Tag Archives: stock-market

03.06.25
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Markets Hate Uncertainty

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

I’ve published many posts on the impact of uncertainty on the well-being of individuals and our capital markets. In neither case are the outcomes positive.

What we are witnessing in the last several trading days is the direct result of policy flip-flopping that is creating abundant uncertainty. As a result, the business environment is deteriorating. One can argue the merits of tariffs, but it is the flip-flopping of these policy decisions that is wreaking havoc. How can a business react to these policies when they change daily, if not hourly.

The impact so far has been to create an environment in which both investment and employment have suffered. Economic uncertainty is currently at record levels only witness during the pandemic. Rarely have we witnessed an environment in which capital expenditures are falling while prices are increasing, but that is exactly what we have today. Regrettably, we are now witnessing expectations for rising input prices, which track consumer goods inflation. It has been more than four decades since we were impacted by stagflation, but we are on the cusp of a repeat last seen in the ’70s. How comfortable are you?

We just got a glimpse of how bad things might become for our economy when the Atlanta Fed published a series of updates driving GDP growth expectations down from a high of +3.9% earlier in the quarter to the current -2.4% published today. The key drivers of this recalibration were trade and consumer spending. The uncertainty isn’t just impacting the economy. As mentioned above, our capital markets don’t like uncertainty either.

I had the opportunity to speak on a panel last week at Opal/LATEC discussing Risk On or Risk Off. At that point I concluded that little had been done to reduce risk within public pension plans, as traditional asset allocation frameworks had not been adjusted in any meaningful way. It isn’t too late to start the process today. Action should be taken to reconfigure the plan’s asset allocation into two buckets – liquidity and growth. The liquidity bucket will provide the necessary cash flow in the near future, while buying time for the growth assets to wade through these troubled waters. Doing nothing subjects the entire asset base to the whims of the markets, and we know how that can turn out.

10.28.24
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3% Return for the Decade? It Isn’t Far-fetched!

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

This blog is a follow up to a post that I published last week. In that post I cited a recent analysis by Goldman Sach’s forecasting a 3% 10-year return. I concluded the blog with the following: “I wouldn’t worry about the 5% fixed income yield-to-worst (YTW) securing my pension liabilities. Instead, I’d worry about all the “growth” assets not used to secure the promises, as they will likely be struggling to even match the YTW on a CFM corporate bond portfolio.”

How likely is it that Goldman and other financial institutions are “right” in forecasting such a meager return for the next decade? I’m sure that plan sponsors and their advisors are pondering the same question. Well, here is more insight into how one forecasts long-term equity returns (not necessarily Goldman’s forecasting technique) and how one might arrive at such a low equity return (S&P 500 as the proxy) that, if realized, would likely crush pension funding.

Inputs necessary to forecast the future return for the S&P 500 are the current S&P EPS ($255), future expected EPS growth (5.5%) and an assumed P/E multiple in 10 years. Finally, add in the dividend yield (1.3%) and you have your expected annualized return.

Charles DuBois, my former Invesco research colleague, provided me with his thoughts on the following inputs. He believes that nominal earnings growth will be roughly 5.5% during the next decade, reflecting 4% nominal GDP growth coupled with a small boost from increasing federal deficits as a share of GDP and a boost for net share buybacks (1.5% in total). 

Right now, earnings per share for the S&P 500 are forecasted to be about $255 in 2024. If earnings grow by the 5.5%/per annum described above, in 10 years earnings for the S&P 500 will be $428 per share.

The S&P is currently trading at 5,834, which is 22.9X (high by any measure) the current EPS. Let’s assume a more normal, but still historically high, multiple of 18X in 10 years. That gets you to an S&P 500 level of 7,704 or a 2.8% annual rate of gain over the next 10 years.  Add in a 1.3% dividend yield gets you to 4.1%. Not Goldman’s 3%, but close. It is still much lower than the long-term average for the market or the average ROA for most public and multiemployer pension plans.

If one were to assume a 15X P/E multiple in 10 years, the return to the S&P 500 is 0.64%/annum and the “total” return is slightly less than 2.0%. UGLY! Obviously, the end of the 10-year period multiple is the key to the return calculation. But all in all, the low returns that most investment firms (including Goldman) are forecasting seem to be in the right neighborhood given these expectations.

Given the potential challenges for Pension America to achieve the desired return (ROA objective) outcome, a cash flow matching (CFM) strategy will help a pension plan bridge this potentially difficult period. Importantly, by having the necessary liquidity to meet monthly benefits and expenses, assets won’t have to be sold to meet those obligations thus eliminating the potential to lock in losses. Lastly, the roughly 5% yield-to-worse (YTW) on the CFM portfolio looks to be superior to future equity returns – a win/win!

It just might be time to rethink your plan’s asset allocation. Don’t place all of your assets into one return bucket. Explore the many benefits of dividing pension assets into liquidity and growth buckets. Want more info? Ryan ALM, Inc. has a ton of research on this idea. Please go to RyanALM.com/research.

05.09.24
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Kinda Silly Question

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

If you ask the average person the following questions, I suspect that most people would answer in the affirmative.

Are you handsome?

Are you intelligent?

Are you honest?

So, I found it somewhat humorous when I saw the headline from a recent conference that said, “Private Credit managers say their is more room for growth”. Are you surprised? How many investment management organizations turn down new business when it presents itself? Does it really matter that private debt has seen something like 10X asset growth in the last couple of decades? Perhaps these managers have such a unique niche that they honestly believe that their product can manage through any challenge, especially one as “trivial” as natural capacity. How many times have you heard the following: “Our maximum capacity that we previously cited was just a target amount. Now that we actually have assets under management, it is clearer that we have much more capacity than initially anticipated.” Seems convenient, doesn’t it?

I can recall a few difficult conversations with both sales and senior management when I was leading an investment team at a previous shop. Our research and portfolio management teams did an outstanding job of determining the appropriate capacity for each strategy, and we had 50+ optimizations that each represented a strategy/product. We were particularly cognizant of the capacity associated with our market neutral product, which was roughly $3 billion in AUM. We had to be most careful with shorting stocks given the borrowing rates being charged by our prime brokers. The size of trades were always a concern. Yet, it really didn’t matter to outside parties that just wanted to see assets flow into our products. It didn’t matter whether or not we would be able to generate the return/risk characteristics as previously defined by our investment team.

These awkward conversations occur all too frequently, especially for investment companies that are public and have quarterly earnings expectations that must be met. I’ve never understood how the investment management industry can claim to be “long-term” investors yet be driven by quarter-to-quarter earnings announcements that impact the investment teams when layoffs are announced. Has our industry just morphed into a number of large sales organizations? Do we have “investment” firms focused on generating appropriate return and risk characteristics? Do these firms truly understand the capacity based on trading metrics?

I don’t work for a company that participates in the Private Credit arena. I couldn’t tell you whether or not there remains adequate capacity to enable managers in that space to generate decent return and risk characteristics. But asking managers in that space whether or not they can take on more assets and generate more fees is kinda silly. I hope that the asset consulting community has the tools to evaluate capacity for not only this asset class, but any other being considered for use in a DB pension. Given that most “active” managers have failed over time to generate a return in excess of their respective benchmark, I would hazard a guess that the natural capacity for their strategy has been eclipsed. These excess assets lead to ever increasing trading costs of market impact and time delays (not commissions). Couple those costs with the fees that active managers charge and you create a hurdle that is difficult to overcome.