Tag Archives: Actuaries

09.12.25
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Actuaries of DB Pension Plans Prefer Higher Interest Rates

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I produced a post yesterday, titled “U.S. Rates Likely to Fall – Here’s the Good and Bad”. In that blog post I wrote, “I’d recommend that you not celebrate a potential decline in rates if you are a plan sponsor or asset consultant, unless you are personally looking for a loan.” Falling rates have historically benefited plan assets, and not just bonds, but risk assets, too. But lower rates cause the present value (PV) of liabilities to grow. A 50 bp decline in rates would cause the PV of liabilities to grow by 6% assuming a duration of 12-years. NOT GOOD!

Not being a trained actuary, although I spend a great deal of time communicating with them and working with actuarial output, I was hesitant to make that broad assessment. But subsequent research has provided me with the insights to now make that claim. Yes, unlike plan sponsors and asset consultants that are likely counting down the minutes to a rate cut next week, actuaries do indeed prefer higher interest rates.

Actuaries of DB pension plans, all else being equal, generally prefer higher interest rates when it comes to funding calculations and the plan’s financial position.

Impact of Higher Interest Rates

  • Lower Liabilities: When interest rates (used as the discount rate for future benefit payments) increase, the (PV) of the plan’s obligations may sharply decrease depending on the magnitude of the rate change, making the plan look better funded.
  • Lower Required Contributions: Higher discount rates mean lower calculated required annual contributions for plan sponsors and often lead to lower ongoing pension costs, such as PBGC costs per participant.
  • Potential for Surplus: Sustained periods of higher rates can create or increase pension plan surpluses, improving the financial health of the DB plan and providing flexibility for sponsors.

Why This Preference Exists

  • Discount Rate Role: Actuaries discount future benefit payments using an assumed interest rate tied to high-grade bond yields. The higher this rate, the less money is needed on hand today to meet future obligations.
  • Plan Health: Lower required contributions and lower projected liabilities mean sponsors are less likely to face funding shortfalls or regulatory intervention. Plans become much more sustainable and plan participants can sleep better knowing that the plan is financially healthy.
  • Plan Sponsor Perspective: While actuaries may remain neutral in advising on appropriate economic assumptions (appropriate ROA), almost all calculations and required reports look stronger with higher interest rates. What plan sponsor wouldn’t welcome that reality.

Consequences of Lower Interest Rates

  • Increase in Liabilities: Contrary to the impact of higher rates, lower rates drive up the PV of projected payments, potentially causing underfunded positions and/or the need for larger contributions.
  • Challenge for Plan Continuation: Persistently low interest rates have made DB plans less attractive or sustainable and contributed to a trend of plan terminations, freezes, or conversions to defined contribution or hybrid structures. The sustained U.S. interest rate decline, which spanned nearly four decades (1982-2021), crushed pension funding and led to the dramatic reduction in the use of traditional pension plans.

In summary, actuaries valuing DB pension plans almost always prefer higher interest rates because they result in lower reported liabilities, lower costs, and less financial pressure on employers. Given that 100% of the plan’s liabilities are impacted by movements in rates, everyone associated with DB pensions should be hoping that current interest rate levels are maintained, providing plan sponsors with the opportunity to secure the funded ratio/status through de-risking strategies. A DB pension plan is the gold standard of retirement vehicles and maintaining them is critical in combating the current retirement crisis.

09.03.25
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Ryan ALM discount rates: ASC 715 and ASC 842

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As we enter the final third of 2025 (how is that possible?), actuaries, accounting firms, and pension plan sponsors may begin reviewing their current discount rate relationship(s). If you are one of those, you may want to speak with us about the Ryan ALM discount rates. Since FAS 158 became effective December 15, 2006, Ryan ALM has created a series of discount rates in conformity to then FAS 158 (now ASC 715). Our initial and continuous client is a BIG 4 accounting firm, which hopefully testifies to the integrity of our data.

