By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

As most folks were focused on the massive snowstorm that crippled a large swath of the U.S., BlackRock was disclosing another significant loss in one of their private debt funds. In this case, BlackRock TCP Capital, a publicly traded middle-market lending fund, expects to mark down the net value of its assets 19 per cent after a string of troubled loans weighed on results, marking the latest sign of pressure in the private credit market.

BlackRock’s vehicle is a business development company (BDC), which pools together private credit loans and trades like a stock. According to multiple reports, the fund has struggled in part because of its exposure to e-commerce aggregators which are companies that buy and manage Amazon sellers. Furthermore, BDC shares have been hit over the past year. There are currently 156 active BDCs, of which 50 are publicly traded. BDC Investors have concerned over private credit returns, underwriting standards and increased regulatory scrutiny. FINALLY!

Of course, this is not an isolated incident for either private credit/debt in general or specifically BlackRock. As you may recall, BlackRock was forced to reprice a private debt holding from par to zero last November, when Renovo Home Partners, a Dallas-based home-remodeling roll‑up that collapsed into Chapter 7 bankruptcy, triggering a roughly $150 million total loss on a private loan largely held by BlackRock.

Funds managed by BlackRock (notably its TCP Capital Corp. BDC) provided the majority of roughly $150 million in private credit to Renovo, while Apollo’s MidCap Financial and Oaktree held smaller slices. As of late September 2025, lenders were still marking this loan at 100 cents on the dollar, implying expectations of full repayment. This shouldn’t have come as a complete surprise because earlier in 2025, lenders had already agreed to a partial write‑off and debt‑to‑equity swap, trying to stabilize Renovo’s capital structure.​

This unfortunate outcome highlights how “mark‑to‑model” valuations in private credit can keep loans at par until very late, then reprice suddenly when a borrower fails. This practice suggest that headline yields in private credit may understate true default and loss severity risk, especially for highly leveraged sponsor‑backed roll‑ups. Yet, it doesn’t seem to have rattled either the market or institutional asset owners who continue to plow significant assets into this opaque and potentially saturated market. It continues to amaze me the number of “searches” being conducted for private credit/debt. Asset classes can get overwhelmed driving down future returns. Do you know what the natural capacity is for this asset class and the manager(s) that you are hiring? Caveat emptor!