Cash Flow Matching Done Right!

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Most of us seek to climb the “ladder to success”. We also use ladders for important everyday activities. I’ll soon be back on a ladder myself, as year-end approaches and the Christmas lights are placed on my home. Despite the usefulness of ladders, there is one place where they aren’t necessarily beneficial. I’m specifically addressing the use of ladders for bond management as a replacement for a defeasement strategy.

There are still so many misconceptions regarding Cash Flow Matching (CFM). Importantly, CFM is NOT a “laddered bond portfolio”, which would be quite inefficient and costly. It IS a highly sophisticated cost optimization process that maximizes cost savings by emphasizing longer maturity bonds (within the program’s parameters capped at the maximum year to be defeased) and higher yielding corporate bonds, such as A and BBB+.

Furthermore, it is not just a viable strategy for private pension plans, as it has been deployed successfully in public and multiemployer plans for decades, as well as E&Fs. It is also NOT an all or nothing strategy. The exposure to CFM is a function of several factors, including the plan’s funded status, current allocation to core fixed income, and the Retired Lives Liability, etc. Many of our clients have chosen to defease their pension liabilities from 5-30 years or beyond. When asked, we recommend a minimum of 10 years, but again that will be a function of each plan’s unique funding situation.

CFM strategies are NOT “buy and hold” programs. CFM implementations must be dynamic and responsive to changes in the actuary’s forecasts of benefits, expenses, and contributions. There are also continuous changes in the fixed income environment (I.e. yields, spreads, credits) that might provide additional cost savings that need to be monitored and managed. Plan sponsors may seek to extend the initial length (years) of the program as it matures which will often necessitate a restructuring or rebalancing of the original portfolio to maximize potential funding coverage and cost reductions.

CFM programs CANNOT be managed against a generic index, as no pension plan’s liabilities will look like the BB Aggregate or any other generic index. Importantly, no pension plan’s liabilities will look like another pension plan given the unique characteristics of that plan’s workforce and plan provisions. The appropriate management of CFM requires the construction of a Custom Liability Index (CLI) that maps the plan’s liabilities in multiple dimensions and creates the path forward for the successful implementation of the asset/liability match.

Importantly, CFM programs are NOT going to negatively impact the plan’s ability to achieve its desired ROA. In fact, a successful CFM program, such as the one we produce, will actually enhance the probability of achieving the return target. How? Your plan likely has an allocation to core fixed income. Our implementation will likely outyield that portfolio over time creating alpha as well as SECURING the promised benefits. Given the higher corporate bond interest rates, an allocation to this asset class can generate a significant percentage of the ROA target with risks substantially below those of other asset classes.

When done right, a successful CFM implementation achieves the following:

Provides liquidity to meet benefits and expenses

Secures benefits for the time horizon the CFM portfolio is funding (1-10 years +)

Buys time for the alpha assets to grow unencumbered

Out yields active bond management… enhances ROA

Reduces Volatility of Funded Ratio/Status

Reduces Volatility of Contribution costs

Reduces Funding costs (roughly 2% per year in this rate environment)

Mitigates Interest Rate Risk for that portion of the portfolio using CFM as benefits are future values that are not interest rate sensitive.

No laddered bond portfolio can provide the benefits listed above. Whether you are responsible for a DB pension, an endowment or foundation, a HNW individual, or any other pool of assets, you likely have liquidity needs regularly. CFM done right will greatly enhance this process. Call on us. We’ll gladly provide an initial analysis on what can be achieved, and we will do it for FREE.

ARPA Update as of May 10, 2024

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Another Monday brings the weekly update on the PBGC’s effort to implement the pension rescue under ARPA. As noted previously, activity has definitely slowed in recent weeks, and the week ending May 10, 2024 is no exception. I can report that the only activity on the PBGC’s ARPA spreadsheet is a withdrawal of a previously revised application. Employers’ – Warehousemen’s Pension Plan, a non-priority plan out of Los Angeles, was seeking $40 million in Special Financial Assistance (SFA) for just over 1,800 plan participants. The latest version of the application had been filed on March 4, 2024.

Unfortunately, there were no additional applications submitted or approved. At the same time, there were no additional applications withdrawn or denied. Lastly, no plans that might have received excess SFA have returned those excess assets at this tie outside of Central States. There remain 129 plans to still have their applications for SFA reviewed and approved.

Glen Eagle Trading reported the following in a recent email, that In 2023, a survey found that 78% of Americans live paycheck-to-paycheck, up six percentage points from the previous year. Unfortunately, in yet another survey 29% of Americans don’t earn enough to cover basic living costs. The ability to fund a retirement is getting to be more challenging than ever, which is why DB pension systems need to be be protected and preserved. The ARPA pension legislation is going a long way to securing pensions for millions of American workers who were on the verge of losing most, if not everything, that they had earned and counted on for their “golden years”.