The benefits of the Ryan ALM ASC 715 Discount Rates are:

  1. Selection – we provide four yield curves: High End Select (top 10% yields), Top 1/3, Above Median (top 50%), Full Universe
  2. Transparency – we provide very detailed info for auditors to assess accuracy and acceptability of our rates
  3. Precision – precise and consistent reflection of current/changing market environment (more maturity range buckets, uses actual bond yields rather than spreads added to Treasury yield curve, no preconceived curve shape/slope bias relative to maturity/duration) than most other discount rate alternatives  
  4. Competitive Cost – our discount rates are quite competitive versus other vendors and can be purchased with a monthly, quarterly, or annual subscription
  5. Flexibility – we react monthly to market environment (downgrades, gaps at certain maturities) with flexibility in model parameters to better reflect changing environment through variable outlier exclusion rules, number of maturity range buckets, and minimum numbers of bonds in each maturity range bucket to better capture observed nuances in the shape of the curve, especially at/near the 30 year maturity point where the market is sparse or nonexistent at times.
  6. Clients – our rates are used by individual plan sponsors, several actuarial and accounting firms including, as stated above, a Big 4 accounting firm
  7. Integration into Ryan ALM products – we use ASC 715 discount rates for our Custom Liability Index and Liability Beta Portfolio™ (cash flow matching) products

Development of our discount rates is the first step in our turnkey system to defease pension liabilities through a cash flow matching (CFM) implementation. Our Custom Liability Index (CLI) and Liability Beta Portfolio (LBP) are the other two critical products in our de-risking process/capability.

In addition to ASC 715, Ryan ALM provides ASC 842 rates, which is the lease accounting standard issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). This standard supersedes ASC 840 and became effective December 15, 2018, for public companies and December 15, 2021, for private companies and nonprofit organizations. Given the widespread prevalence of off-balance sheet leasing activities, the revised lease accounting rules are intended to improve financial reporting and increase transparency and comparability across organizations. ASC 842 will provide management better insight into the true extent of their lease obligations and lead to improvements in capital allocation, budgeting and lease versus buy decisions.

The discount rate to be used is the rate implicit in each lease. This could be difficult and not readily determined. In that case ASC 842 requires the lessee to use the rate that the company borrows at based on their credit rating. Ryan ALM can provide the ASC 842 discount rates based on each lessee borrowing rate or credit rating (i.e. A or BBB). We can provide these discount rates monthly, quarterly or whatever frequency is needed.

We’d be pleased to discuss with you our discount rates or any element of this state-of-the-art capability.

08.20.25
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Hey Ryan ALM – What if…?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

We hope that you are enjoying a wonderful summer season. Thanks for taking the time to visit our blog, where we’ve now produced >1,650 mostly pension-related posts.

I wanted to share the following email exchange from earlier this week. I received an email at 6:40 pm on Monday from a senior member of the actuarial community who is familiar with our work. He said that he had a client meeting on Wednesday and he was wondering if we could model some potential outcomes should the plan decide to take some risk off the table by engaging a cash flow matching strategy (CFM).

The actuary gave us the “net” liabilities (after contributions) for the next 10-years and then asked two questions. How far out into the future would $200 million in AUM cover? If the client preferred to defease the next 10-years of net liabilities, how much would that cost? We were happy to get this inquiry because we are always willing to be a resource for members of our industry, including plan sponsors, consultants, and actuaries.

We produced two CFM portfolios, which we call the Liability Beta Portfolio™ or LBP, in response to the two questions that had been posed. In the first case, the $200 million in AUM would provide the client with coverage of $225.8 million in future value (FV) liabilities through March 31, 2031 for a total cost of $196.3 million. Trying to defease the next 10-years of liabilities would cost the plan $334.8 million in AUM to defease $430 million in net liabilities.

 $200 million in AUM10-year coverage
End Date3/31/31 7/01/35
FV$225,750,000$430,000,000
PV$196,315,548$334,807,166
YTM  4.52%  4.75%
MDur  2.73 years  4.45 years
Cost Savings $-$29,424,452-$95,192,834
Cost Savings %  13.04%   22.14%
Excess CF$230,375$679,563
RatingBBB+  A-

As we’ve mentioned on many occasions, the annual cost savings to defease liabilities averages roughly 2%/year, but as the maturity of the program lengthens that cost savings becomes greater. We believe that providing the necessary liquidity with certainty is comforting for all involved. Not only is the liquidity available when needed, but the remaining assets not engaged in the CFM program can now grow unencumbered.

