WHY?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Why do we have two different accounting standards in the U.S. for valuing pension liabilities?

Why does it make sense to value liabilities at a rate (ROA) that can’t be used to defease pension liabilities in this interest rate environment?

Why do we continue to create an asset allocation framework that only guarantees volatility and not success?

Why do we think that the pension objective is a return objective (ROA) when it is the liabilities that need to be funded and secured?

Why haven’t we realized that plowing tons of plan assets into an asset class/strategy will negatively impact future returns?

Why are we willing to pay ridiculous sums of money in asset management fees with no guaranteed outcome?

Why is liquidity to meet benefits an afterthought until it becomes a major issue?

Why does it make sense that two plans with wildly different funded ratios have the same ROA?

Why are plan sponsors willing to live with interest rate risk in the core bond allocations?

Why do we think that placing <5% in any asset class is going to make a difference on the long-term success of that plan?

Why do we think that moving small percentages of assets among a variety of strategies is meaningful?

Why do we think that having a funded ratio of 80% is a successful outcome?

Why are we incapable of rethinking the management of pensions with the goal to bring an element of certainty to the process, especially given how humans hate uncertainty?

WHY, WHY, WHY?

If you are as confused as I am with our current approach to DB pension management, try cash flow matching (CFM) a portion of your plan. With CFM you’ll get a product that SECURES the promised benefits at low cost and with prudent risk. You will have a carefully constructed liquidity bucket to meet benefits and expenses when needed – no forced selling in challenging market environments. Importantly, your investing horizon will be extended for the growth (alpha) assets that haven’t been used to defease liabilities. We know that by buying time one dramatically improves the probability of a successful outcome. Furthermore, your pension plan’s funded status will be stabilized for that portion of the assets that uses CFM. This is a dynamic asset allocation process that should respond to improvement in the plan’s funded status. Lastly, you will be happy to sit back and watch the mayhem in markets unfold knowing that you don’t have to do anything except sleep very well at night.

The Intrinsic Value of Bonds

Ronald J. Ryan, CFA, Chairman

The true value of bonds is the certainty of their cash flows (interest + principal payments). I don’t believe there is another asset class with such attributes. This is why bonds have traditionally been the asset choice for LDI strategies in general and, defeasement specifically. Given that the true objective of a pension is to secure benefits in a cost-efficient manner with prudent risk then cash flow matching with bonds is a best fit. In the 1970s and 1980s cash flow matching was called Dedication and was the main pension strategy at that time.

Today we live in a volatile and uncertain financial world. Volatility of a pension’s funded status is not a good thing and leads to volatility in contribution costs which are calculated annually based on the present value of assets versus the present value of liabilities. Since 2000 contribution costs have spiked and for many pension plans are 5 to 10x higher than 1999. One would think that a prudent plan sponsor would install a strategy to derisk their pension and reduce or even eliminate this volatility. Cash flow matching (CFM) is the answer. CFM fully funds and matches the monthly liability cash flows (future values) thereby eliminating the present value volatility that plaques most pensions.

As our name implies, Ryan ALM is an Asset Liability Manager specializing in CFM. As the founder of Ryan ALM, my experience with CFM goes back to the 1970s when I was the Director of Fixed Income research at Lehman Bros. Our current CFM model (Liability Beta Portfolio™ or LBP) is a cost optimization model that will fully fund monthly liability cash flows at the lowest cost to the plan sponsor. Our model will reduce funding costs by about 2% per year (1-10 years of liability cash flows = 20% cost reduction). Moreover, there are several other significant benefits to our LBP:

  • LBP de-risks the plan by cash flow matching benefit payments with certainty
  • LBP provides liquidity to fully fund liabilities so no need for a cash sweep
  • Mitigates interest rate risk since it is funding benefits (future values)
  • LBP reduces asset management costs (Ryan ALM fee = 15 bps)
  • Enhances ROA by out-yielding active bond management 
  • Reduces volatility of the funded ratio + contributions
  • Buys time for Alpha assets to grow unencumbered

  “Where is the knowledge we have lost in information” T.S. Eliot

What Was The Purpose?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I was introduced to the brilliance of Warren Mosler through my friend and former colleague, Chuck DuBois. It was Chuck who encouraged me to read Mosler’s book, “The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy”. I would highly recommend that you take a few hours to dive into what Mosler presents. As I mentioned, I think that his insights are brilliant.

