Another Unintended Consequence?

Today, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down pension reform law as unconstitutional.  The December 2013 law was designed to lift retirement age, cap pensionable salaries, and reduce cost-of-living increases.  On the surface this will be viewed as a victory for the DB participants, but is it truly?  The law’s intent was to help municipalities manage more appropriately contributions into the system.  Through this appeal process “victory”, I fear that Illinois public systems will come under greater scrutiny, likely leading to more pressure to freeze or terminate DB plans for both existing and future employees.  Instead of helping to secure a longer life for DB plans, which we feel is an absolute necessity, this court action may be the death knell.

Any movement to reduce participation in DB plans, while forcing future employees into DC-like programs, will further exacerbate a retirement crisis that is quickly unfolding in the US. We’ve discussed at great length the pitfalls of an employee-lead retirement program, so we won’t cover that here, but would encourage you to go to the KCS website at http://www.kampconsultingsolutions.com to view the many articles in our Fireside Chat series.

Lastly, if a DB system is not likely to be sustained, we would encourage both plan sponsors and board trustees to explore the benefits of alternative DB-like structures (hybrids), including Double DB, a fixed-cost retirement plan design, before migrating your employees to a DC plan.  Asking an untrained employee to manage a very difficult assignment is just not fair, and the financial outcome will likely fall far short from what the participant would have experienced if they’d remained in a DB plan with a monthly annuity feature.

KCS’s First Quarter 2015 Update

We are pleased to provide you with the KCS First Quarter  2015 Update.

Click to access KCS1Q15.pdf

We live in very interesting times for the global markets, as witnessed during the first quarter’s action. The fall in global interest rates continues to challenge most market observers’ expectations, especially with regard to US rates. The growth in pension liabilities continues to outpace asset growth, putting additional pressure on the funded status of most DB plans.  Just meeting the ROA expectation isn’t enough these days if your plan is in an underfunded state.  Asset growth needs to be focused on eclipsing liability growth by a healthy margin. If not, don’t be surprised to see the plan’s UAAL growing substantially.

But, the decline in long-term interest rates isn’t solely a pension issue, as low rates continue to make it very challenging for retirees to create a monthly income stream without eating into their balances or forcing individuals to assume much more risk.

We are prepared to help you with both your assets and liabilities.

Thank you for your continuing support of KCS.

Sincerely,

Dave, Ivory, Jock, Larry, Lillian, Penn and Russ

KCS Fireside Chat, April 2015 – Pension Plan Liabilities – See Me, Feel Me, Touch Me

We are pleased to provide you with the latest edition of the KCS Fireside Chat series.

Click to access KCSFCApr15.pdf

In this article we touch on a couple of recent experiences / conversations that we’ve had.  As always, we hope that the sharing our our views / insights lead you to think about issues in a different light.  Enjoy, and happy holidays.

Is Now the Time to Move to Active From Passive in U. S. Equities?

I had the opportunity this past Monday to attend the Opal Financial Group’s “Investment Consultants Forum”.  There were many interesting topics covered during the day, including my session on “Asset Allocation Strategies in a Volatile Market”. However, there seemed to be outsized interest in the active versus passive discussion, especially as it related to U. S. equities.

I listened intently to the discussion, as I’ve been a student of the markets, products, cycles, etc, for much of my 33 years in the business.  I was disappointed by the responses that I heard, especially from one consultant who “favored” active because their firm can pick superior “alpha generating” managers on a consistent basis.

I did not hear one consultant address the real issues related to why active and passive approaches both make sense depending on the environment, and how active managers are influenced by their own portfolio construction biases.

Most active managers (there are always exceptions) have a value tilt to their stock selection criteria / factors, tend to build equal weighted portfolios, which creates a small cap bias vis a vis the large cap indices, and they maintain some residual cash, even if they aren’t making an asset allocation call.  Given these portfolio construction biases, it is fairly easy to understand that active managers aren’t going to perform well in strong up markets, favoring mega cap firms, which is where we’ve been!  The passive index benefits from being fully invested, and the large cap bias (market weighting) is further fueled by the momentum (non-value indicators) driving the these large cap stocks and the markets.

As you can imagine, these trends are further exacerbated by strong positive cash flows into the recently better performing segments of the market, whether that be retail or institutional money, as neither group exhibits an ability to be a Contrarian.

