Furthermore, by securing near-term liabilities, the non-bond assets can now grow unencumbered providing more time to wade through these challenging times. I have no idea how long this conflict will last. I also don’t know how much damage has occurred and that which might still happen to oil production in the Middle East. Implementing a strategy that doesn’t rely on forecasting U.S. interest rates should be a high priority today.

Making the switch is easy. Rotate your current core fixed income assets from an active investment strategy to a CFM portfolio. There isn’t a need to revisit the fund’s asset allocation. We’ll even look for opportunities to take-in-kind some of your existing holdings. You’ll appreciate not having to search each month for the liquidity to meet the monthly promises that have been made to your participants, as the CFM strategy will provide all the liquidity that you need. Moreover, the Ryan ALM CFM model is skewed to A/BBB+ corporate bonds which should outyield most generic bond indexes that are skewed to Treasuries (e.g. the AGG).


03.31.26
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Trouble Paying the Bills?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

“The worst thing that can happen,” Andrew Junkin, CIO, Virginia Retirement System says, “is that you’re a forced seller in any market.”

That quote appeared in a Chief Investment Officer article from March 4, 2026. We couldn’t agree more with Mr. Junkin. Despite improved funding, public funds are being challenged to find adequate cash flow to meet the monthly benefits and expenses. Two factors are at play: 1) improved funding leads to lower annual contributions, and 2) much heavier allocations to alternatives have dried up liquidity, as expected capital distributions fail to materialize.

According to a report by NIRS, from 2001 to 2023, public pension plans shifted roughly 20% of public equity and fixed income into alternatives such as private equity, real estate, and private credit. These are illiquid investments. Despite the “wisdom” of the pension crowd, illiquidity is a RISK and not an alpha generator. As more assets shifted into these illiquid investments, the trades became ever more crowded reducing liquidity further. That is, unless one was willing to take a significant haircut through the secondary markets.

As a reminder, public pension funds are designed to become cash-flow negative over time. Contributions into these funds exceed benefits in earlier decades, building a corpus to be used to fund retirements down the road. They are designed to have the last $ pay the last promised benefit. There is no inheritance waiting for the last few beneficiaries.

You want to have adequate liquidity that isn’t forcing the sale of assets at inopportune times? Develop an asset allocation strategy that bifurcates your assets into two buckets – liquidity and growth – and stop the focus on the ROA as if it were the Holy Grail. It isn’t! Use a cash flow matching (CFM) investment strategy to ensure that abundant liquidity is available from next month as far into the future as your allocation goes. The remainder of the assets go into the growth bucket. If you still want to maintain a heavy allocation to alternatives, they can now grow unencumbered as they are no longer a source of liquidity.

The allocation should be driven by the pension plan’s funded ratio and ability to contribute. We recently provided a large fund with an analysis that showed a plan with <50% funding could still secure the promised NET benefits for the next 33-years, while creating a substantial surplus that could now be managed as aggressively as members of that Board could withstand. Not only are the promised benefits secure, but so are the participants who can now sleep well at night knowing that myriad risks won’t sabotage their golden years.

03.25.26
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What is My Funded Ratio? Who Cares!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

The funded ratio of a DB pension plan gets a lot of attention, especially if it is perceived to be weak. But does the funded ratio truly tell you the whole story as to the financial health of a DB pension plan? We, at Ryan ALM, Inc. don’t think so.

So, how is the funded ratio calculated:

Funded ratio = MV of plan assets / plan liabilities earned to date X 100

The market value of assets is a present value (PV) calculation. The market value of liabilities is the future value of liabilities earned to date discounted back to a PV calculation based on a discount rate. For public and multiemployer plans the discount rate tends to be the fund’s return on asset assumption (ROA), while it is an AA corporate blended rate for private pensions. In today’s interest rate environment, the discount rate for private plans will be roughly 1.5% less than the discount rate based on the average ROA. That means that liabilities for private funds will have a greater current value than the value of liabilities calculated based on the discount rate using the ROA. Oh, okay, so the choice of a discount rate can change my funded ratio. That’s interesting. So that tells me that if I wanted to improve my funded ratio, all I’d have to do is increase my discount rate to lower the PV of my liabilities. That’s very interesting.

