Category Archives: Uncategorized

05.02.25
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Enhancing the Probability of Achieving the ROA

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

We are often confronted by plan sponsors and their advisors with the objection of using cash flow matching (CFM) because the “expected return” is lower than the plan’s return on asset assumption (ROA). Given that objection, we often point out that each asset class has its own expected return. The ROA target is developed by weighting each asset class’s exposure by the forecasted return. In the case of the bond allocation, the YTW is used as the target return.

If the plan sponsor has an allocation to “core” fixed income, there is a fairly great probability that our CFM portfolio, which we call the Liability Beta Portfolio (LBP), will outyield the core fixed income allocation thus enhancing the probability of achieving the ROA. This is accomplished through our heavy concentration in A/BBB+ investment grade corporate bonds that will outyield comparable maturity Treasuries and Agencies, which are a big and growing percentage of the Aggregate Index. In most cases, the yield advantage will be 50-100 bps depending on the maturities.

Ron Ryan, Ryan ALM’s Chairman, has produced a very thoughtful research piece on this subject. He also discusses the negative impact on a plan’s ability to achieve the ROA through the practice of sweeping dividend income, interest income, and capital distributions from the plan’s investment programs. Those distributions are better used when reinvested in the investment strategies from which they were derived, as they get reinvested at higher expected growth rates. The CFM program should be the only source to fund net benefits and expenses, as there is no forced selling when benefits and expenses are due.

There is no viable excuse to not use CFM. The benefits from this strategy are plentiful, especially the securing of the promised benefits which is the primary objective for any pension plan. We encourage you to visit RyanALM.com to read the plentiful research on this subject and other aspects of cash flow matching.

05.02.25
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Opportunity Cost Goes Both Ways

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I had an interesting conversation at the IFEBP Investment forum. It wasn’t the first time that this topic has been raised and I am willing to state that it won’t be the last. I was discussing the benefits of cash flow matching (CFM) with a trustee who raised concern about locking in the asset / liability match, suggesting that by defeasing a period longer than 3-5-years may lead to “regret” if there had been an opportunity to generate a greater return from those assets used to defease a portion of the liabilities.

Anytime an asset allocation decision is taken, there is always the possibility that some combination of asset classes and products would have produced a greater return in the short-term. However, opportunity cost can easily be opportunity lost. When one engages in a CFM strategy, one does so because they understand that the primary objective in managing a DB pension is to SECURE the promised benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. Managing a pension fund is not a return game despite the prevailing orthodoxy in our industry.

Why would one not want to secure a portion of the asset base providing the necessary liquidity to meet benefits and expenses? It is so comforting, or it should be, not to have to worry about raising liquidity in challenging markets. At the same time, the CFM strategy is buying time for the alpha (risk) assets to grow unencumbered. We normally suggest that a 10-year CFM be implemented, but that decision is predicated on a number of factors specific to that plan. We can, and have, engaged in assignments shorter than 10-years, and CFM provides the same benefits, even if the cost savings may be less than that provided by a longer assignment.

Furthermore, there is always the question of maintaining the maturity of the assignment (5-, 7-, 10- or more years) once the program is up and running. Plan sponsors must decide if the assignment should be allowed to run out after the initial allocation, be maintained at the same maturity, or extended given improved funding. If markets don’t behave there is no obligation to extend the program. If markets get crushed and the sponsor feels that liquidating the CFM portfolio assets could be used to buy “low” that is available given the liquidity profile of investment grade bonds. We don’t understand why one would want to do that since the matching of assets and liabilities creates certainty, which is missing in traditional pension management.

DB pension plans are critical to the long-term financial security of the participants. Securing the promised benefits reduces the possibility that adverse outcomes don’t result in the fund having to take dramatic action such as additional tiers or worse, the freezing of the plan. CFM stabilizes both the funded status for that portion of the fund and contributions. I would think that getting as much into CFM and reducing the uncertainty of managing the plan given our volatile markets should be an unquestionable goal.

04.29.25
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Benefits of Cash Flow Matching (CFM)

By: Ronald J. Ryan, CFA, Chairman, Ryan ALM, Inc.