Given the portfolio construction biases that exist, what is likely to happen in the passive / active relationship in the next 1-2 years? We believe that it is time to reduce one’s exposure to passive strategies (not eliminate), as we see small and mid cap stocks leading the US markets in the near-term.  Why? First, the strengthening US $ will negatively impact the earnings and profits of US mega cap companies that derive a meaningful percentage of their revenue from overseas activity.  Second, large cap stocks (S&P 500 as proxy), fueled in part by the aggressive move into passive approaches, have beaten small cap stocks (R2000 as proxy) by 9+% in the last 12 months, and have performed in line for the last 10 years, despite small cap stocks supposedly being more risky and less liquid (where’s the compensation?).

We would suggest that you move your large cap allocation to the bottom of your target range, while increasing small to mid cap to an overweight exposure.  Furthermore, if you have a target allocation for both active and passive exposures that you shift more assets into active US equity approaches at this time.  After 6 years of US equity strength, large cap dominance, a strengthening $, and a slight style outperformance by growth versus value, we think that the time is right for active managers to begin to add value, while benefiting from the biases that they create in their portfolios.

Are Liabilities Tangible? See Me, Feel Me, Touch Me!

KCS was recently invited to participate in a finals presentation for a small public defined benefit plan.  We were one of six consulting firms to present that evening, and fortunately, the last firm to present on what turned out to be a very late evening.

As I predicted, each of the firms that preceded us talked about how they would go about achieving the prospect’s 7.5% return on asset assumption (ROA) through “superior” asset allocation strategies and manager selection.  I attempted to throw cold water on their claims by stating that hitting the ROA was basically irrelevant, especially given the poor funding status of this plan, and that the only true benchmark / objective for a plan sponsor’s DB plan should be their plan’s liabilities.

According to Trust Universe Comparison Service (TUCS), the average public pension had a 6.8% return in 2014.  This result fell slightly below most public pension return objective, but it wasn’t devastating on the surface, especially if one only focused on the asset side of the pension ledger.  However, and in fact, 2014 was a bad year for Pension America, as a further decline in US interest rates exacerbated liability growth by more than twice asset growth.

In attempting to differentiate ourselves from the competition we stressed the need for plan sponsors to get an update on their liabilities more often that once every year or two, delayed 6 months, until they received their actuarial reports.  It is our claim that asset allocation should be driven by the plan’s liabilities, funded ratio and contribution policies, and not the assets.

As one would expect, our claims were met with skepticism, since each of the firms that went before only spoke about assets and the ROA. We were told that asset consultants focus on the asset side because they are “tangible” and liabilities are not.  REALLY? What is more tangible than a promise that has been made to a plan participant? Like assets, liabilities can be priced daily. They are bond-like in nature and are impacted by changes in the interest rate environment and benefit formula adjustments. The present value of future DB plan liabilities have grown substantially during the last 15 years, as US interest rates have plummeted.

What did plan sponsors do? They exacerbated the situation by creating a huge mismatch between their plan’s assets and liabilities by reducing exposure to traditional US fixed income. Why? The yield on US bonds declined to less than the ROA, and  they argued (as did their consultants) that fixed income would become a drag on the portfolio’s return.  Focusing on assets, and not liabilities, has had a devastating impact on the funded status of America’s DB plans (particularly multi-employer and public pensions).

As if that wasn’t enough, yesterday I spoke at the Opal Financial Groups “Investment Consultants Forum”.  Notice that it wasn’t titled the “Investment and Liability Consultant Forum”. I spoke on asset allocation strategies with two others. Neither of my fellow panelists spoke about needing to understand the objective, and they certainly didn’t address a plan’s liabilities.  In fact, one gentleman from a leading asset consulting firm talked about his firm using a model portfolio. Given that every client’s liabilities are different, how can there be such a thing as a model portfolio for a DB plan?  This business never ceases to amaze me!

Pension America is in crisis due to the demise in the use DB plans.  It will only get worse if we continue to support the notion that only the asset side of the pension equation is relevant.  We better embrace a new approach before it is too late, as the same old, same old isn’t working and it won’t start now.  There is nothing more tangible than a promise made. Not having the financial resources to meet that promise would be devastating for the participant.

KCS’s March 2015 Fireside CHat – Don’t Hate The Restate!

We are pleased to share with you the latest edition of the KCS Fireside Chat series.  The March 2015 article focuses attention on the need for plan sponsors of qualified retirement plans to restate or rewrite their plan to conform to current law.  The IRS is responsible for overseeing this process.  We hope that you find our partner, Dave Murray’s insights helpful.  The link follows:

Click to access KCSFCMar15.pdf

Show Me The Money – The Fallacy of the Funded Ratio!