So, it appears that the funded ratio calculation can be manipulated to some extent. As we think about the formula above, is there anything missing? Yes, where are the future contributions, which can be significant. Why are future payment liabilities in the calculation, but projected contributions, which are future assets of the fund, not included? Common thinking suggests that those future contributions aren’t guaranteed, which is why they aren’t factored into the funded ratio calculation. However, is that a correct assumption? In doing some research, it appears >80% of DB pension funds receive 100% of the annual required contribution (ARC). Even NJ’s public pension system is making the ARC and then some.

We recently had a conversation with a large plan sponsor who thought that their fund was <50% funded based on the formula above. Not surprisingly, they were very focused on this ratio and looking for investment strategies that could potentially enhance it. As an FYI, this plan’s future contributions as forecasted by their actuary were significant. In fact, future contributions were so large that they were equal to 73% of the forecasted liabilities! Yes, without including the pension fund’s current assets, this plan was 73% funded, provided those projected contributions were met which they have been for more than a decade.

So, given these forecasted contributions is that pension fund really <50% funded?

In another example, the same fund that thought that they were poorly funded, could defease net pension liabilities for the next 33-years. How is it possible that a plan that believes it is <50% funded able to significantly reduce risk, enhance liquidity, and SECURE pension promises for 33-years? Furthermore, this fund was going to establish a $4.4 billion surplus on the day that those benefits and expenses were defeased for 33-years. If it just earned the projected ROA, that $4.4 billion would grow to $34.2 billion during that 33-year period. Wow! 

So, I ask once more, does that sound like a plan in financial distress, which a funded ratio of <50% might suggest? NO!

The funded ratio is but one measure of a pension plan’s health. Unfortunately, many in our industry would look at that # and say that more risk needs to be taken to achieve “full funding” down the road, when in fact reducing risk through a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy is the appropriate approach. It is past the time to get off the scary asset allocation rollercoaster. 

03.24.26
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ARPA Update as of March 20, 2026

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I’m sure that folks were very (perhaps bitterly) disappointed not to get my weekly update yesterday on the PBGC’s implementation of the ARPA pension legislation. I was traveling for business yesterday, but unlike many travelers, my experience at Newark Airport was shockingly positive. I have heard of 4-6 hour waits to get through security and planes that are forced to leave the gate with as few as 5 passengers. Various estimates put the daily impact of these disruptions at $285 million to $580 million once a 10% reduction in flights occurs.

What about ARPA? As regular readers know, the PBGC has worked through a significant majority of non-mass withdrawal applicants. There remains just one fund – Plasterers Local 79 Pension Plan – that hasn’t gotten to submit an initial application form those on the waitlist. There are still a few pension funds from the original Priority Groups that haven’t filed an initial application seeking SFA.

During the prior week, Cumberland, Maryland Teamsters Construction and Miscellaneous Pension Plan received approval of its revised SFA application. They will receive $9.5 million for their 101 plan members. Congrats!

In other news, there is no other news, as there were no new applications submitted, as the PBGC’s eFiling portal remains temporarily closed. Also, there were no applicants denied, no plans were asked to repay a portion of the SFA, and no applications were withdrawn or added to the waitlist.

The treatment of the 80 plans (from potentially 131) currently on the waitlist that fall under the category of plans suffering mass withdrawal prior to 2020 is the last remaining significant issue that the PBGC must still work through.

U.S. Treasury yields have risen sharply since the beginning of the Iran conflict. As challenging as that development is on existing bond funds, the entry point for SFA recipients wanting to use CFM to secure the benefits and expenses is as good as it has been in more than 1-year. As a reminder, higher yields reduce the cost of those future promises.

