Tag Archives: Public Funds

09.09.25
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A Peer Group?

By: Russ Kamp, CEO, Ryan ALM, Inc.

Got an email today that got my heart rate up a little. The gist of the article was related to a particular public pension fund that eclipsed its “benchmark” return for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025. Good job! However, the article went on to state that they failed to match or exceed the median return of 10.2% for the 108 public pension funds with asset >$1 billion. What a silly concept.

Just as there are no two snowflakes alike, there are no two public pension systems that are the same, even within the same state or city. Each entity has a different set of characteristics including its labor force, plan design, risk tolerance, benefit structure, ability to contribute, and much more. The idea that any plan should be compared to another is not right. Again, it is just silly!

As we’ve discussed hundreds of times, the only thing that should matter for any DB pension plan is that plan’s specific liabilities. The fund has made a promise, and it is that promise that should be the “benchmark” not some made up return on asset (ROA) assumption. How did this fund do versus their liabilities? Well, that relationship was not disclosed – what a shocker!

Interestingly, the ROA wasn’t highlighted either. What was mentioned was the fact that the plan’s returns for 3-, 5-, and 10-years were only 6.2%, 6.6%, and 5.4%, respectively (these are net #s), and conveniently, they just happened to beat their policy benchmark in each period.

I’d be interested to know how the funded ratio/status changed? Did contribution expenses rise or fall? Did they secure any of the promised benefits? Did they have to create another tier for new entrants? Were current participants asked to contribute more, work longer, and perhaps get less?

I am a huge supporter of defined benefit plans provided they are managed appropriately. That starts with knowing the true pension objective and then managing to that goal. Nearly all reporting on public pension plans focuses on returns, returns, returns. When not focusing on returns the reporting will highlight asset allocation shifts. The management of a DB pension plan with a focus on returns only guarantees volatility and not success. I suspect that the 3-, 5-, and 10-year return above failed to meet the expected ROA. As a result, contributions likely escalated. Oh, and this fund uses leverage (???) that gives them a 125% notional exposure on their total assets. I hope that leverage can be removed quickly and in time for the next correction.

07.26.24
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Sometimes You Just Have To Shake Your Head

By: Russ Kamp, Managing Director, Ryan ALM, Inc.

CIO Magazine recently published an article chronicling the trials and tribulations of the Dallas Police and Fire and Dallas Employees pension systems. This is not the first time that these systems have been highlighted given the current funded status of both entities, especially the F&P plan currently funded at 39%. The article was based on a “commissioned” study by investment adviser Commerce Street Investment Management, that compiled and in June presented its report to the city’s ad hoc committee on pensions. According to the CIO Magazine article, they were “tasked with assessing the pension funds’ structure and portfolio allocation; reviewing the portfolios’ performance and rate of return; and evaluating the effectiveness of the pension funds’ asset allocation strategy.” That’s quite the task. What did they find?

Well, for one thing, they were comparing the asset allocation strategies of these two plans with similarly sized Texas public fund plans, including three Houston-based systems: the Houston Firefighters’ Relief and Retirement Fund, the Houston Police Officers’ Pension System, and the Houston Municipal Employees Pension System. The practice of identifying “peers” is a very silly concept given that each system’s characteristics, especially the pension liabilities, are as unique as snowflakes. The Dallas plans should have been viewed through a very different lens, one that looked at the current assets relative to the plan’s liabilities.

Unfortunately, they didn’t engage in a review of assets vs. liabilities, but they did perform an asset allocation review that indicated that the two Dallas plans did not have enough private equity which contributed to the significant underfunding. Really? Commerce Street highlighted the fact that “Houston MEPS’ private equity allocation is 28.2%, and the average private equity allocation among the peer group is 21.3%, compared with the DPFP and Dallas ERF’s allocations of 12.2% and 10.5%, respectively.” How has private equity performed during the measurement period? According to the report, Dallas P&F’s plan performed woefully during the 5-years, producing only a 4.8% return, which paled in comparison to peers. Was it really a bad thing that Dallas didn’t have more PE based on the returns that its program produced?