We’ve often spoken about the fallacy of the return on asset assumption (ROA), as not being the appropriate objective for a pension plan, but we’ve never introduced the idea that the funded ratio is not a good indicator of a plan’s financial health until today.  We think that a plan can hide behind the funded ratio, which can mask the true economics of that plan. How is that possible? Let us given you an example. But, first some facts.

  • During the last 5 years (ending 12/31/14) the average public pension plan (TUCS universe) has generated a 9.95% annualized return, which would be considered very good relative to most plan’s stated ROA (8%).
  • Also, during the last 5 years, liabilities (according to Ryan ALM) have grown by 10.14% annualized.
  • Given the fact that asset growth easily eclipsed the ROA, and kept pace with liabilities, one would think that the funded ratio would remain fairly stable, and you’d be right.  So what is the issue?

Let’s look at pension math. Let’s assume that your plan has $375 million in assets as of December 31, 2009, and a funded ratio of 75% (S&P stated that the average plan was 72% funded at that time). That would suggest that your liabilities amounted to $500 million.  If you grow assets by the 9.95% and liabilities by the 10.14%, your funded ratio only falls from 75% to 74.4%.

On the surface, everything seems to be stable, if not improving.  However, the funding gap in terms of the plan’s unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) has ballooned. In our example, assets grew to $602.6 million, while liabilities increased to $810.4 million. The UAAL went from $125 million, as of 2009, to $207.8 million in just five years, increasing by a whopping 65.8%.

So, do you still think that the ROA, which was easily eclipsed, and the funded ratio, relatively stable at roughly 74 -75%, are the key pension metrics? Managing a pension plan shouldn’t be about return, but about providing a stated benefit at the lowest cost possible. How many budgets can afford the volatility witnessed in our example? We suspect that few can! This is why a plan’s liabilities need to be at the forefront of asset allocation and manager structure decisions, and not a bit player, as they are today.

The POB – It’s Back! But, Is It A Wise Move?

The comeback of Pension Obligation Bonds (POB) shouldn’t surprise anyone. State and local governments are desperate for ways to address projected public pension deficits of >$4 trillion when liabilities are marked to market.

In one of the more recent examples, trustees of the Kentucky Teachers Retirement System, a DB pension plan funded at barely 50%, and with nearly $14 billion in unfunded liabilities, moved forward with a proposal to issue a $3.3 billion POB, passing the bill to the state Senate, where it is expected to be reviewed next week. With passage of the legislation, the $3.3 billion infusion into the plan would immediately bump the teachers’ funding level to 63 percent, according to KTRS trustees.

In Kansas, meanwhile, Gov. Sam Brownback is proposing Kansas sell $1.5 billion in POBs to help close the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System’s $9 billion funding gap.  We understand how tempting it is to issue bonds at these low interest rates to close huge funding gaps in these public pension plans, but does it make sense in this environment, especially after six years of an equity bull market?

In July, 2013 the KCS team published a Fireside Chat on the subject of POBs.  Here is a link to the original article http://www.kampconsultingsolutions.com/images/kcsjul13fc.pdf

We weren’t thrilled with the idea of POBs at that time, and given how markets have continued to rally, we are less supportive at this time.  Please don’t hesitate to reach out to us with any thoughts related to this subject.

The Pension World’s Example of an Oxymoron

Oxymoron – “A rhetorical figure in which incongruous or contradictory terms are combined, as in a deafening silence and a mournful optimist.” (Yahoo dictionary search)

Well, we need go no further than most public DB plan’s actuarial reports to find a “perfect” example of an oxymoron – the “Schedule of Funding PROGRESS”! This schedule is truly a treasure chest of information, but to describe what has transpired in nearly all public plans during the last 10-15 years as “progress” would be an outrageous exaggeration.  Let’s take a look at the following information that I was able to grab from the web on a public pension plan, whose identity will remain anonymous.

As of year-end 1999, this plan had an actuarial value of assets in excess of $450 million and an actuarial accrued liability of $611 million, giving the plan an unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) of $161 million and a funded ratio of 73.7%.  The payroll supporting this plan was $178 million, so that the UAAL was 90.4% of payroll.  Let’s fast forward 13 years from 1999’s conclusion to December 31, 2012.  Unfortunately, the data that I am about to share with you doesn’t paint a happy picture.  The actuarial value of assets has grown nicely, net of contributions / benefit payments, and now stand at $667 million, but the actuarial accrued liability has jumped to $1.3 billion, for a UAAL of $653 million, representing an increase in excess of 400%!  Furthermore, the funded ratio has plummeted from 73.7% to 50.5%, and that isn’t on a mark to market basis. Lastly, the UAAL now represents more than 270% of payroll.