The true objective of a pension is to secure and fund benefits in a cost-efficient manner with prudent risk. This is best accomplished by cash flow matching (CFM). In the 1970s and 1980s it was greatly in vogue and called Dedication. CFM aligns the cash flows of assets to match and fully fund the liability cash flows (benefits + expenses (B+E)) chronologically. Since bonds are the only asset class with the certainty of cash flows (principal and interest), bonds have always been the choice to CFM liability cash flows. The benefits of the Ryan ALM CFM approach are numerous and significant:

Reduces Risk – Risk is best defined as the uncertainty of achieving the objective. CFM will secure the objective of paying benefits with certainty.

    Reduces Cost – The cost to fund future B+E is reduced by about 2% per year (1-10 years = 20%).

    Enhances the ROA – There is a ROA for each asset class. For bonds, it is usually the YTM of a generic bond index. The Ryan ALM CFM is heavily skewed to A/BBB+ corporate bonds and will outyield these bond indexes thereby enhancing the ROA for the bond allocation.

    Mitigates Interest Rate Risk – CFM matches and funds actuarial projections of B+E which are all future values. Importantly, future values are not interest rate sensitive. Future values of B+E should be the focus of a pension objective. Present values are interest rate sensitive but that is not the objective. Since CFM will match the liability cash flows it will have the same or similar duration profile and present value interest rate sensitivity. 

    Eliminates Cash Sweep– Many pensions do a cash sweep of all assets to find the liquidity needed to fund current B+E. CFM will provide this liquidity so there is no need for a cash sweep that harms asset growth. This should enhance the ROA of growth assets whose dividends may have been used to fund current B+E. According to a Guinness Global study of the S&P 500 dating back to 1940, dividends + dividends reinvested accounted for about 49% of the S&P 500 total return for rolling 10-year periods and 57% for 20-year periods. CFM buys time for the growth assets to grow unencumbered.

        Reduces Volatility of Funded Ratio and Contributions – CFM will match and fully fund the liability cash flows chronologically thereby reducing or eliminating any funding ratio volatility for the period it is funding. This should help reduce the volatility of contributions as well.

          Provides Accurate Pension Inflation Hedge – The actuarial projections of B+E include inflation. As a result, CFM not only is the proper liability cash flow hedge but is the only accurate way to hedge pension inflation (benefits, expenses, salary, etc.). Please note that pension inflation is not equal to the CPI but can vary greatly.

          Reduces Pension Expense – For corporations, the present value growth of assets versus the present value growth of liabilities in $s creates a line item called pension expense. Corporations want asset growth to match liability growth in $s to avoid a hit to earnings and use a duration match strategy to hedge. CFM will provide a more accurate duration match since it funds monthly liability cash flows and not an average duration. Public plans do not have this earnings issue.

          Don’t hesitate to reach out to us if you’d like to learn more about how Ryan ALM’s Cash Flow Matching capability can benefit your plan. You can always visit RyanALM.com to get additional research insights . Finally, we are always willing to provide a free analysis. All we need are the projected benefits, expenses, and contributions. The further into the future those projection cover the greater the insights.

              04.28.25
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              Verus: “LDI for Public Sponsors”

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              Dan Hougard, FSA and Associate Director, Actuarial Services at Verus has recently published an excellent thought piece on LDI for public pension plans. In this case, the LDI refers to Cash Flow Matching (CFM). We at Ryan ALM, believe that LDI is the label in which sits both CFM and duration matching strategies. Furthermore, we absolutely agree with Dan’s assessment that public pension plans can benefit in this environment of higher yields despite the accounting differences that may not make the use of CFM obvious.

              As most readers of this blog know, we often criticize public pension accounting (GASB) for pension liabilities that allow the use of the ROA assumption to “discount” liabilities, while corporate/private pension plans use a market-based interest rate (FASB). We applaud Dan for stating that “the purpose of a pension plan’s investment portfolio (assets) is to ensure that the promised benefits (liabilities) can be paid to beneficiaries as they come due”. We at Ryan ALM believe that the primary objective in managing a DB plan is to SECURE the benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk.