The 7 frauds, innocent or not, cover a variety of subjects including trade, the federal deficit, Social Security, government spending, taxes, etc. Regarding trade and specifically the “deficit”, Mosler would tell you that a trade deficit inures to the benefit of the United States. The general perception is that a trade deficit takes away jobs and reduces output, but Mosler will tell you that imports are “real benefits and exports are real costs”.

Unlike what I was taught as a young Catholic that it is better to give than to receive, Mosler would tell you that in Economics, it is much better to receive than to give. According to Mosler, the “real wealth of a nation is all it produces and keeps for itself, plus all it imports, minus what it exports”. So, with that logic, running a trade deficit enhances the real wealth of the U.S.

Earlier this year, the Atlanta Fed was forecasting GDP annual growth in Q1’25 of 3.9%, today that forecast has plummeted to -2.4%. We had been enjoying near full employment, moderating yields, and inflation. So, what was the purpose of starting a trade war other than the fact that one of Mosler’s innocent frauds was fully embraced by this administration that clearly did not understand the potential ramifications. They should have understood that a tariff is a tax that would add cost to every item imported. Did they not understand that inflation would take a hit? In fact, a recent survey has consumers expecting a 6.7% price jump in goods and services during the next 12-months. This represents the highest level since 1981. Furthermore, Treasury yields, after initially falling in response to a flight to safety, have marched significantly higher.

Again, I ask, what was the purpose? Did they think that jobs would flow back to the U.S.? Sorry, but the folks who suffered job losses as a result of a shift in manufacturing aren’t getting those jobs back. Given the current employment picture, many have been employed in other industries. So, given our full-employment, where would we even get the workers to fill those jobs? Again, we continue to benefit from the trade “imbalance”, as we shipped inflation overseas for decades. Do we now want to import inflation?

It is through fiscal policy (tax cuts and government spending) that we can always sustain our workforce and domestic output. Our spending is not constrained by other countries sending us their goods. In fact, our quality of life is enhanced through this activity.

It is truly unfortunate that the tremendous uncertainty surrounding tariff policy is still impacting markets today. Trillions of $s in wealth have been eroded and long-standing trading alliances broken or severely damaged. All because an “innocent” fraud was allowed to drive a reckless policy initiative. I implore you to stay away from Social Security and Medicare, whose costs can always be met since U.S. federal spending is not constrained by taxes and borrowing. How would you tell the tens of millions of Americans that rely on them to survive that another innocent fraud was allowed to drive economic policy?

Milliman – Corporate Pension Funding Falls in March

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Milliman has just released its monthly Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index (PFI), which analyzes the 100 largest U.S. corporate pension plans. Weak investment returns, estimated at -1.4%, drove the PFI asset level down by $25 billion during March. Current assets for the top 100 plans are now $1.3 trillion. The fall in assets was only partially offset by the rise in the discount rate (13 bps) during the month. As a result, the surplus fell by $7 billion to $51 billion as of March 31, 2025.

The discount rate ended the month at 5.49%, which reduced plan liabilities by $18 billion, to $1.25 trillion by the end of March. As a result of assets falling by more than liabilities, the PFI funded ratio dropped from 104.6% at the end of February to 104.1% at the end of March. For the quarter, discount rates fell 10 basis points and the Milliman 100 plans lost $8 billion in funded status.   

“While the slight rise in discount rates in March led to a monthly decline in plan liabilities, plan assets fell even further due to poor market performance, which caused the funded status to fall below the 104.8% level seen at the beginning of 2025,” said Zorast Wadia, author of the PFI. Given market action during the first 10 days of April, it will be interesting to see if the impact from rising rates can offset the dramatic fall in asset values. Inflation fears fueled by tariffs could lead to rising bond yields, which will help mitigate some of the risk to equities given the possibility of declining earnings. As Zorast mentioned in the Milliman release, “plan sponsors will want to consider asset-liability matching strategies to preserve their balance sheet gains from last year”, especially given that 30-year corporates are once again yielding close to 6%.