Another Challenging Month for US Fixed Income

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

S&P Dow Jones is out with its monthly “Dash Board” on a variety of benchmarks, both domestic and foreign. April proved challenging for both US equities and bonds. With regard to stocks, the S&P 500 was down -4.1% bringing the YTD performance to +6.04%. It was a tougher environment for both mid cap (-6.0%) and small cap (-5.6%). Small caps (S&P 600) continue to be pressured and the index is now down -3.3% YTD. As US interest rates continue on a course higher, US equities will continue to be challenged.

The higher US rates are also continuing to pressure US fixed income. The Aggregate Index produced a -1.8% April, and the index is now down -2.4% since the start of 2024 despite the rather robust YTM of 5.3%. As we’ve discussed on many occasions, bonds are the only asset class with a known cash flow of a terminal value and contractual coupon payments. As a result, bonds should be used for the certainty of those cash flows and specifically to defease pension liabilities. As a reminder, pension liabilities are bond-like in nature and they will move with changes in interest rates. Don’t use bonds as a total return strategy, as they will not perform in a rising rate environment. Sure, the nearly 40-year decline in rates made bonds and their historical performance look wonderful, but that secular trend is over.

Use the fixed income allocation to match asset cash flows of interest and principal to the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses. As a result, that portion of the total assets portfolio will have mitigated interest rate risk, while SECURING the promised benefits. Having ample liquidity is essential. Using bonds to defease pension liabilities ensures that the necessary liquidity will be available as needed. The current US interest rate environment may be pressuring total return-seeking fixed income managers, but it is proving cash flow matching programs with a very healthy YTM that dramatically reduces the cost of those future value payments. Don’t waste this golden opportunity.

What’s the Motivation?

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

There appears in the WSJ today an article stating that pension plans were pulling “hundreds of billions from stocks”. According to a Goldman analyst, “pensions will unload $325 billion in stocks this year, up from $191 billion in 2023″. We are told that proceeds from these sales will flow to both bonds and alternatives. First question: What is this estimate based on? Are average allocations now above policy normal levels necessitating a rebalancing? Are bonds more attractive given recent movements in yields?

Yes, equities have continued to rally through 2024’s first quarter, and the S&P 500 established new highs before recently pulling back. Valuations seem stretched, but the same argument could have been made at the end of 2023. Furthermore, US interest rates were higher heading into 2023’s fourth quarter. If bond yields were an attractive alternative to owning equities, that would have seemed the time to rotate out of equities.

The combination of higher interest rates and equity valuations have helped Corporate America’s pensions achieve a higher funded status, and according to Milliman, the largest plans are now more than 105% funded. It makes sense that the sponsors of these plans would be rotating from equities into bonds to secure that funded status and the benefit promises. Hopefully, they have chosen to use a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy to accomplish the objective. Not surprisingly, public pension plans are taking a different approach. Instead of securing the benefits and stabilizing the plan’s funded status and contribution expenses by rotating into bonds, they are migrating both equities and bonds into more alternatives, which have been the recipients of a major asset rotation during the last 1-2 decades, as the focus there remains one of return. Is this wise?

I don’t know how much of that estimated $325 billion is being pulled from corporate versus public plans, but I would suggest that much of the alternative environment has already been overwhelmed by asset flows. I’ve witnessed this phenomenon many times in my more than 40 years in the business. We, as an industry, have the tendency to arbitrage away our own insights by capturing more assets than an asset class can naturally absorb. Furthermore, the migration of assets to alternatives impacts the liquidity available for plans to meet ongoing benefits and expenses. Should a market correction occur, and they often do, liquidity becomes hard to find. Forced sales in order to meet cash flow needs only serve to exacerbate price declines.

Pension plans should remember that they only exist to meet a promise that has been made to the participant. The objective should be to SECURE those promises at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. It is not a return game. Asset allocation decisions should absolutely be driven by the plan’s funded status and ability to contribute. They shouldn’t be driven by the ROA. Remember that alternative investments are being made in the same investing environment as public equities and bonds. If market conditions aren’t supportive of the latter investments, why does it make sense to invest in alternatives? Is it the lack of transparency? Or the fact that the evaluation period is now 10 or more years? It surely isn’t because of the fees being paid to the managers of “alternative” products are so attractive.

Don’t continue to ride the asset allocation rollercoaster that only ensures volatility, not success! The 1990’s were a great decade that was followed by the ’00s, in which the S&P 500 produced a roughly 2% annualized return. The ’10s were terrific, but mainly because stocks were rebounding from the horrors of the previous decade. I don’t know what the 2020s will provide, but rarely do we have back-to-back above average performing decades. Yes, the ’90s followed a strong ’80s, but that was primarily fueled by rapidly declining interest rates. We don’t have that scenario at this time. Why assume the risk?