How did this happen?  The common practice in public DB plans is to focus on the return on asset assumption (ROA), as the plan’s primary objective, and not the plan’s specific liabilities. When attributing blame for the poor funding of public DB plans, most sponsors and their consultants regularly mention as the culprit the bear markets of 2001-2003 and 2007 – 2009.  In reality, it has been the massive decline in US interest rates that have exacerbated Pension America’s funding woes.

As the data above highlights, DB plans on average were much better funded in the late ’90s, with many plans being significantly over-funded. Had they adopted their plan’s liabilities as the primary objective and not the ROA, it is safe to say that these plan’s would not have significantly reduced their exposure to traditional fixed income, which only served to exaggerate the asset / liability mismatch, and lead them to seek more risky assets, including alternatives.

As 2014 will further highlight, liability growth continued to far outpace asset growth deepening DB Plan funding issues.  The benefits received from traditional retirement programs are too valuable to lose.  The communities in which these beneficiaries live derive great economic stimulus from the monthly annuity that is received.  We need, and can, do a better job.

For one thing, plan sponsors need to get a better handle on their plan’s liabilities.  Receiving an actuarial report every one to two years, delayed six months will not accomplish that objective.  Plan sponsors need to drive asset allocation decisions based on the plan’s liabilities and expected contributions, and not on some ROA, that is more of a Goldilocks number (it just “feels” right) than fact.  We believe that every plan should have a custom liability index (CLI) created using their specific liabilities.  It is only with a CLI that asset allocation can be responsive to changes in the plan’s funded ratio.  Let’s talk before contribution costs get so out of control that your DB plan becomes the next victim of the rush to DC alternatives.

NJ’s Singular Focus on the ROA is Misdirected

On Sunday, February 1, 2015, The Record (Northern, NJ daily) reported that NJ’s pension fund beat market expectations in 2014 with a 7.3% return. However, it was also highlighted that the return fell short of the 7.9% return on asset assumption (ROA) that NJ has established as their annual asset objective. Worse, and not mentioned, is the fact that liability growth (estimated at >20%) far outpaced asset growth in 2014, as long-term interest rates continued to plummet. Even if NJ’s pension plan had achieved the desired 7.9% ROA, the plan’s liabilities grew substantially larger, further exacerbating the plan’s underfunding.

It is truly unfortunate that plan sponsors of defined benefit plans continue to focus exclusively on the asset side of the equation, neglecting liabilities, which at the end of the day are the only reason that these plans exist. Understanding a plan’s liabilities will help with asset allocation decisions, and should lead to more stable funded ratios and contribution costs, which is imperative as the annual contributions become a larger percentage of NJ’s budget.

I am not opposed to the state sponsoring a traditional defined benefit plan. On the contrary, DB plans need to remain the backbone of the US retirement industry, as defined contribution plans (401(k)-type) have proven to be inadequate retirement vehicles for most of our private sector employees today. Why? According to a recently released household survey conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as of 2013, approximately 31 percent of Americans reported having zero retirement savings. Worse, the median retirement savings for those 55-64 years old is only $14,500. How do we expect that astonishingly low account balance to support anyone’s retirement, especially as we are on average living longer?

Public fund plan sponsors need to take a different approach to managing these plans. It is truly regrettable that the pursuit of the ROA, as if it were the Holy Grail, has lead NJ and other public entities to abandon traditional equity and fixed income investments in lieu of alternative investments, such as hedge funds, that have failed to generate commensurate returns. In fact, a simple (unrealistic) 60% US equity allocation (Russell 3000) / 40% US bond allocation (Barclays Aggregate index) would have produced a 10% return in 2014, far outpacing the 7.3% result highlighted in the article, and at substantially reduced fees.

Lastly, it was stated that NJ’s pension system was underfunded by roughly $37 billion, as of June 30, 2014. However, according to an analysis by Moody’s, New Jersey’s unfunded pension liabilities doubled to an astonishing $83 billion at the end of June. New more realistic accounting guidelines required by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) require New Jersey, and other states, to use smaller discount rates (not the ROA) to determine the true liability. The Moody’s report — New Jersey Reports Surge in Unfunded Liabilities Under New Pension Accounting Rule — indicates New Jersey has limited time to fix its poorly funded public pensions.