An Ugly Day For Pension America

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Yes, today’s ugliness in the markets is only one day and how many times have we heard or read that you can’t market time or if you miss just the best performing 25-, 50-, or 100-days in the stock market, your return will resemble that of cash or bonds? Those facts are mostly correct. We may not be able to market time, but we can certainly put in place an asset allocation framework that gets DB pension plans off the rollercoaster of performance. We can construct an asset allocation that provides the necessary liquidity when markets may not be able to naturally. An asset allocation that buys time for the growth asset to wade through troubled markets. A framework that secures the promised benefits and stabilizes both funded ratios and contribution expenses for that portion of the fund that has adopted a new strategy.

Yes, today is only one day, but the impact can be significantly negative. See, it isn’t just the loss that has to be made up, as pension plans are counting on a roughly 7% return (ROA) for the year. Every negative event pushes that target further away. Equity values are getting whacked and today’s market activity is just exacerbating the already weak start to the year. While equity markets are falling, U.S. interest rates are down precipitously. The U.S. 10-year Treasury note’s yield is down just about 0.8% since early in January. As a reminder, the average duration of a DB pension is about 12 years or twice the duration of the Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate Index, which is the benchmark for most core fixed income mandates. So, your bond portfolios may be seeing some appreciation today and since the start of 2025, but those portfolios are not growing nearly as fast as your plan’s liabilities, which have grown by about 10.6% (12 year duration x 0.8% + income of 1.0% = 10.6%). As a result, funded ratios are taking a hit.

I wrote this piece back on March 4th reminding everyone that the uncertainty around tariffs and other factors should inspire a course change, an asset allocation rethink. I suspect that it didn’t. So, one can just assume that markets will come back and the underperformance will not have impacted the pension plan, but that just isn’t true. In many cases, equity market corrections take years to recover from and in the process contribution expenses rise, and in some cases dramatically so.

Adopting a new asset allocation framework doesn’t mean changing the entire portfolio. A restructuring can be as simple as converting your highly interest rate sensitive core bond portfolio into a cash flow matching (CFM) portfolio that secures the promised benefits from next month out as far as the allocation can go. In the process you will have improved the plan’s liquidity, extended the investing horizon for the alpha assets, stabilized the funded status for that segment of your plan, and mitigated interest rate risk, as those benefit payments are future values which aren’t interest rate sensitive. You’ll sleep very well once adopted.

The Buying Of Time Can Reap Huge Rewards

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

When we present the list of benefits associated with using Cash Flow Matching (CFM), one of the benefits that we highlight is the buying of time a.k.a. an extended investing horizon. Our pension community tends to fall prey to short-termism despite claiming to be long-term investors. Quarterly observations are presented through the consultants regular performance reviews and managers are often dismissed after a relatively short period of “underperformance”. Actuarial reports tend to be annual which dictate projected contribution expenses. Yet, by extending the investment horizon to something more meaningful like 10-years or more, the probability of achieving the desired outcome is dramatically improved.

I recently played around with some S&P 500 data dating back to 12/31/69 and looked at the return and standard deviation of observations encompassing 1-10-year moving averages and longer periods such as 15-, 20-, 30-, and even 50-year moving averages for the industry’s primary domestic equity benchmark. Living in a one-year timeframe may produce decent annual returns, but is also comes with tremendous volatility. In fact, the average one-year return from 12/69 to 2/25 has been 12.5%, but the annual standard deviation is +/- 16.6%, meaning that 68% of the time your annual return could be +29.1% to -4.1%. Extending the analysis to 2 standard deviations (95% of the observations) means that in 19 out of 20 years the range of results can be as broad as +45.7% to -20.7%.

However, extend out your investing horizon to 10-years, and the average return from 12/69 dips to 11.4%, but the standard deviation collapses to only 5.0% for a much more comfortable range of +16.4% to 6.4%. Extend to 2 standard deviations and you still have a positive observation in 19 out of 20 years at +1.4% as the lower boundary. Extend to 30-years and the volatility craters to only +/-1.2% around an average return of 11.25%.

