Tag Archives: private-markets

03.04.26
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Here’s Another Example – Why, Oh Why?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

In October 2022, I wrote the following: “I believe that we have overcomplicated the management of DB pension plans. If the primary objective is to fund the promised benefits in a cost-efficient manner and with prudent risk, why do we continue to waste so much energy buying complicated products and strategies that often come with ridiculously high fees and little alpha?”

I still believe that our industry continues to build complicated asset allocation structures unnecessarily. In a recent P&I article, the following was reported: that a public pension system will adjust their asset allocation to reflect new targets including a 4% allocation to hedge funds and 3% to opportunistic credit, alongside increases in private equity to 13.5% from 8% and private debt to 8% from 6.5% — funded by reductions in domestic equities, international equities, and infrastructure.

This action is occurring after the investment consultant ABC recommended the changes following an asset-liability study, with the goal of enhancing protection against volatility and drawdowns while maintaining sufficient liquidity. Can you get more complicated? Are they really claiming that this structure will maintain sufficient liquidity? Sure, there may be a reduction in “volatility” because these strategies are not marked-to-market, as opposed to the public markets, but claiming that sufficient liquidity will be maintained is a joke!

I’ve been arguing for quite some time that the private markets are overbought. As assets continue to flow into these strategies, liquidity has dried up with little capital flowing back to the investor, which is why the secondary markets have flourished. Too many assets in any strategy deflate future returns, which we have witnessed. Regarding hedge funds, which are not aligned with the primary objective in managing a DB pension plan which is a relative objective (assets versus pension liabilities and NOT the ROA) they continue to be extremely expensive offerings that have produced subpar returns for the better part of the last two decades.

If the objective is to maintain sufficient liquidity look no further than cash flow matching (CFM) which will ensure that the necessary liquidity to meet benefits and expenses is available each month of the assignment as far out as the allocation goes without a need for a cash sweep of growth assets. Furthermore, one doesn’t have to pay hedge fund fees to get that “liquidity”. You can get a CFM strategy for 15 bps or less. While your liquidity needs are being met, the CFM portfolio will also extend the investing horizon for the remainder of the fund’s assets enhancing the probability that those less liquid, highly opaque offerings have time to produce the forecasted returns.

Afraid that you are going to give up “return” by using a CFM strategy? We recently completed an analysis for a large public pension system that believed they were <50% funded. We proved that we could fully fund and SECURE the NET liabilities (after contributions) of benefits and expenses (B&E) through 2059! Yes, a CFM portfolio with a YTM of 5.4% was able to fully fund the net B&E for 33-years. In addition, we were able to produce a surplus in excess of $4 billion, which can now just grow and grow and grow. In fact, investing that surplus in an S&P 500 index fund would grow those assets at a 6.5% annual return (the fund’s target ROA) to $35.3 billion by 2059. If the index produced an 8% nominal return for that period those surplus assets grow to >$75 billion that can be used to reduce future contributions, meet future liabilities, and perhaps enhance benefits.

Oh, wait, it gets even better. By investing in just the CFM strategy and the S&P 500 index fund, this plan can reduce annual investment fees from nearly $50 million per year to <$4 million, a reduction of 93%. Those fee savings add another $1.5 billion to the surplus before any return is generated on those savings. As Ripley would say, “BELIEVE IT OR NOT”!

Again, the management of a DB plan is not rocket science. Fund the annual required contributions, focus on the primary objective to SECURE the promised benefits at low cost and prudent risk, and you have a program that is neither complicated nor expensive to administer. When will we learn?

10.17.25
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Remember: NO Free Lunch!

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

In 1938, journalist Walter Morrow, Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, wrote the phrase “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch”. The pension community would be well-served by remembering what Mr. Morrow produced more than eight decades ago. Morrow’s story is a fable about a king who asks his economists to articulate their economic theory in the fewest words. The last of the king’s economists utters the famous phrase above. There have been subsequent uses of the phrase, including Milton Friedman in his 1975 essay collection, titled “There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch”, in which he used it to describe the principle of opportunity cost.

I mention this idea today in the context of private credit and its burgeoning forms. I wrote about capacity concerns in private credit and private equity last year. I continue to believe that as an industry we have a tendency to overwhelm good ideas by not understanding the natural capacity of an asset class in general and a manager’s particular capability more specifically. Every insight that a manager brings to a process has a natural capacity. Many managers, if not most, will eventually overwhelm their own ideas through asset growth. Those ideas can, and should be, measured to assess their continuing viability. It is not unusual that good insights get arbitraged away just through sheer assets being managed in the strategy.

Now, we are beginning to see some cracks in the facade of private credit. We have witnessed a significant bankruptcy in First Brands, a major U.S. auto parts manufacturer. Is this event related to having too much money in an asset class, which is now estimated at >$4 trillion.? I don’t know, but it does highlight the fact that there are more significant risks investing in private deals than through public, investment-grade bond offerings. Again, there is no free lunch. Chasing the higher yields provided by private credit and thinking that there is little risk is silly. By the way, as more money is placed into this asset class to be deployed, future returns are naturally depressed as the borrower now has many more options to help finance their business.

In addition, there is now a blurring of roles between private equity and private credit firms, which are increasingly converging into a more unified private capital ecosystem. This convergence is blurring the historic distinction between equity sponsors and debt providers, with private equity firms funding private credit vehicles. Furthermore, we see “pure” credit managers taking equity stakes in the borrowers. So much for diversification. This blurring of roles is raising concerns about valuations, interconnected exposures, and potential conflicts of interest due to a single manager holding both creditor and ownership stakes in the same issue.

As a reminder, public debt markets are providing plan sponsors with a unique opportunity to de-risk their pension fund’s asset allocation through a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy. The defeasement of pension liabilities through the careful matching of bond cash flows of principal and interest SECURES the promised benefits while extending the investing horizon for the non-bond assets. There is little risk in this process outside of a highly unlikely IG default (2/1,000 bonds per S&P). There is no convergence of strategies, no blurring of responsibilities, no concern about valuations, capacity, etc. CFM remains one of the only, if not the only, strategies that provides an element of certainty in pension management. It isn’t a free lunch (we charge 15 bps for our services to the first breakpoint), but it is as close as one will get!