Tag Archives: cash-flow-matching

05.01.24
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CFM: Buy Time and Reduce Risk

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

A traditional DB plan’s asset allocation comes with a lot of annual volatility (see the graph below). That volatility gets reduced as one extends the investing horizon, but it is still quite uncertain until you extend sufficiently, such as 10 or more years. However, as plan sponsors and investment managers, we have been living in a quarter-to-quarter measurement cycle for decades. In that environment, a 1 standard deviation (1 SD) measurement for a 1-year time frame (Ryan ALM asset allocation model since 1999) is +/- 10.5%. In the example below, 68% of the observations (1 SD) will fall between 16.5% and -4.5%. A 2 SD measurement would have the range for 95% of the observations between 27% and -15%. That gap, or should I say canyon, is a 1-year observation. Extend the measurement period to 5-years and the range of results is still wide but less so at +/- 9.8% for 2 SDs. It isn’t until you get beyond 10 years that the volatility associated with a fairly traditional asset allocation gets to a reasonable level.

Is there a way to bring more certainty to the asset allocation process that would allow for longer observation periods and less volatility? Absolutely! A plan sponsor and their advisors can adopt a bifurcated asset allocation in which a liquidity bucket is created that will fund and match the plan’s liability cash flows of benefits and expenses chronologically from the next month as far out as the allocation will cover (10+ years) allowing for the remainder of the alpha assets (all non-bond assets) to now grow unencumbered. The task for those assets is to meet future liabilities.

As the graph below highlights, a carefully constructed cash flow matching (CFM) portfolio can help plan sponsors wade through the volatility associated with shorter timeframes. The CFM portfolio will consist of investment grade bonds whose cash flows of interest and principal will be matched to the liability cash flows. This process now ensures (absent defaults) that the necessary liquidity is available when needed as those future promises have been SECURED. The remaining assets can now be managed as aggressively as the plan’s funded status dictates.

With this process, short-term market dislocations will no longer impact the plan’s ability to meet its obligations. There will be no forced selling to meet benefit payments. The alpha assets can now grow without fear of being sold at an unreasonable level. The CFM program takes care of your needs while establishing a buffer (longer investing horizon) from market corrections that happen on a fairly regular basis. This structure should also lead to less volatility related to contributions and the plan’s funded status.

Given the elevated US interest rate environment, now is the time to engage in this process. CFM will provide a level of certainty that doesn’t exist in a traditional asset allocation. This is a “sleep well at night” strategy that should become the core holding for DB pensions. As I mentioned in an earlier blog post today, bonds should only be used for the cash flows they produce. They should not be used as total return-seeking instruments. Leave that task to the alpha assets that will benefit from a longer investing period.

05.01.24
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Another Challenging Month for US Fixed Income

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

S&P Dow Jones is out with its monthly “Dash Board” on a variety of benchmarks, both domestic and foreign. April proved challenging for both US equities and bonds. With regard to stocks, the S&P 500 was down -4.1% bringing the YTD performance to +6.04%. It was a tougher environment for both mid cap (-6.0%) and small cap (-5.6%). Small caps (S&P 600) continue to be pressured and the index is now down -3.3% YTD. As US interest rates continue on a course higher, US equities will continue to be challenged.

The higher US rates are also continuing to pressure US fixed income. The Aggregate Index produced a -1.8% April, and the index is now down -2.4% since the start of 2024 despite the rather robust YTM of 5.3%. As we’ve discussed on many occasions, bonds are the only asset class with a known cash flow of a terminal value and contractual coupon payments. As a result, bonds should be used for the certainty of those cash flows and specifically to defease pension liabilities. As a reminder, pension liabilities are bond-like in nature and they will move with changes in interest rates. Don’t use bonds as a total return strategy, as they will not perform in a rising rate environment. Sure, the nearly 40-year decline in rates made bonds and their historical performance look wonderful, but that secular trend is over.

Use the fixed income allocation to match asset cash flows of interest and principal to the liability cash flows of benefits and expenses. As a result, that portion of the total assets portfolio will have mitigated interest rate risk, while SECURING the promised benefits. Having ample liquidity is essential. Using bonds to defease pension liabilities ensures that the necessary liquidity will be available as needed. The current US interest rate environment may be pressuring total return-seeking fixed income managers, but it is proving cash flow matching programs with a very healthy YTM that dramatically reduces the cost of those future value payments. Don’t waste this golden opportunity.

04.29.24
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ARPA Update as of April 26, 2024

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Can you believe that a 1/3 of 2024 will soon be behind us? It is finally feeling like Spring in NJ today.

There is not much to discuss regarding the PBGC’s implementation of the ARPA pension legislation. According to the latest update, there were no new applications filed, approved, denied, or withdrawn. However, there was one fund that received the SFA. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 152 Retail Meat Pension Plan, a Mount Laurel, NJ, plan received SFA and interest in the amount of $279.3 million for the more than 10k plan participants.

There currently are 114 names on the waitlist. Of those, 27 have been invited to submit applications. As the data above reflects, 8 of those applications have been approved, 12 are currently under review, while another 7 have been withdrawn presumably to have the submission corrected and resubmitted. In addition to that activity, 112 of the 114 funds have locked-in a valuation date for SFA measurement (discount rate). Ninety-two percent of those chose 12/31/22, while 2 have no lock-up and the other 9 have chosen dates between December 31, 2022 and November 30, 2023. As a reminder, the SFA is based on a series of discount rates. The lower the rate, the greater the potential SFA. Using the 10-year Treasury yield as a proxy for the discount rate, those plans locking in an evaluation date as of year-end 2022 have done alright, as the yield at the end of 2022 was 3.88%, while it currently stands at 4.63% (4/29 at 3:39 pm).