We, at Ryan ALM, were blessed in 2024 to take on an assignment to cash flow match 30+ years of this plan’s liabilities. We covered all of the projected liability cash flows through 2056 and still had about $8 million in surplus assets, which were invested in two equity funds, that can now just grow and grow and grow since all of the plan’s liquidity needs are being covered by the CFM strategy! So, how important is a long investing runway? Well, if this plan’s surplus assets achieve the average S&P 500 30-year return during the next 30-years, that $8 million will grow to >$195 million.

We often speak with prospects about the importance of bifurcating one’s asset base into two buckets – liquidity and growth. It is critically important that the plan’s liquidity be covered through the asset cash flows of interest and principal produced by bonds since they are the only asset with a known future value. CFM eliminates the need for a cash sweep which would severely reduce the ROA of growth assets. This practice will allow the growth or alpha assets to wade through choppy markets, such as the one we are currently witnessing, without fear that liquidity must be raised to meet benefits at a less than opportune time.

The plan sponsor highlighted above was fortunate to have a well-funded plan, but even plans that are less well-funded need liquidity. Ensuring that benefits and expenses can be met monthly (chronologically) without forcing liquidity that might not naturally exist is critical to the successful operation of a pension plan. CFM can be used over any time frame that the plan sponsor desires or the plan can afford. We believe that extending the investment horizon out to 10-years should be the minimum goal, but every plan is unique and that uniqueness will ultimately drive the decision on the appropriate allocation to CFM.

FOMC and Powell Deliver Worrying Message

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I produced a post recently titled, “Parallels to the 1970s?” in which I discussed the challenging economic environment that existed during the 1970s as a result of two oil shocks and some sketchy decision making on the part of the US Federal Reserve. The decade brought us a new economic condition called stagflation, which was a term coined in 1965 by British politician Lain Macleod, but not widely used or recognized until the first oil embargo in 1973. Stagflation is created when slow economic growth and inflation are evident at the same time.

According to the graph above, the FOMC is beginning to worry about stagflation reappearing in our current economy, as they reduced the expectations for GDP growth (the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model has Q1’25 growth at -1.8%), while simultaneously forecasting the likelihood of rising inflation. Not good. If you think that the FOMC is being overly cautious, look at the recent inflation forecasts from several other entities. Seems like a pattern to me.

Yet, market participants absorbed the Powell update as being quite positive for both stocks and bonds, as markets rallied soon after the announcement that the FOMC had held rates steady. Why? There is great uncertainty as to the magnitude and impact of tariffs on US trade and economic growth. If inflation does move as forecasted, why would you want to own an active bond strategy? If growth is moderating, and in some cases forecasted to collapse, why would you want to own stocks? Aren’t earnings going to be hurt in an environment of weaker economic activity? Given current valuations, despite the recent pullback, caution should be the name of the game. But, it seems like risk on.

Given the uncertainty, I would want to engage in a strategy, like cash flow matching (CFM), that brought an element of certainty to this very confusing environment. CFM will fully fund the liability cash flows (benefits and expenses) with certainty providing timely and proper liquidity to meet my near-term obligations, so that I was never in a position where I had to force liquidity where natural liquidity wasn’t available. Protecting the funded ratio of my pension plan would be a paramount objective, especially given how far most plans have come to achieve an improved funding status.

I’ve written on many occasions that the nearly four decades decline in rates was the rocket fuel that drove risk assets to incredible heights. It covered up a lot of sins in how pensions operated. If a decline in rates is the only thing that is going to prop up these markets, I doubt that you’ll be pleased in the near-term. Bifurcate your assets into two buckets – liquidity and growth – and buy time for your pension plan to wade through what might be a very challenging market environment. The FOMC was right to hold rates steady. Who knows what their next move will be, but in the meantime don’t bet the ranch that inflation will be corralled anytime soon.

Nothing Here! Really?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Yesterday’s financial news delivered an inflation surprise (0.5% vs. 0.3%), at least to me and the bond market, if not to the U.S. equity market. The Federal reserve had recently announced a likely pause in their rate reduction activity given their concerns about the lack of pace in the inflation march back to its 2% target. This came on the heels of “Street” expectations after the first 0.5% cut in the FFR that there were “likely” to be eight (8!) interest rate cuts by the summer of 2025. Oh, well, the two cuts that we’ve witnessed since that first move last September may be all we get for a while. “Ho hum” replied the U.S. stock market.