              Key highlights from Dan’s research:

              Many plan sponsors approach their investment policy without explicitly focusing on the liabilities

              Because public plans discount liabilities at the ROA the perceived benefit of LDI (CFM) is not as obvious

              Public plans could match longer-duration cashflows combined with “market-based” reporting for a portion of the liabilities – such as all current retirees.

              The lowest risk asset class for pension investors are fixed income securities, as income is used to pay benefits, and securities are held to maturity so there is no interest rate risk.

              During periods of market stress, negative cash flow plans may be forced to sell assets at depressed prices.

              CFM can overcome that challenge by providing the needed cash flow to cover obligations while the return-seeking portfolio grows unencumbered.

              IG credit yields haven’t been this attractive since 2010.

              Public pension portfolios tend to have very uncertain outcomes and carry “tremendous” asset-liability mismatch.

              Finally, CFM “investing can offer considerable value for many pension plans”!

              It is wonderful to see a thoughtful article on this subject. We, at Ryan ALM, often feel as if we are all alone in our quest to protect and preserve defined benefit plans for the masses through cash flow matching, which SECURES the promised benefits at a reasonable cost and with prudent risk. It also allows for a wonderful night’s sleep during periods of excessive uncertainty.

              04.28.25
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              ARPA Update as of April 25, 2025

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              In some ways it is difficult to believe that we are through 1/3 of 2025, but in other ways it seems like it has been a very long four months.

              Regarding ARPA and the PBGC’s implementation of this critical legislation, last week produced modest activity, as reported in the PBGC’s weekly spreadsheet. I’m pleased to report that another two plans, Laborers’ Local No. 91 Pension Plan and Pension Plan of the Asbestos Workers Philadelphia Pension Fund, each submitted revised applications seeking Special Financial Assistance (SFA). These two non-priority group members are hoping to receive a combined $87.3 million in SFA for the 2,057 plan participants.

              In other news, fIUE-CWA Pension Plan repaid a small portion of the SFA that it received. The $2.5 million represented <1% of the total SFA received. To date, 50 plans (or roughly 85% of the potential population), have “settled” with the U.S. Treasury on census errors. Another 4 were found not to have received excess SFA. Finally, there are approximately 6 plans yet to come to some conclusion with the Treasury Department.

              As you can surmise, there were no applications approved or denied, and none withdrawn during the last week. In addition, there were no pension funds seeking to be added to the waitlist. The last entry was in March 2025.

              Volatility remains quite rampant within U.S. markets, both equity and bond. For those soon to receive SFA distributions, higher long-term U.S. Treasury rates make cash flow matching an attractive alternative to either active equity or fixed allocations. Please consider securing those promised benefits through a CFM mandate.

              04.25.25
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              A Call for Pension Reform – Five Years Later

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              On March 25, 2020, I produced a post titled, “Why Pension Reform is Absolutely Necessary“. A few of you may recall that blog. I penned the post in reaction to a series of statistics that my friend John A. produced. John is a retired Teamster and an incredibly important driver behind efforts to reinstate benefits that had been cut under MPRA. John’s analysis was based on a survey that he conducted on multiemployer plans that had roughly 43,000 plan participants impacted by that misguided legislation. That universe of participants would grow to more than 75,000. What he discovered through his polling and outreach was shocking!

              Their benefit reductions amounted to nearly $34,000,000 / month.  (That is a ton of lost economic activity.)

              95% were not able to work.

              72% were providing primary care for an ailing loved one.

              65% were not able to maintain healthcare insurance.

              60% had lost their home.

              55% were forced to file for bankruptcy.

              80% were living benefit check to benefit check.

              100% of the PBGC maximum benefit payout was inadequate ($12,870 for a retiree with 30-years of work).

              50% of the retirees were U.S. service veterans.

              Shocked? I certainly was and continue to be that our government allowed the benefits to be cut for hard working American workers who rightfully earned them through years of employment.

              Where are we today? Fortunately, the got the passage of ARPA pension reform (originally referred to as the Butch Lewis Act) which was signed into law by President Biden in March 2021. Responsibility to implement the legislation fell to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In my original blog post, I referred to a potential universe of 125 multiemployer plans that might be eligible for Special Financial Assistance (SFA). That list would eventually become 204 plans (see below).