03.17.26
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What Would You Do?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Happy St. Paddy’s Day to my Irish friends (I’m 1/2 Irish) and those that would like to be. May the luck of the Irish embrace you today.

As many of you know, we are always willing to provide to the pension and E&F communities a free analysis to highlight how a Cash Flow Matching (CFM) mandate could secure the promised benefits/grants for your fund and importantly, provide the necessary liquidity to meet future promises. In many cases, we will produce multiple runs covering a variety of periods usually 5-years to 30-years. Often the sponsor of the fund is shocked by the potential cost reduction of those future obligations.

We recently provided a large pension plan with several potential implementations, as they try to improve the fund’s liquidity profile, while also desiring to secure those future promises. Here are three scenarios that we provided to them and I’d welcome your feedback on what you would do.

Scenario #1 – Provide a CFM portfolio using the core fixed income allocation ($3 billion/15% of total assets) to match and fund the NET (after contributions) liability cash flows of benefits and expenses (B&E). In this scenario, we can cover the next 6-years of B&E through 6/30/32, covering $3.44 billion in FV benefits and expenses for $3.0 billion (a cost reduction of $443.3k or 12.88%). The YTM on the portfolio is 4.09 and the duration 3.09 years, with the average quality being A-. The remaining assets can continue to be managed as they currently are, but they now benefit from a 6-year investing horizon in which they are no longer providing any liquidity to meet monthly obligations.

Scenario #2 – Provide a CFM portfolio using the same $3 billion (only needed $2.96 billion) or 15% of the fund’s total assets, but implement the strategy using a vertical slice of the liabilities going out 30-years. In this example, we can cover 22% of the liability cash flows for the next 30-years. The FV of those liabilities are $6.3 billion (as opposed to the $3.44 billion using 100% CFM for 6-years). We can reduce the FV cost by $3.33 billion or 53%. The remaining 85% of the fund’s assets can be managed as they presently are, but they don’t benefit from the longer investing horizon, as they will be called upon to provide liquidity to meet the residual B&E.

Scenario #3 – 100% CFM covering net liabilities through 6/30/59. In this case we showed that we can cover 100% of the NET B&E for $9.9 billion in assets, while providing the plan with a $4.4 billion surplus. The FV of those B&E through 2059 are reduced by about $13 billion or 56%! The surplus assets now have a 33-year investing horizon to just grow and grow! A modest 6.5% annualized return for that period produces a surplus of $34.2 billion that can be used to fund B&E after 2059, enhance benefits, and/or reduce future contributions. An 8% annualized return produces a surplus >$75 billion. Oh, my! Also, in this scenario, the organization ONLY needs an annual 2.56% return on the remaining assets to fully fund ALL projected B&E well beyond 2059, as determined by our Asset Exhaustion Test (AET).

Importantly, these scenarios only work if the sponsoring entity provides the forecasted contributions, which in this case they have consistently done for the past 10+ years.

So, I ask once again, what would you do? Scenario 1 ($3 billion/15% of total assets) provides a 100% coverage for 6-years while reducing cost by 13%. Scenario 2 reduces the cost of FV B&E by 53% or $3.4 billion, but covers only 22% of the liabilities, while Scenario 3 reduces the FV cost by 56%, while securing the net promises through 2059 for a cost of $9.9 billion resulting in a surplus of $4.4 billion.

I guess that there is a fourth scenario which is to do nothing, but why would you want to continue to ride the proverbial performance rollercoaster that only guarantees volatility and not success when you can secure a portion of the liabilities, significantly reduce the cost of those future promises, improve liquidity, and “buy time” for the residual assets to just grow unencumbered?

As the Irish say – “May the most you wish for be the least you get“.

03.16.26
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Unfortunately, the Joke Was On Us!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I started raising alarm bells related to DB pension exposure to alternatives – mainly private equity and private credit several years ago, and have produced roughly a dozen blog posts that touch on this issue. You may recall some of the posts from 2024:

The Joke’s On Us!