The discounting of yesterday’s inflation release is pretty astounding. Like you, I’ve read the financial press and the many emails that have addressed the CPI data 52 ways to Sunday. Much of the commentary proclaims this data point as a one-off event. For instance, the impact of egg price increases (13.8% last month alone) is temporary, as bird flu will be contained shortly. Seasonal factors impacting “sticky-priced” products tend to be announced in January. I guess those increases shouldn’t matter since they only impact the consumer in January. As a reminder, Core inflation (minus food and energy) rose from 3.1% to 3.3% last month. That seems fairly significant, but we are told that the other three core readings were down slightly, so no big deal. Again, really? Each of those core measures are >3% or more than 1% greater than the Fed’s target.

Then there are those that say, “what is significant about the Fed’s 2% inflation objective anyway”? It is an arbitrary target. Well, that may be the case, but for the millions of Americans that are marginally getting by, the difference between 2% and 3% inflation is fairly substantial, especially when we come up with all of these measures that exclude food, energy, housing (shelter), etc. Are you kidding?

As mentioned previously, expectations for a massive cut in interest rates due to the perception that inflation was well contained have shifted dramatically. Just look at the graph above (thanks, Bloomberg). Following the Fed’s first FFR cut of 50 bps, inflation expectations plummeted to below 1.5% for the two-year breakeven. Today those same expectations reveal a nearly 3.5% expectation. Rising inflation will certainly keep the Fed in check at this time.

As mentioned earlier in this post, U.S. equities shrugged off the news as if the impact of higher inflation and interest rates have no impact on publicly traded companies. Given current valuations for U.S. stocks, particularly large cap companies, any inflation shock should send a shiver down the spines of the investing community. Should interest rates rise, bonds will surely become a more exciting investment opportunity, especially for pension plans seeking a ROA in the high 6% area. How crazy are equity valuations? Look at the graph below.

The current CAPE reading has only been greater during the late 1990s and we know what happened as we entered 2000. The bursting of the Technology bubble wasn’t just painful for the Information Technology sector. All stocks took a beating. Should U.S. interest rates rise as a result of the current inflationary environment, there is a reasonable (if not good) chance that equities will get spanked. Why live with this uncertainty? It is time to get out of the game of forecasting economic activity. Why place a bet on the direction of rates? Why let your equity “winnings” run? As a reminder, managing a DB pension plan should be all about SECURING the promised benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. Is maintaining the status quo prudent?

It May Not Be the Iron Gwazi, But…

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I was fortunate to enter the investment industry in October 1981. The 10-year Treasury note’s yield was around 15% at that time. U.S. interest rates would fall (collapse?) for most of the next four decades until they bottomed during the beginning of Covid-19. Oh, it was great to be a bond manager during those decades. You could basically be long duration relative to the Aggregate index with little worry that rates would rise. It was a time to “mint” money in fixed income. Then, it wasn’t!

The beginning of Covid-19 brought about a substantial reaction to the collapse of our economy through major federal stimulus programs. The historic infusion of financial support created excess demand for goods and services at the same time that many of those services were temporarily restricted. The result was the worst inflation shock since the 1970s, which led to the double digit yields mentioned above.

It wasn’t surprising that inflation would appear after decades of it being well contained. It was perhaps the magnitude (9.1% inflation at the peak) of the move that grabbed everyone’s attention. For bond managers, the revival of inflation created an environment that forced the U.S. Federal Reserve to initiate the most aggressive policy shift in quite some time beginning in March 2022. As a result of the Fed’s action, bond managers suffered their worst year ever as represented by the BB Aggregate Index (-13%). The average fixed income manager faired only slightly better than the index according to eVestment’s database, as the median core bond manager produced a -12.8% result for all of 2022.