If you’d like to see how a CFM program could improve your plan’s liquidity with certainty, just provide us with the forecasted contributions, benefits, and expenses, and we’ll do the rest. Oh, and by the way, we got the analysis completed and to the actuary by 12:30 pm on Tuesday in plenty of time to allow him to prepare for his Wednesday meeting. Don’t be shy. We don’t charge for this review.

02.18.25
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Terrific Issue Brief from the American Academy of Actuaries

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

An acquaintance of mine shared an issue brief that was produced by the American Academy of Actuaries last April. They Academy describe their organization and role, as follows. “The American Academy of Actuaries is a 20,000-member professional association whose mission is to serve the public and the U.S. actuarial profession. For more than 50 years, the Academy has assisted public policymakers on all levels by providing leadership, objective expertise, and actuarial advice on risk and financial security issues. The Academy also sets qualification, practice, and professionalism standards for actuaries in the United States.”

The brief addressed surplus management for public pension systems. What does it mean and what should be done when a plan is in “surplus”. It is important to understand that a surplus calculation (plan assets – plan liabilities) is a single point in time. Our capital markets (assets) and U.S. interest rates (discounting of liabilities) are constantly changing. A plan that is deemed to be in surplus today could easily fall below 100% the very next day.

The go go decade of the 1990s witnessed public pension’s producing fairly consistent double-digit returns. Instead of locking in these gains through sound surplus management, benefits were often enhanced, contributions trimmed, or both. As a result, once the decade of the ’00s hit and we suffered through two major recessions, the enhancements to the benefits which were contractually protected and the lowered contributions proved tough to reverse.

According to Milliman, they estimate the average public funded ratio at 81.2% (top 100 plans) as of November 30, 2024. This is up substantially from September 30, 2022 when the average funded ratio was roughly 69.8%. But it highlights how much work is still needed to be done. I agree that it is wise to have a surplus management plan should these critically important funds once again achieve a “surplus”. I would hope that the plan is centered on de-risking their traditional asset allocations by using more bonds in a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy to reduce the big swings in funding. Furthermore, it is critically important to secure what has already been promised than to weaken the funded status by enhancing benefits or cutting contributions prematurely.

I’d recommend to everyone involved in pension management that they spend a little time with this report. The demise of DB pension plans in the private sector has created a very uncertain retirement for many of our private sector workforce. Let’s not engage in practices that lead to the collapse of public sector DB plans.

02.04.25
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DB Pensions Are NOT Ponzi Schemes!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I recently stumbled onto an article that was highlighting the impending pension crisis (disaster) that is unfolding in Florida. The author’s primary reason for concern is the fact that there are now more beneficiaries collecting (659,333) than workers paying in (459,428). Briefly mentioned was the fact that the pension system currently has a funded ratio of 83.7% up from 82.4% last year. The fact that there are more recipients than those paying into the system is irrelevant. DB pension systems are not Ponzi Schemes, which in nothing more than a fraudulent vehicle that relies on a continuous influx of new “investors” (substitute plan participants) to pay the existing members of the pool.

A DB pension’s promises (benefit payments) are calculated by actuaries who have an incredibly challenging job of forecasting each individual’s career path (tenure), salary growth, longevity, etc. They do a great job, but they’ll be the first to tell you that they don’t get the individual participant calculations correct, but they do an amazing job of getting the total universe of payments nearly spot on. An acquaintance of mine, who happens to be an excellent actuary shared the following, “pension plans are funded over an active member’s career so that there will be sufficient funds to pay retirement benefits for life.  The funding rules in Florida require contributions to get the plan 100% funded over time.”

Granted, there are states that have not made the annual required contribution, in some cases for decades, and those plans are suffering (poorly funded) as a result. That isn’t the actuary’s issue, but they are left to try to make up the difference by forecasting the need for greater contributions and more significant returns. The payment of contributions comes with little uncertainty, while the reliance on greater investment performance comes with a huge amount of uncertainty over short time frames. I wouldn’t want my pension fund or livelihood (Executive Director, CIO, etc.) dependent on the capital markets.