Why would the recommendation be to increase PE when it comes with higher fees, less liquidity, little transparency, and the potential for significant crowding out due to excess migration of assets into the asset class? During the same time that Dallas P&F was producing a 4.8% 5-year PE return, US public equities, as measured by the S&P 500, was producing a 15.7% (ending 12/31/23) or 15.1% 5-year return ending 3/31/24. It seems to me that having less in PE might have been the way to go.

The Commerce report recommended that “to improve the pension funds’ returns and funded ratios, the city should: analyze what top performing peers have done; collaborate to find new investment strategies; improve governance policies and procedures; and provide recommendations for raising the funds’ investment performance.” Well, there you have it. How about returning to pension basics? Dallas is going to have to contribute significantly more in order to close the funding gap. They are not going to be able to create an asset allocation that will dramatically outperform the ROA target. Remember: if a plan is only 50% funded, achieving the ROA will result in the funded status deteriorating even more. They need to beat the ROA target by 100% in order to JUST maintain the deficit.

I’ve railed about pension systems needing to get off the asset allocation rollercoaster to ruin. This recommendation places the Dallas systems on a much more precarious path. So much for bringing some certainty to the management of pension plans. No one wins with this strategy. Not the participant, sponsor, or the taxpayers.

05.20.15
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Double DB® – Answers To Your Questions

Earlier this week we shared with you the virtues of Double DB® and encouraged you to reach out with any questions.  I am very pleased with the response that we’ve gotten.

As a reminder, a group of us have confronted two important pension issues: pension cost volatility and resultant perilous pension indebtedness due to prior underfunding (see Illinois, NJ, and a host of other plans).

We have developed an over-arching, patent pending answer to all of it – Double DB®, which;
(1) Provides pensions, not “employee accessible” cash.
(2) Is “percentage of payroll” financed.
(3) Easily “manages” debt from past underfunding.

Here are some of your questions.

Q: How do you manage debt from past underfunding of a traditional DB plan?

Have the plan actuary determine the percentage of payroll expected to finance the plan debt in 30 years based on the actuary’s estimate of the rate of growth in the underlying payroll and the estimate of the rate of growth of the debt. Plan to allocate this percentage of payroll to debt financing every year. If it turns out that more or less than 30 years is required, simply accept the longer or shorter term or adjust the allocated percentage of payroll along the way.

Q: How do you fund and manage Double DB®?

Have the actuary determine the percentage of payroll needed to finance future service benefits of the plan. Plan to pay this percentage of payroll in every future year. In the first year, plan to place one half into a trust fund identified as DB1 and the other half into a trust fund identified as DB2. In the second and each future year, place the then actuarial cost of half of the future service benefit cost into DB1 and the remainder into DB2. Accordingly, one half of the future costs of the plan will always be financed on an actuarially sound basis within DB1, while DB2 will have assets reflecting the extent that experience is more favorable or less favorable than expected at the outset.

Q: What benefit can the employee expect to receive?

In each year of retirement a pensioner will receive one half the scheduled plan benefit from DB1 and an experience modified variation of the scheduled plan benefit from DB2. If an entering plan participant would prefer to have a level benefit rather than the two-part benefit as described, he/she may elect an option to receive, say, 90% of DB1 benefits from DB2 and thereby receiving 95% of the benefit value to which he/she is entitled in retirement. Accordingly, the DB2 component of the plan will be provided a 10% “fee” for taking the risk of paying a larger benefit than the benefit to which the pensioner was entitled over the years of retirement. The 90% component can be more than 90% if the actuary for the plan is satisfied that a higher percentage is justified based on his/her appraisal of the risk.

We thank you for your continued interest.  Please don’t hesitate to bring additional questions to our attention.