The following two years have been incredibly volatile for U.S. bond managers. Calendar year 2023 was looking to be a very poor year until the investing community was certain that the Fed had accomplished its objective by the end of that year, and as a result, interest rates fell. For the year, the median fixed income manager was up 6.1%, or a little bit less than 1/2 what they had lost in the previous year. This past year was no better, except that markets were rosier to begin 2024, only to have a challenging conclusion to the year as inflation proved much stickier. The median manager produced only a 2% return for the year, holding on to <1/2 the income while seeing principal losses. Given the topsy turvy nature of the bond market during the last three years, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the median manager has only generated a -1.9% 3-year annualized result.

The rollercoaster of fixed income returns observed during the last several years may not be as extreme as those we witness in other asset classes, mainly equities, but it is not helpful to the long-term funding of pension plans or endowments and foundations. As most know, changes in interest rates are the greatest risk to fixed income strategies. The 4-decade decline in rates was preceded by a nearly 3-decade rise in rates beginning in the early 1950s. Does the significant rise in rates starting in 2022 mark the beginning of another long-term secular upward trend or is this just a head fake? I wouldn’t want to have to bet on the future of interest rates in order to manage a successful program and you shouldn’t either.

Cash flow matching (CFM) mitigates interest rate risk. The defeasing of benefit payments, which are future values, are not interest rate sensitive since a $1,000 monthly payment in the future is $1k whether rates rise or fall. Furthermore, the cost savings that are produced on the day that the CFM portfolio is built will be maintained whether rates rise or fall. We are seeing at least a -2% reduction in cost per year in our model. Ask us to defease your benefit payments for 10 years and you’ll see a roughly 20% reduction. Longer-term programs (such as 30-years) can see substantial cost savings and annual reductions >-2%/year.

So, I ask, why invest in a core bond product, the success of which is predicated mostly on the direction of interest rates, when one can invest in a CFM strategy that provides the certainty of cash flows to meet benefit payments? Furthermore, CFM portfolios mitigate interest rate risk and extend the investing horizon for your plan’s alpha (growth) assets, while getting you off the rollercoaster of annual returns. Lastly, given the recent rise in U.S. interest rates, building a CFM portfolio with investment grade corporate bonds can produce a YTW of 5.5% or better. Seems like a sleep well at night strategy to me.

BTW, the Iron Gwazi is the world’s steepest and fastest hybrid rollercoaster found at Busch Gardens in Florida. It has a height of 206 feet and a 91 degree drop. It might just rival the feeling one got going through the Great Financial Crisis. That wasn’t any fun!

Hey, Pension Community – We Have Liftoff!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Not since October of 2023 have we seen long-dated Treasury yields at these levels. Currently, the 30-year Treasury bond yield is 5% (12:47 pm EST) and the 10-year Treasury Note’s yield has eclipsed 4.8%. Despite tight credit spreads, long-dated (25+ years) IG corporate bond yields are above 6% today (chart in the lower right corner).

Securing pension liabilities, whether your DB plan is private, public, or a multiemployer plan, should be the primary objective. All the better if that securing (defeasement strategy) can be accomplished at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. The good news: the current rate environment is providing plan sponsors with a wonderful opportunity to accomplish all of those goals, whether you engage in a cash flow matching (CFM) for a relatively short period (5-years), intermediate, (10ish-years) or longer-term (15- or more years) your portfolio of IG corporate bonds will produce a YTM of > 5.5%. This represents a significant percentage of the target ROA.

Furthermore, as we’ve explained, pension liabilities are future values (FVs), and FVs are not interest rate sensitive. Your portfolio will lock in the cost savings on day one, and barring any defaults (about 2/1,000 in IG bonds), the YTM is what your portfolio will earn throughout the relationship. That is exciting given the fact that traditional fixed income core mandates bleed performance during rising rate regimes. In fact, the IG index is already off 1.2% YTD (<10 trading days).

Who knows when the high equity valuations will finally lead to a repricing. Furthermore, who knows if US inflation will continue to be sticky, the Fed will raise or lower rates, geopolitical risks will escalate, and on and on. With CFM one doesn’t need a crystal ball. You can SECURE the promised benefits for a portion of your portfolio and in the process you’d be stabilizing the funded status and contribution expenses associated with those assets. Don’t let this incredibly attractive rate environment come and go without doing anything. We saw inertia keep plans from issuing POBs when rates were historically low. It is time to act.