We’ll have to see if the others have faired as well. In the meantime, the higher US interest rates have certainly helped from an investment standpoint, as the current environment is providing 5%+ YTM investment grade bond portfolios. The higher rates reduce the cost of those future promises while extending the coverage period to secure benefits through a cash flow matching investment strategy.

04.24.24
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Tricky? Not Sure Why!

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

The WSJ produced an article on April 22, 2024 titled, “Path for 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yield to 5% Is Possible but Tricky” At the time of publication, the 10-year Treasury note yield was just under 4.7%. It is currently at 4.66%. Those providing commentary talked about the need to further reduce expectations for potential rate cuts of another 25 to 40 basis points. As you may recall, there were significantly greater forecasts of rate cuts at the beginning of 2024, but those have been scaled back in dramatic fashion.

Given the current inflationary landscape in which the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) increased 0.4 percent in March and 3.5% annually, a move toward 5% for the US 10-year Treasury note’s yield shouldn’t be surprising or tricky. According to the graph below, the US 10-year yield has averaged a “real” yield of nearly 2% (1.934%) since 1984. A 2% inflation premium would place today’s 10-year Treasury note yield at roughly 5.6%.

Given the current economic conditions (2.9% GDP growth for Q1’24) and labor market strength (3.8% unemployment rate), it certainly doesn’t seem like the Fed’s “aggressive” action elevating the Fed Funds Rate from 0 to 5.5% today has had the impact that was anticipated. Inflation in 2024 has been sticky and may in fact be increasing. Should geopolitical issues grow in magnitude, inflation may get worse. These current conditions don’t say to me that a move to a 5% 10-year Treasury note yield should be tricky at all. As a reminder, the yield on this note hit 4.99% in late October 2023. Financial conditions have not gotten more restrictive since then.

Should the Treasury yield curve ratchet higher, with the 10-year eventually eclipsing 5%, plan sponsors would have a wonderful opportunity to secure the future promised benefits at significantly reduced cost in present value terms, especially if the cash flow matching portfolio used investment grade corporate bonds with premium yields. Although US corporate bond spreads are tight relative to average spreads, they still provide a healthy premium. Don’t let this rate environment pass without taking some risk from your plan’s asset allocation. We’ve seen that scenario unfold before and the outcome is scary.

04.18.24
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What’s the Motivation?

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

There appears in the WSJ today an article stating that pension plans were pulling “hundreds of billions from stocks”. According to a Goldman analyst, “pensions will unload $325 billion in stocks this year, up from $191 billion in 2023″. We are told that proceeds from these sales will flow to both bonds and alternatives. First question: What is this estimate based on? Are average allocations now above policy normal levels necessitating a rebalancing? Are bonds more attractive given recent movements in yields?

Yes, equities have continued to rally through 2024’s first quarter, and the S&P 500 established new highs before recently pulling back. Valuations seem stretched, but the same argument could have been made at the end of 2023. Furthermore, US interest rates were higher heading into 2023’s fourth quarter. If bond yields were an attractive alternative to owning equities, that would have seemed the time to rotate out of equities.

The combination of higher interest rates and equity valuations have helped Corporate America’s pensions achieve a higher funded status, and according to Milliman, the largest plans are now more than 105% funded. It makes sense that the sponsors of these plans would be rotating from equities into bonds to secure that funded status and the benefit promises. Hopefully, they have chosen to use a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy to accomplish the objective. Not surprisingly, public pension plans are taking a different approach. Instead of securing the benefits and stabilizing the plan’s funded status and contribution expenses by rotating into bonds, they are migrating both equities and bonds into more alternatives, which have been the recipients of a major asset rotation during the last 1-2 decades, as the focus there remains one of return. Is this wise?

I don’t know how much of that estimated $325 billion is being pulled from corporate versus public plans, but I would suggest that much of the alternative environment has already been overwhelmed by asset flows. I’ve witnessed this phenomenon many times in my more than 40 years in the business. We, as an industry, have the tendency to arbitrage away our own insights by capturing more assets than an asset class can naturally absorb. Furthermore, the migration of assets to alternatives impacts the liquidity available for plans to meet ongoing benefits and expenses. Should a market correction occur, and they often do, liquidity becomes hard to find. Forced sales in order to meet cash flow needs only serve to exacerbate price declines.

Pension plans should remember that they only exist to meet a promise that has been made to the participant. The objective should be to SECURE those promises at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. It is not a return game. Asset allocation decisions should absolutely be driven by the plan’s funded status and ability to contribute. They shouldn’t be driven by the ROA. Remember that alternative investments are being made in the same investing environment as public equities and bonds. If market conditions aren’t supportive of the latter investments, why does it make sense to invest in alternatives? Is it the lack of transparency? Or the fact that the evaluation period is now 10 or more years? It surely isn’t because of the fees being paid to the managers of “alternative” products are so attractive.

Don’t continue to ride the asset allocation rollercoaster that only ensures volatility, not success! The 1990’s were a great decade that was followed by the ’00s, in which the S&P 500 produced a roughly 2% annualized return. The ’10s were terrific, but mainly because stocks were rebounding from the horrors of the previous decade. I don’t know what the 2020s will provide, but rarely do we have back-to-back above average performing decades. Yes, the ’90s followed a strong ’80s, but that was primarily fueled by rapidly declining interest rates. We don’t have that scenario at this time. Why assume the risk?