I frequently hear the concern expressed about negative cash flow plans (i.e. contributions do not fully fund benefits). Why? If pension systems are truly designed based on each participant’s forecasted benefit, mature plans are bound to eventually fall into negative cash flow situations. These plans are designed to pay the last plan participant the last $1 of assets. These pension systems aren’t designed to be an inheritance for some small collection of beneficiaries who make it to the finish line. Importantly, there should be different investment strategies used for plans that are collecting more than they are paying out versus those in negative cash flow situation.

DB pensions are critically important retirement vehicles that need to be protected and preserved. Fabricating a crisis based on an incorrect observation is not helpful. If plan sponsors contribute the necessary amount each year and manage the assets prudently, these pension systems should be perpetual. Neglect the basics and all bets are off!

11.06.24
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Have You Ever Wondered?

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Ever wonder why future pension contributions aren’t part of the funded ratio calculation, yet future benefit payments are? Ironically, under GASB 67/68, which requires an Asset Exhaustion Test (AET), which is a test of a pension plan’s solvency, future contributions are an instrumental part of the equation. Why the disconnect? 

Also, the fact that future contributions, which in many cases are mandated by legislation or through negotiations, are not in the funded ratio means that the average funded ratio is likely understated. Furthermore, given the fact that the funded ratio is likely understated, the asset allocation, which should reflect the funded status, is likely too aggressive placing the plan’s assets on a more uncertain path leading to bigger swings in the funded ratio/status of the plan as the capital markets do what they do.

As part of the Ryan ALM turnkey LDI solution, we provide an AET, which often highlights the fact that the annual target return on asset assumption (ROA) is too high. A more conservative ROA would likely lead to a much more conservative asset allocation resulting in far smaller swings and volatility associated with annual contributions and the plan’s funded status. As you will soon read, contributions are an important part of the AET for public pensions. When performing the test, you need to account for future contributions from both employees and employers. These contributions, along with investment returns, help to sustain the pension plan’s assets relative to liabilities over time.

Here’s a quick summary of how contributions fit into the asset exhaustion test:

  1. Current Assets: Start with the current market value of the plan’s assets.
  2. Benefit Payments: Forecast the actuarial projections for future benefit payments
  3. Administrative Expenses: Add in the actuarial projections for administrative expenses
  4. Future Contributions: Subtract the actuarial projections for future contributions from employees and employers to get a net liability cash flow.
  5. Investment Returns: Grow the current market value of plan’s assets at the expected investment return on the plan’s assets (ROA) plus a matrix of lower ROAs to create an annual asset cash flow
  6. Year-by-Year Projection: Perform a year-by-year projection to see if the asset cash flows will fully fund the net liability cash flows. Choose the lowest ROA that will fully fund net liability cash flows as the new target ROA for asset allocation

By including contributions in the test, you get a more accurate picture of the plan’s long-term sustainability. So, I ask again, why aren’t future contributions included in the Funded Ratio calculation? Isn’t it amazing how one factor (not including those contributions) can lead to so many issues? With less volatility in funded status and contributions, DB plans would likely have many more supporters among sponsors and the general public (aka taxpayer) . It is clearly time to rethink this issue.

07.30.15
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Future Contributions Into A DB Plan Should Be Considered An Asset Of The Fund

Recently, Mary Williams Walsh, NY Times, penned an article titled,

“Standards Board Struggles With Pension Quagmire”.

The gist of the article had to do with what role did the actuaries and actuarial accounting play in the current state of public pension funding. Many of the actuaries felt that they were pressed by politicians into reverse-engineering their calculations to achieve a predetermined result (contribution cost). “That can’t be good public policy,” said Bradley D. Belt, a former pension regulator, who is now the vice chairman of Orchard Global Capital Group.

According to Ms. Walsh, “he called for additional disclosures by states and cities, including the current value of all pensions promised, calculated with a so-called risk-free discount rate, which means translating the future benefits into today’s dollars with the rate paid on very safe investments, like Treasury bonds.”