Good Ideas are Often Overwhelmed!

Kinda Silly Question

Well, unfortunately it appears that it is time to pay the piper! As mentioned in the posts listed above, we as an industry don’t truly appreciate the idea that there is a natural capacity to EVERY investment. As an industry, we DO overwhelm good ideas and those funds that are late to the party are often left with just the crumbs in the chaffing dish.

I stumbled over a good, but scary, list of recent events within private credit. The list was compiled by Ignacio Ramirez Moreno, Host of The Blunt Dollar Podcast:

Cliffwater saw 14% redemption requests.

Morgan Stanley’s fund got 10.9%.

Blackstone hit a record 7.9%.

All three capped withdrawals below what investors requested.

Glendon Capital flagged concerns about Blue Owl’s valuations.

Pimco called it “a crisis of really bad underwriting.”

JPMorgan’s marking down loans and tightening lending to private credit funds.

Partners Group thinks defaults could double.

Pimco’s predicting a “full-blown default cycle.”

Apollo’s saying the pain could last 12-18 months.

Well, that is some list! In addition, I was always quite skeptical of the credit quality that was assigned to these companies, and I guess that I wasn’t too far off given that 43% of private credit borrowers have negative free cash flow. Furthermore, the U.S./Israel vs. Iran war won’t help either, as inflation expectations have ratcheted higher reducing significantly the prospects for Fed action leading to lower rates. In fact, it would not be surprising to see the Fed have to raise rates. If such an action occurs, the higher interest rates could exacerbate the current challenging environment for private debt borrowers and their income statements.

Let’s see how the pension plan sponsor community and their advisors deal with private credit’s first real crisis. It should be both interesting and likely painful.

03.13.26
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What is the PCE Price Index Telling Us?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As most investors know, the Federal Reserve’s primary inflation measure is the Core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) targets 2% annual PCE inflation while trying to balance long-term price stability and maximum employment. The PCE is produced by the Department of Commerce. Why the PCE? The PCE inflation index covers broad household spending and importantly it adjusts for shifts in consumer behavior, unlike fixed-basket indexes, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Furthermore, the PCE reflects actual expenditures economy-wide and updates the index weights more dynamically. The goal of the PCE inflation measure is to help gauge underlying trends in the broader economy.

The most recent PCE inflation data was published as of today, March 13, 2026, covering a period through January 2026. Core PCE (excluding food and energy) ticked up to 3.06% in January 2026, after having touched 3% at year-end. Cleary, this reading remains well above the Fed’s 2% target, reflecting persistent underlying pressures that may become even more dramatic with the 41% increase per barrel of WTI registered since the close on Friday, February 27th.

The PCE inflation measure has recently accelerated while CPI cooled primarily due to differences in housing weights (lower in PCE) and consumer behavior adjustments.

MonthHeadline PCE (%)Core PCE (%)Headline CPI (%)Core CPI (%)
Dec 20252.93.02.72.9
Jan 20262.93.12.42.5
Feb 2026 (est)??2.4?

The fact that core PCE has now exceeded 3% must be worrying for the FOMC/FED that are also dealing with broader economic pressures, such as employment and US interest rates. Speaking of rates, historically the U.S. 10-year Treasury note has traded at a premium yield to inflation of roughly 2%, with periods as high as 3% or greater. The 10-year Treasury note is currently trading at a yield of 4.25% (as of 10:29 am) suggesting that a “normal” spread should have the YTM at 5.1%.

Given the great uncertainty related to current economic and geopolitical issues, it would not be surprising to see the Treasury yield curve continue to shift upwards. Such a move would create a wonderful environment for pension plan sponsors to de-risk through a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy. It is time to bring an element of certainty to the management of DB pensions to reside in a state of great uncertainty! Don’t wait to explore the amazing benefits provided by CFM.