              I’m extremely pleased to announce that 119 funds of the 204 potential recipients have received more than $71.6 billion in SFA and interest supporting the retirements of 1,555,460 plan participants. Awesome! There is still much to do, and hopefully, the sponsors of these funds will prove to be good stewards of the grant $s by conservatively investing the SFA and reserving the risk taking for the legacy assets that have time to wade through challenging markets.

              What an incredible accomplishment! So many folks would have been subject to very uncertain futures. The securing of their benefits goes a long way to allowing them to enjoy their retirement years. Unfortunately, there are too many American workers that don’t have a defined benefit plan. In many cases they have an employer sponsored defined contribution plan, but we know how challenging it can be for those participants to fund, manage, and disburse that benefit. For many others, there is no employer sponsored benefit. Their financial futures are in serious jeopardy.

              That said, what appeared to be a pipe dream once the U.S. Senate failed to take up the BLA legislation has become an amazing success story. Just think of all the economic activity that has been created through these monthly payments that certainly dwarf the $34 million/month mentioned above. Congrats to all who were instrumental in getting this legislation created and passed!

              04.23.25
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              Housing: A Major Impediment to Saving for Retirement

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              The demise of defined benefit (DB) pensions is putting great financial pressure on individuals to save for retirement through a defined contribution (DC) program. I’ve often railed about asking untrained individuals to take on the responsibility to fund, manage, and then disburse a “benefit” through a DC plan, arguing that most Americans don’t have the necessary disposable income, investment acumen, or a crystal ball to help with longevity issues.

              Many (most)Americans are financially strapped and there are many contributors to this crisis, including student loan debt, monthly childcare expenses, food, medical insurance, car/home insurance, and housing costs to name but a few. I could address each of these and the impact that they have on the average American worker, but let’s focus on housing today. The cost of buying and maintaining a residence is suffocating. Property taxes often add the equivalence of a monthly “mortgage” on top of one’s monthly mortgage, especially if you live in high tax states such as New Jersey.

              Here are some startling facts when comparing the impact of housing costs on families from the 1950s to today’s circumstances. It wasn’t unusual to have only one member of a couple (mostly the male) working outside the home in the 1950s. That ability has nearly vanished today. Why? Well for one, the average home was <$7,400 in the early ’50s and the average family income was roughly $3,300. So, for slightly more than 2Xs one’s family income you could own your roughly 1,000 square foot home.

              Today, the median home is priced at $431k according to Redfin, while the median household income is <$80k. Maryland leads that way at just over $94,000, while Mississippi trails all states at $44k. It now costs more than 5Xs one’s family income to purchase a home in the U.S. By the way, the “average” home in the ’50s would be worth about $98k in today’s $s so about 23% of what it actually costs to buy today. Oh, my! The housing market has dramatically outpaced inflation during the last 7 decades, and there doesn’t seem to be an end to the escalation despite the greater home prices and today’s interest rate environment.

              Just the housing costs alone are a great burden of the American worker. Add to this expenditure all that was mentioned above and then some, and you shouldn’t be surprised that median 401(k) balances are as anemic as they are. Let’s work together to bring back traditional DB plans so that most Americans will have a decent opportunity to retire before their 80th birthday!

              04.22.25
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              WHY?

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              Why do we have two different accounting standards in the U.S. for valuing pension liabilities?

              Why does it make sense to value liabilities at a rate (ROA) that can’t be used to defease pension liabilities in this interest rate environment?

              Why do we continue to create an asset allocation framework that only guarantees volatility and not success?

              Why do we think that the pension objective is a return objective (ROA) when it is the liabilities that need to be funded and secured?

              Why haven’t we realized that plowing tons of plan assets into an asset class/strategy will negatively impact future returns?

              Why are we willing to pay ridiculous sums of money in asset management fees with no guaranteed outcome?

              Why is liquidity to meet benefits an afterthought until it becomes a major issue?

              Why does it make sense that two plans with wildly different funded ratios have the same ROA?