Actuaries currently use higher discount rates, which complies with their professional standards but flies in the face of modern asset-pricing theory. Changing their practice to resolve this is one of the most hotly contested proposals in the world of public finance, because it would show the current market value of public pensions and probably make it clear that some places have promised more than they can deliver.

But, if we are going to require DB plans to mark-to-market their fund’s liabilities, inflating future promised benefits, we should also include future contributions as an asset of the plan. Since many, if not most plans, have a legal obligation to fund the plan at an actuarial determined level or through negotiations, these contributions are likely to be made (NJ is one of the exceptions).

When valuing liabilities at “market” without taking into consideration future contributions, plans are artificially lowering their funded ratio, while negatively exacerbating their funded status. Most individuals (tax payers) would not understand the “accounting”, but they would certainly comprehend the negative publicity of a < 50% funded plan.

Most public pension plans derive a healthy percent of their assets through contributions.  Not reflecting these future assets in the funded ratio creates the impression that these funds are not sustainable, which for most public plans is not close to reality.

We need DB plans to be the backbone of the US retirement industry. Only marking to market liabilities without giving a nod to future contributions doesn’t fairly depict the whole story. We can do better.

06.26.15
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“The Truth Will Set You Free”

I continue to be perplexed, befuddled, mystified, and perhaps stumped by the reticence shown by plan sponsors and their consultants in wanting to know the value of the liabilities in their defined benefit plan on an on-going basis!

As a reminder, the defined benefit plan solely exists to provide a predefined benefit to past, present and future employees of the system in a cost effective manner such that contribution costs remain low and stable. Again, the plan exists to meet a liability.  It doesn’t exist to meet a return on asset assumption. Yet, plan sponsors spend 95% of their time worried about the assets in their plan and very little time on how liabilities are being impacted by market forces.

If two pension plans have widely differing fund ratios, say 100% and 60%, should they have the same asset allocation? No, they shouldn’t. They certainly shouldn’t have the same ROA objectives. Why would a plan sponsor of a well funded plan want to live with the volatility associated with an asset allocation designed to support a 60% funded plan?  Plan sponsors should adjust their asset allocation based on the plan’s funded ratio.

A more fully funded plan should have a much more conservative asset allocation than a poorly funded program. However, in order to know what the funded ratio is, one needs a more accurate and current understanding of the value of the plan’s liabilities.  Currently, the only visibility on a plan’s liabilities is through the annual actuarial report, which tends to be provided 4-6 months delinquent. For many plans, they may still only have a view on year-end 2013 liabilities. We can assure you that liability growth has swung wildly in the last 17-18 months, as interest rates fell significantly in 2014, before backing up so far this year.

In a previous blog posting we discussed 2014’s performance for the average pension plan. We highlighted the fact that the average plan slightly underperformed the average ROA, and that based on that performance most sponsors likely felt that it was an okay year.  Unfortunately, that perception would be incorrect as liability growth easily outpaced asset growth in 2014.

In addition, had sponsors taken risk off the table in 1999 when most DB plans were over-funded, they would have adjusted their asset allocations toward fixed income and away from equities. Regrettably, more risk was put into the plans when fixed income allocations were dramatically reduced for fear that the lower yielding environment would reduce a plan’s ability to meet the ROA objective.  As you know, DB plans have missed the last 15 years of a bond bull market, while subjecting those plans to greater equity risk and two major market declines.

Clearly, liabilities and assets have different growth rates. Yet, the industry continues to believe that by achieving the Holy Grail ROA annually that everything will be fine. Unfortunately, that perception is false.

Would you be comfortable playing a football game in which you only knew your score (assets), but had no clue as to what your opponent was doing (liabilities)? How would you adjust your play calling or defense? I suspect that you wouldn’t play any game in which this scenario existed. Then why as an industry are we playing the pension game by only focusing on the assets with no understanding as to how your liabilities are doing?

We can win the pension game, WE NEED TO WIN THE PENSION GAME, but in order to do so we must utilize tools that provide us with all the information that we need to manage these plans more effectively.  Having greater clarity on the liabilities doesn’t have to be a bad thing!  What are you afraid of?