03.09.26
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It’s Not Just the Price of Gasoline!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Folks (the investment community) seem to be focused on the rising price of oil for its effect on gasoline prices, but the impact of rising oil prices has far greater implications for the broader U.S. economy. Evidence indicates that a vast majority of manufactured goods and industrial processes use petroleum products that are feedstocks to make plastics, synthetic fibers, solvents, and many chemicals, which then become inputs into consumer goods, packaging, vehicles, electronics, building materials, and more.

Because plastics, synthetic fibers, and petrochemical-derived materials pervade sectors from automotive to consumer goods to packaging, a large majority of U.S. manufactured products (“most”) depend on oil products somewhere in their supply chain, either as material or as critical process input.

An extended increase in the price oil could have a dramatic impact on inflation, U.S. interest rates, the labor force, and overall economic activity. Have pension plans done enough to secure the necessary liquidity to meet the promised benefits and the expenses incurred to meet those monthly payments? Has the significant migration of pension assets to alternatives significantly reduced the available liquidity? Do plans understand that in crisis most asset classes tend to find correlations closer to 1 than 0, making the forced sale of assets to meet benefits challenging and more expensive.

Dividing a pension plans asset allocation into two buckets – liquidity and growth – as opposed to having the plan’s assets focused on the return on asset (ROA) assumption can mitigate liquidity risk. Use a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy to ensure that the necessary liquidity (asset cash flows of interest and maturing principal from bonds) is available to meet the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses monthly. While the CFM strategy is SECURING the promised benefits, the remainder of the assets can just grow unencumbered – no forced selling.

Who knows how long this conflict in the Middle East will last. Pension plans may be “long-term” investors, but they have short-term cash needs that must be met. There is no kicking the can down the road. Adopt this bi-furcated asset allocation and enjoy the benefits that come from the knowledge that your promises have been secured.

03.06.26
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DB Pension Plan “Absolute Truths” Revisited

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

This post may be familiar to some of you, as I originally published it in October 2024. Given today’s great uncertainty related to geopolitics, markets, and the economy, I thought it relevant to share once again. Please don’t hesitate to reach out to me if you want to challenge any part of this list. We always welcome your feedback.

The four senior members at Ryan ALM, Inc. have collectively more than 160 years of pension/investment experience. We’ve lived through an incredible array of markets during our tenures. We have also witnessed many attempts on the part of Pension America to try various strategies to meet the promises that have been made to the pension plan participants.

Regrettably, defined benefit (DB) pension plans continue to be tossed aside by corporate America in favor of defined contribution (DC) plans. Both public and multiemployer plan sponsors would be wise to adopt a strategy that seeks more certainty to protect and preserve these critically important retirement vehicles before they are subject to a similar fate.

We’ve compiled a list of DB pension “Absolute Truths” that we believe return the management of pension plans back to its roots when SECURING the promised benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk was the primary objective. The dramatic move away from the securing of benefits to the arms race focused on the return on asset assumption (ROA) has eliminated any notion of certainty in favor of far greater variability in likely outcomes.

Here are the Ryan ALM DB Truths:

  • Defined Benefit (DB) pension plans are the best retirement vehicle!
  • They exist to fulfill a financial promise that has been made to the plan participant upon retirement.
  • The primary objective in managing a DB plan is to SECURE the promised benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk.
  • The promised benefit payments are liabilities of the pension plan sponsor.
  • Liabilities need to be measured, monitored, and managed more than just once per year.
  • Liabilities are future value (FV) obligations – a $1,000 monthly benefit is $1,000 no matter what interest rates do. As a result, they are not interest rate sensitive.
  • Pension inflation is not equal to the CPI but a rate unique to each plan sponsor.
  • Best way to hedge pension inflation is through Cash Flow Matching (CFM) since inflation is in the actuarial projections
  • Plan assets (stocks, bonds, real estate, etc.) are present value (PV) or market value (MV) calculations. We do not know the FV of assets except for bonds cash flows (interest and principal at maturity).
  • To measure and monitor the funded status, liabilities need to be converted from FV to PV – a Custom Liability Index (CLI) is absolutely needed.
  • A discount rate is used to create a PV for liabilities – ROA (publics), ASC 715 (corps), STRIPS, etc.
  • Liabilities are bond-like in nature. The PV of future liabilities rises and falls with changes in the discount rate (interest rates).
  • The nearly 40-year decline in US interest rates beginning in 1982 crushed pension funding, as the growth rate for future liabilities far exceeded the growth rate of assets.
  • The allocation of plan assets should be separated into two buckets – Liquidity (beta) and Growth (alpha).
  • The liquidity assets should consist of a bond portfolio that matches (defeases) asset cash flows with the plan’s liability cash flows (benefits and expenses (B&E)).
  • This task is best accomplished through a CFM investment process.
  • The liquidity assets should be used to fund B&E chronologically buying time for the alpha assets to grow unencumbered in their quest to meet those faraway future liabilities not yet defeased by the liquidity assets.
  • The Growth assets will consist of all non-bonds, which can now grow unencumbered, as they are no longer a source of liquidity. Growth assets will fund those remaining future liabilities not yet defeased by the liquidity assets.
  • The Return on asset (ROA) assumption should be a calculated # derived through an Asset Exhaustion Test (AET)
  • The pension plan’s asset allocation should be responsive to the plan’s funded status and not the ROA.
  • As the funded status improves, port alpha (profits) from the Growth portfolio into the Liquidity bucket (de-risk) extending the cash flow matching assignment and securing more promises.
  • This de-risking ensures that plans don’t continue to ride the asset allocation rollercoaster leading to volatile contribution costs.
  • DB plans are a great recruiting and retention tool for managing a sponsor’s labor force.
  • DB plans need to be protected and preserved, as asking untrained individuals to fund, manage, and then disburse a “benefit” through a Defined Contribution plan is poor policy.
  • Unfortunately, doing the same thing over and over and over is not working. A return to pension basics is critical.

You’ve made a promise: measure it – monitor it – manage it – and SECURE it…   

Get off the pension funding rollercoaster – sleep well!

03.06.26
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Milliman: Corporate Pension Funding now at 109.4%

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Milliman has released the latest monthly report on the Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index (PFI). As a reminder, this index analyzes the 100 largest U.S. corporate pension plans.

For February, the PFI funded ratio rose from 109.1% as of January 31, to 109.4% as of February 28, marking the highest collective funded ratio since the 109.9% mark observed in July 2001. However, the funding improvement was solely a result of asset performance, as declining discount rates of 14 basis points reduced the discount rate to 5.33% and raised the PFI projected benefit obligation (liabilities) to $1.235 trillion. Fortunately, monthly returns of 2.15% offset the impact of falling U.S. interest rates leading to growth in the market value of plan assets by $22 billion, to $1.351 trillion.

“February’s investment performance drove the month’s $5 billion gain in funding levels,” said Zorast Wadia, author of the Milliman PFI. He went on to say that “while this marks 11 straight months of funding improvements, further declines in interest rates may occur, and ongoing market volatility makes it vital for plan sponsors to undertake surplus-management strategies focused on both sides of the balance sheet.” We continue to support Zorast in recommending that managing assets to liabilities is critical for DB pension plans in all market environments, but especially given the significant uncertainty under which markets are currently operating. As a reminder, the primary objective in managing a DB pension is to SECURE the promised benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. It is NOT a return objective.

We, at Ryan ALM, do not forecast interest rates, but the impact of rising oil prices (WTI currently up 30.7% as of 9:13 am EST since Friday) will likely have an impact on inflation and interest rates. It will be interesting to see if a potential fall in the value of liabilities proves greater than the potential impact that rising rates might have on equity markets and other assets. Will we see the 12th consecutive month of improved funding levels?

Please click on the link below for a look at the complete Milliman corporate pension funding report.

View this month’s complete Pension Funding Index.