              Why are plan sponsors willing to live with interest rate risk in the core bond allocations?

              Why do we think that placing <5% in any asset class is going to make a difference on the long-term success of that plan?

              Why do we think that moving small percentages of assets among a variety of strategies is meaningful?

              Why do we think that having a funded ratio of 80% is a successful outcome?

              Why are we incapable of rethinking the management of pensions with the goal to bring an element of certainty to the process, especially given how humans hate uncertainty?

              WHY, WHY, WHY?

              If you are as confused as I am with our current approach to DB pension management, try cash flow matching (CFM) a portion of your plan. With CFM you’ll get a product that SECURES the promised benefits at low cost and with prudent risk. You will have a carefully constructed liquidity bucket to meet benefits and expenses when needed – no forced selling in challenging market environments. Importantly, your investing horizon will be extended for the growth (alpha) assets that haven’t been used to defease liabilities. We know that by buying time one dramatically improves the probability of a successful outcome. Furthermore, your pension plan’s funded status will be stabilized for that portion of the assets that uses CFM. This is a dynamic asset allocation process that should respond to improvement in the plan’s funded status. Lastly, you will be happy to sit back and watch the mayhem in markets unfold knowing that you don’t have to do anything except sleep very well at night.

              04.21.25
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              Public Pension Funding Declines

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              Milliman analyzes data from the nation’s 100 largest public defined benefit plans and publishes that information through the Public Pension Funding Index (PPFI). They have recently released output from the index through March 31, 2025. The PPFI funded ratio fell in March from 81.1% as of February 28, to 79.5% as of March 31, following two rather benign months to begin 2025.

              Milliman has assigned blame for the decline in the plans’ funded ratios to the uncertainty related to trade and tariff policies as the key drivers to the negative result. The 100 public plans experienced an estimated combined monthly return of -1.6%. According to Milliman, “individual plans’ returns ranged from -3.1% to -0.1%”. The -1.6% aggregate return created Investment losses totaling $83 billion while bringing total assets for the PPFI plans to $5.2 trillion in assets as of March 31. 

              Public pension plan liabilities grew during the month (at the ROA and not a true discount rate), from $6.52 trillion at the end of February to $6.54 trillion at the end of March. The funding gap between plan assets and plan liabilities expanded to $1.34 trillion as of March 31.   

              Regrettably, five plans fell below the 90% funding mark, leaving only 25 plans above this funding threshold, while another 12 plans are less than 60% funded (UGH!). I suspect that many of the plans with funded ratios at or above 90% actually have funded ratios below that threshold when a market-based discount rate is used given that Milliman estimated the discount rate for private plans was 5.49% in their March 2025 update. A higher discount rate reduces the present value of those future promises.

              View the Milliman 100 Public Pension Funding Index.

              04.21.25
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              ARPA Update as of April 18, 2025

              By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

              For those that observe, we hope that you had a Blessed Easter or a Happy Passover.

              Regarding ARPA and the PBGC’s activity last week, we’ll refer to it as muted. There were no new applications submitted, as the eFiling portal remains temporarily closed. In fact, there haven’t been any applications submitted since April 3rd. In addition, there weren’t any applications denied (fortunately) or approved or withdrawn. Also, no multiemployer plans were seeking to be added to the waitlist. I guess that took the religious week seriously and rested, but not just on the 7th day!

              There was one piece of news. Southwest Ohio Regional Council of Carpenters Pension Plan repaid a portion of the Special Financial Assistance that they received. They repaid $5.5 million on a grant of $177 million or 3.1%. This represents the second largest refund to date, with only Retirement Plan of Local 1482 – Paint and Allied Products Manufacturers Retirement Fund returning a greater sum at 3.9% of the SFA. Fifty-three plans have now returned $209.0 million from grants totaling $47.8 billion or 0.44%. It is estimated that another 6-7 plans might have to rebate a portion of their SFA.

              U.S. interest rates continue to rise. For those plans hoping to receive SFA in the near future, defeasing those promised benefits is becoming less expensive providing for greater cost savings and longer coverage periods. We are happy to provide SFA recipients with a free analysis on how a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy can benefit your plan.